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Introduction
This dissertation investigates the eﬀects of a potential increase of production and com-
mercialization of dairy products in Senegal, due to the emergence of intermediaries in
this sector. In this country, as in most African countries, milk production takes place in
an extensive pastoral or agro-pastoral system, where cattle are raised on pasture. It con-
cerns a large part of the population, especially in rural areas: 48.12% of the Senegalese
households (73.48% in rural areas) own cattle (ESPS, 2005). In general, households in-
volved in agriculture, livestock and forest employments face poverty: 63.28% of them are
considered as poor, compared to 37.82% in other employments (ESPS, 2005). In that
sense, the development of the dairy sector has the potential to reduce poverty.
Although milk consumption in Africa is still low compared to the rest of the world,
dairy products make now part of the consumption habits of most African households.
In Senegal, the quantity consumed has quadrupled during the period 1961-1993. Nev-
ertheless, despite this increased demand, the domestic milk production has risen by less
than 40% during the same period (FAOstat, 2009).
It is often claimed that the expansion of the sector is hampered by a lack of competi-
tiveness against imported milk powder. Indeed, currently, Senegalese demand is mainly
satisﬁed by these imports, covering 68% of the demand (MINEFI, 2006). Producers' or-
ganizations and NGOs argue that prices remain too low due to this unfair international
competition. This is seen as one of the reasons which keeps small producers in poverty.
The famous Oxfam's campaign Milking the CAP was founded on the following claim:
The EU dairy regime aﬀects developing countries in three main ways: by depressing
world market prices, by pushing developing country exporters out of third markets, and
by directly undermining domestic markets in developing countries (...) The result is that
domestic prices are depressed and local producers, many of whom live in poverty, are
driven out of business (Oxfam, 2002: 16). In Belgium, Luxembourg and France, more
than 30 000 people sign the petition Lait, l'Europe est vache avec l'Afrique based on
the same assertion (CFSI, 2007).
However, other factors explain the relative inertia of the Senegalese milk sector. This
is partly due to the characteristics of the livestock sector: generally, each peasant has only
some cows and each one provides between 0.5 and 2 liters of milk per day. Both elements
lead to small quantities of milk produced, between 2 and 10 liters per day (Duteurtre,
2006). The productivity per animal is determined by its breed (local cattle breeds,
Zebu Gobra, Taurine N'Dama or D'jakoré are known to have low productivity) but also
to the quantity of feeds available. Cattle are mainly raised on pasture where grass is
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only abundant during the wet season (from June to October). Feed supplements can
be provided by the use of organic manure and harvest residues, notably from cotton
and sesame. However, one of the main constraints for improving milk production is the
diﬃculty for the farmers to obtain these cattle feeds (Dieye et al., 2005, Dieye, 2003).
Another factor which hampers the increase of production are high transport costs.
Holloway et al. (2000) found that, in Ethiopia, each additional minute walk to the
collection center reduces the marketable quantity of milk by 0.06 liters per day. In a
region where milk yields per day are less than 4 liters, this is of considerable importance.
High transport costs also have a negative impact on the use of feed supplement. In Kenya,
Staal et al. (2002) have found that an additional 10 kilometers between the farmer
and Nairobi decreases the probability of using concentrate feeding by more than 1%.
The nature of the milk makes it diﬃcult to transport on large distances. However, while
production is distributed on most of the rural areas in the country, consumption is mainly
concentrated in Dakar, sometimes at more than 300 kilometers from the producers.
Inadequate transport infrastructure also contribute to increase the transport cost. As
incurring large costs for transporting small quantities of milk may turn to be unproﬁtable,
farmers sometimes prefer not to take part to the market, or to participate only some days,
resulting in very low quantities of milk commercialized on the market.
Figure 1: Milk processing units (mini-dairies) in Senegal (2005 and
2008)
* Source: Broutin (2005) and Broutin (2008)
Since the nineties, we have seen the emergence of small-scale processing units called
mini-dairies that play an intermediary role between the farmers and the market (Dieye
et al., 2005, Corniaux et al., 2005). These intermediaries have some kind of advantage
over the farmers to sell the products on the market. They use more eﬃcient transport
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devices, such as trucks, they own bulk cooling tanks, such that they can stock the milk
and do not have to transport it every day, etc.
These intermediaries seem to rapidly expand. Based on a survey conducted in 2002
in Kolda (Southern Senegal), Dieye et al. (2005) have reported that the quantities of
milk collected by small-scale processing units in this area increased from 21250 liters
in 1996 to 113600 liters in 2001 with the number of processing units increasing from 1
to 5. The quantity collected nearly doubled in the two following years (214205 liters
collected in 2003) with the number of intermediaries increasing to 8 (Dieye, 2006). The
same pattern is observed in the other regions. Figure 1 represents the expansion of these
intermediaries between 2005 and 2008.
Potentially, these mini-dairies can play a role in the increase of local production and
commercialization of dairy products in Senegal. On ﬁgure 2, one may note that domestic
milk production, that have stagnated for 30 years, has begun to increase in the nineties.
In this dissertation, we investigate several aspects related to these intermediaries.
Figure 2: Evolution of local milk production in Senegal (1961-2010)
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Amongst the dairy products available in Senegal, milk powder represents 47% of
the consumption (Duteurtre, 2006). This powder is transformed at home into liquid
milk or sour milk, or directly used in the coﬀee for instance. Apart from the powder,
dairy industry proposes transformed products that are highly appreciated by Senegalese
households. Indeed, industrial (as opposed to home-made) sour milk accounts for 20%
of the consumption (Duteurtre, 2006). Until recently, the Senegalese dairy industry
produced mainly sour milk made with imported powder. However, the emergence of
mini-dairies has brought a new product on the market: industrial sour milk made with
local fresh milk.
In chapter 1, we investigate if a demand exists for this new product. In particular, we
look if this product is substitutable with the powder-based sour milk, or if consumers are
willing to pay a diﬀerent price for a local milk based sour milk. Using data from a survey
conducted on 400 households in the region of Dakar, we ﬁnd evidence that consumers are
willing to pay a positive premium for sour milk made with local fresh milk, based on a
choice-based-conjoint analysis as well as on contingent valuation measures. Moreover, we
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identify some niche markets that the mini-dairies could target to sell their products at a
considerably higher price than the imported ones. We also put into light that providing
information to the consumers about the origin of the product is a crucial element for
eﬀectively being able to set a higher price for their products. With this respect, the
creation of a certiﬁcation for the local origin, as it has be considered by NGOs and
producers' organizations (Prolait, 2009), could increase the value of local milk-based
products with respect to the powder-based ones.
We observe that contracts between mini-dairies and farmers often involve interlinked
transactions. Additionally to playing an intermediary role on the milk market, the dairy
also play this role on the input market, providing the farmer the cattle feeds that are
necessary for his production. In such a contract, both output and input prices are
determined jointly. In the region of Kolda, Dieye et al. (2005) report that processing
units provide credit and cattle feeds to the farmers in order to increase commercial links.
The two most important milk processing units in this region (Bilaame Puul Debbo and
Le Fermier) use three diﬀerent mechanisms for linking milk purchase and feeds selling:
credit for feeds purchase, direct feeds purchase for the farmer, or guarantee to the feeds
seller in case of non-payment by the farmer (Dieye, 2006). In Northern Senegal, La
Laiterie du Berger buys large quantities of cattle feeds and resells it to the farmers at
50 percent of the market price (Bathilly, 2007).
Chapter 2 examines the contract prices that should be optimal from the point of view
of a mini-dairy using interlinked transactions. From this, we determine under which con-
ditions the presence of such an intermediary could help to increase farmers' production
and income and reduce poverty, measured by a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator. We
compare a benchmark spatial price discrimination case with two pricing policies that are
observed in practice (uniform pricing and mill pricing) and derive some policy recom-
mendations regarding the type of pricing that should be imposed to the intermediaries
by a policy maker whose aim is to reduce poverty.
While the importance of smallholders' market participation for poverty alleviation
in developing countries has been increasingly recognized (Von Braun and Kennedy,
1994, Heltberg and Tarp, 2002, Barrett, 2008 etc.), Metzger et al. (1995) report
that, in Senegal, less than 25% of milk production is commercialized. According to
Dieye (2003), the presence of mini-dairies seems to improve this market participation.
The survey he conducted in the peri-urban region of Kolda, where several mini-dairies
are established, show that the level of milk commercialization reaches 75% in the wet
season.
In chapter 3 we analyze under which condition the presence of an intermediary can
improve farmers' participation to the market. We compare an interlinked contract model
with a simple one, in order to derive if the interlinkage permits to improve farmers' par-
ticipation. Using a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator, we explore the potential poverty
reduction eﬀect of the diﬀerent types of contract (interlinked or simple) and pricing pol-
icy (discrimination, uniform or mill pricing), that we decompose into two parts: on the
one hand the poverty reduction due to the increase of the income of farmers who were
able to take part to the market in the absence of the intermediary and, on the other
hand, the poverty reduction due to the increased participation.
Finally, we want to determine under what conditions the intermediaries ﬁnd it proﬁ-
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table to enter the market. On the one hand they have to support irreversible costly
investment, and, on the other hand milk price is characterized by important volatility
which leads to uncertainty and tends to discourage investment. In this context, using
a net present value rule for determining the investment plant of such a ﬁrm may lead
to overoptimistic results, hence, in chapter 4, we use the real option theory (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994). To better represent the reality, we take into account the possibility for
the ﬁrm to further expand its collection area once the ﬁrst investment is made. Taking
this possibility into account drastically changes the results compared to a model where
the size of the collection area is ﬁxed. Using data on the milk sector in Senegal, we
simulate these eﬀects in a real context. We check the proﬁtability of two existing mini-
dairies and explore whether the project of transforming local milk into powder could be
proﬁtable.
11
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Chapter 1
Willingness-to-pay for local milk-based
dairy products in Senegal∗†
1.1 Introduction
Senegalese (and West African) dairy sector is claimed to be under pressure due to
cheap imports of milk powder coming from European Union (see for instance Oxfam,
2002 or CFSI, 2007). Indeed, currently, Senegalese demand is mainly satisﬁed by these
imports, local production covering only 32% of the demand (MINEFI, 2006).
Amongst the dairy products available in Senegal, milk powder represents 47% of
the consumption (Duteurtre, 2006). This powder is transformed at home into liquid
milk or sour milk, or directly used in the coﬀee for instance. Apart from the powder,
dairy industry proposes transformed products that are highly appreciated by Senegalese
households. Indeed, industrial (as opposed to home-made) sour milk accounts for 20%
of the consumption (Duteurtre, 2006). Until recently, the Senegalese dairy industry
produced mainly sour milk made with imported powder. However, since the nineties,
small-scale milk processing units, which ensure rural milk collection, seem to rapidly
expand (Corniaux et al., 2005, Dieye et al., 2005). These units propose sour milk
made with fresh local milk.
No signiﬁcant diﬀerence seems to appear between the market prices of local milk based
sour milk and imported powder based one. A possible explanation could be that the
consumers are indiﬀerent between both products. In that case, they would be perfectly
substitutable, and the so-called import surge of milk powder from Europe is favorable
for consumers, as it makes cheaper products available.
However, it is suggested that consumers prefer local milk based products. Broutin et
al. (2006) show that 90% of households consuming local sour milk would like to increase
∗Mélanie Lefèvre (CREPP, HEC-ULg, Université de Liège).
†We are grateful to Tatiana Goetghebuer, Bernard Lejeune, Joe Tharakan and Vincenzo Verardi for
discussion, comments and helpful suggestions, as well as to Cécile Broutin and GRET for providing the
data.
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their consumption but cannot do it because of the lack of availability (mentioned by
more than 50% among them). Another study, from Sissokho and Sall (2001), states
that 79% of the consumers consider that local milk-based dairy products have a higher
quality than imported ones.
In what follows, we use data on stated preferences to conﬁrm or inﬁrm the assertion
that local milk based products are preferred. In particular, we want to estimate if
consumers are willing to pay a positive premium in order to consume local fresh milk
based sour milk in opposition to a product made with imported powder. Additionally,
we would like to quantify this premium.
If it turns that consumers are willing to pay a positive premium for local milk based
products, the two kinds of goods are not perfectly substitutable and a diﬀerence should
appear in market prices. Hence one question is why we do not observe such a diﬀerence.
We suspect that part of the answer comes from the diﬃculty to distinguish local from
imported products. Indeed, the presentation (packaging, advertising, etc.) of powder
based products may sometimes induce consumers to believe that they are made with
local milk (see for instance Bakhoum, 2006).
If consumers are willing to pay more for local products, it means that there exists an
opportunity for local origin certiﬁcation as it has be considered by NGOs and producers'
organizations (Prolait, 2009). This certiﬁcation would increase the value of local milk-
based product with respect to the powder-based ones, giving to local producers the
possibility to compete with imports, despite their higher production costs (mainly high
transport costs due to the perishable nature of fresh milk and to the poor quality of road
infrastructures). In this case, local milk-based products could be sold on the Senegalese
market at such a price that they ﬁnd a demand. If this condition is satisﬁed, increasing
local milk production may be proﬁtable to consumers as well as to producers. In a
country where, in rural areas, seven out of ten households own cattle, this expansion
would increase the income of a large share of the population.
While a reliable certiﬁcation for the local origin may be diﬃcult to implement in a
developing country context, at least producers who use local raw material could imple-
ment advertising that informs consumers about the local origin of their products. With
this respect, we want to identify some niche markets of particular consumers that these
producers should particularly target, as they are willing to pay a higher premium for
local milk based products.
From a policy perspective, better regulation could be encouraged regarding the pack-
aging of powder-based sour milk. Currently, the only regulation imposed is to mention
the quantity of milk powder used, if it is larger than 5 grams per 100 grams of milk
(Broutin, and Diedhiou, 2010). However, this is not always respected (Bakhoum,
2006). Moreover, no regulation is imposed on the type of packaging, such that imported
products are often presented with a local zebu cow or a Peul woman, that induce the
consumer to think they are made with local milk.
Nevertheless, origin certiﬁcation, advertising focused on the local origin and lobbying
for better regulation are relevant only if consumers do value local products more than
imported ones. This is what we analyze, using data on 400 household in the region of
Dakar and two kinds of methods: choice-based-conjoint (CBC) analysis and contingent
valuation (CV). Several studies have been conducted in various context to evaluate the
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willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the local origin, using diﬀerent methods such CBC and CV
but also experimental auctions or hedonic prices. However, this literature is mainly con-
cerned by consumption choices in developed countries and, to our knowledge, evaluations
of the WTP for local products have never been conducted in Africa.
In choice-based-conjoint analysis, individuals are asked to choose between alternative
products deﬁned by various attributes including the price. Comparing the choices allows
to estimate the WTP for the diﬀerent characteristics, notably the local origin (see for
instance, Alfnes (2004) on Norwegian beef compared to Swedish and Botswana ones,
Quagrainie et al. (1998) on Alberta-labeled beef or Darby et al. (2006) on labeled
Grown in Ohio strawberries).
Contingent valuation consists in directly questioning individuals about their WTP.
Conducting this type of survey on consumers from Colorado, Loureiro andHine (2002)
have found that locally grown potatoes carry a potential premium of about 10% over
the initial price. Loureiro and Umberger (2003) have evaluated that respondents
are willing to pay 38% more for US Certiﬁed Steak and 58% more for US Certiﬁed
Hamburger. In Vandermersch and Mathijs (2004)'s study, more than 50% of the
respondents agree to pay 0.05 or 0.1 euros more for Belgian milk. Buchardi et al.
(2005) have determined that German consumers have a higher WTP (about 0.18 euros
per liter) for fresh milk from their own region compared to the same product from another
region.
Both methods suﬀer from the so-called hypothetical bias, the tendency for stated
WTP to overestimate actual WTP (Cummings et al., 1995). It is due to the hypothet-
ical nature of question: the transaction does not eﬀectively occur: consumers do not
really have to spend money. In the CBC case, this bias is mitigated, as consumers are
asked to mimic their typical purchase choices, but not completely eliminated. Carls-
son and Martinsson (2001) have shown, in the case of public goods (environmental
projects) that the (hypothetical) preferences expressed in a CBC survey are not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from the (actual) ones expressed when the money transfer takes place.
In the case of private goods (beef steaks) however, Lusk and Schroeder (2004) have
found that hypothetical responses are statistically diﬀerent from the actual ones. As our
analysis is focused on a pure private good, we must treat the results with caution. CBC
analyses generally overestimate the WTP. In the case of contingent valuation, the hypo-
thetical bias represents generally a major limitation. Nevertheless, in the survey we use,
respondents are not directly asked to state their willingness to pay for the local origin,
but instead they have to state the price they are willing to pay on one hand for local
milk based sour milk and on the other hand for powder based one. Comparing these
values, we expect to have an unbiased estimate of the premium they want to pay for the
local origin. Contingent valuation has also the advantage of consisting in a very simple
task for the respondent. In the CBC analysis however, the respondent's task is more
diﬃcult, responses may be inconsistent across questions, answers may be inﬂuenced by
the complexity of the task, etc.1
1See Lusk andHudson, (2004: 157) or Carlsson andMartinsson (2001: 180) for a more complete
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This chapter is structured as follows. Next section presents an overview of observed
milk prices in Senegal. In section 3, we present the methodologies we use to estimate
the willingness-to-pay for local products, and describe the data. Section 4 is devoted to
model speciﬁcations and hypotheses while section 5 exposes and discusses the results.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
1.2 Observed prices
Table 1.1 shows the results of a linear regression of the observed prices of various
sour milks on some of their characteristics, including the raw material (fresh local milk
or imported powder). This analysis uses data on the prices of 41 products (7 diﬀerent
brands) collected in the supermarkets of Dakar in November 2005 (Duteurtre, 2006).
Due to the small size of the sample, the results have to be interpreted with caution.
Nevertheless, they do not show any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between prices of sour milks
made with powder of fresh milk, i.e. the coeﬃcient related to the raw material is not
signiﬁcant.
Table 1.1: Determinants of observed prices (linear regression)
Variable Coeﬀ. (s.e.)
Packaging (Bucket=1, sachet=0) 265.86∗∗∗ (42.65)
Taste (Sugar=1, no sugar=0) 32.67 (42.81)
Raw Material (Fresh=1, powder=0) 0.997 (60.45)
Volume (in liters) -79.48∗∗∗ (27.09)
Constant 856.36∗∗∗ (47.98)
Number of observations: 41 products. R2=0.5318.
Dependant variable: price per liter. *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level.
This does not necessarily implies that consumers are not willing to pay more for local
products. We suspect it is partly due their inability to distinguish the raw materials.
Table 1.2 reports summary results from the GRET survey2 question according to you,
what is the raw material of the following products (brands): powder or fresh milk?. The
results are reported only for respondents who consume the brand. General ignorance
about the raw material is noticed for the brands that are made with powder. For instance,
41.75% of the respondents consume Niiw, but only 17% among them know it is made with
powder. More than 50% think it is made with fresh raw material. However, more than
75% of the respondents who consume Wayembam correctly answer that it is made with
fresh milk. This seems to indicate that people consuming a product made with fresh milk
do an informed choice, while people who consume sour milk made with powder might
have chosen another product if they were better informed. It is even more a concern as
review of the CBC drawbacks.
2See the next section for a description of this survey.
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85.75% of the respondents aﬃrm that they are able to recognize fresh raw material from
powder and vice-versa.
Table 1.2: Product knowledge
Brand % of respondents % of consum. who % of consum. who % of consum.
who consume think it is made think it is made who
with powder with fresh milk don't know
Brands made with powder
Starlait 27.00 52.78 21.30 25.93
Sarbi 27.50 20.91 52.73 26.36
Niiw 41.75 16.77 55.69 27.54
Ma Kalait 0.50 50.00 0.00 50.00
Sen Sow 16.75 14.93 49.25 35.82
Banic 5.75 26.09 43.48 30.43
Taif Sow 7.75 25.81 41.94 32.26
Jaboot 36.25 33.79 32.41 33.79
Brand made with fresh milk
Wayembam 16.50 10.61 77.27 12.12
It is not surprising that consumers of powder-based sour milk think it is made with
fresh milk, as the advertising about these products is often ambiguous: for instance,
most of the brands include Wolof words (such as sow, which means milk). Even when
the composition is clearly indicated, most consumers do not read it, or are not able to
read it, and are more inﬂuenced by a picture of Senegalese characters or local zebu cows
on the packaging.
Table 1.3: Impact of marketing on price (linear regression)
Variable Coeﬀ. (s.e.)
Packaging (Bucket=1, sachet=0) 263.45∗∗∗ (40.96)
Taste (Sugar=1, no sugar=0) 19.28 (45.61)
Picture (Local=1, other=0) 118.19∗∗∗ (43.21)
Name language (Wolof=1, other=0) -5.70 (51.70)
Volume (in liters) -71.53∗∗∗ (24.81)
Constant 806.61∗∗∗ (61.06)
Number of observations: 38 products. R2=0.6427.
Dependant variable: price per liter. *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level.
A question is whether this misinformation about the composition of the product
is important in determining its price. Table 1.3 gives us an indication that it has a
signiﬁcant impact. This table shows how those marketing characteristics aﬀect the price.
The methods and data used are the same as in table 1.1 but the explicative variable fresh
raw material is now replaced by the characteristics that tend to persuade the consumers
that the raw material is fresh milk. Subject to the same caution as before, results
from table 1.3 indicate that the presence of a local image on the packaging signiﬁcantly
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increases the price of sour milk. On average, products that have such a picture cost 118
CFA more per liter.
We suspect that consumers are willing to pay more for local products but are not
able to do so because they are not able to recognize such products. In what follows,
we test this aﬃrmation by estimating the willingness-to-pay for the local raw material,
based on hypothetical products, such that the information problem is eliminated (i.e.
respondents are perfectly aware of the composition of the hypothetical product).
1.3 Data and methods
We use data from a survey realized in April 2002 in the context of the program INCO
MPE agroalimentaires coordinated by the NGO GRET3 (Broutin et al., 2006), on 400
households from the region of Dakar (departments of Dakar, Pikine and Ruﬁsque).
The survey includes rating/ranking choice-based-conjoint (CBC) data about sour
milk. Eight hypothetical sour milks (products A to H in table 1.4) were proposed to the
respondents. These products diﬀer by their characteristics (or attributes) and price, but
are chosen to represent the reality, i.e products with the same characteristics and price
might exist on the Senegalese market.4
Table 1.4: Hypothetical products proposed to the respondents
Product Packaging Taste Raw material Price (CFA)
A per weight no sugar powder 275
B per weight sugar fresh 325
C per weight sugar powder 225
D sachet sugar fresh 275
E sachet no sugar fresh 225
F sachet no sugar powder 325
G sachet sugar powder 225
H per weight no sugar fresh 225
All these products are liquid sour milk, made with fresh milk or with milk powder,
packed individually (sachet) or sold per weight, with or without additional sugar. Note
that no mention of local characteristic is made. However we use the attribute fresh raw
material as a proxy for local raw material. Indeed, up to now, there is not any milk
powder produced in Senegal, thus the powder form of the raw material implicitly returns
3Groupe de recherche et d'échanges technologiques, www.gret.org.
4When constructing the survey, the GRET has identiﬁed four relevant attributes (packaging, taste,
raw material and price) and corresponding levels using Kelly's repertory grid method (see for instance
Steenkamp and Van Trijp, 1997). Combining attributes levels gave 2x2x2x3=24 possible hypothet-
ical products, that was reduced to 8 using the SPSS Orthoplan procedure (see SPSS (2005) for more
information about the procedure). This sub-set is designed to capture the main eﬀects for each attribute
level.
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to its imported origin. Our own informal discussions with Senegalese consumers conﬁrm
that they consider that powder is always imported and fresh milk always local. However,
we are not able, in this study, to distinguish the valuation of taste due to the freshness
of the local raw material and the pure impact of the local origin.
In a ﬁrst step, consumers facing the eight proposed products, were asked which
product(s) are you willing to buy now, taking into account its (their) characteristics
and price?. The highest note (5) was given to this (these) product(s). In a second
step, respondents were asked which product(s) they are not willing to buy, given its
(their) characteristics and price. This (these) product(s) obtained the lowest note (1).
In the last step, respondents had to rank the remaining products in three categories,
corresponding to the notes 4, 3 and 2.
Table 1.5: CBC descriptive results
Product Mean note Note=1 Note=2 Note=3 Note=4 Note=5
(least preferred) (middle classes) (most preferred)
A 2.59 39.75 % 12.25 % 12.00 % 21.50 % 14.50 %
B 3.17 25.75 % 12.25 % 11.00 % 21.00 % 30.00 %
C 2.77 31.75 % 15.75 % 13.00 % 23.25 % 16.25 %
D 4.10 8.50 % 3.75 % 9.25 % 21.75 % 56.75 %
E 3.94 9.25 % 5.75 % 11.25 % 29.25 % 44.50 %
F 3.20 19.50 % 16.50 % 12.75 % 27.50 % 23.7 %
G 3.84 10.00 % 10.25 % 9.50 % 26.50 % 43.75 %
H 3.22 23.00 % 11.75 % 1325 % 24.00 % 28.00 %
Number of observations: 400 households.
This scheme combines two properties that may be used for evaluate the WTP. On the
one hand, people were asked to give a note (from one to ﬁve) to alternative products, this
is known as rating CBC. However, the intensity of the notes may depend on unobserved
individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Nevertheless, the particular design of the question (i.e. ﬁrst
giving rate 5, then rate 1, then the other rates) tends to reduce this eﬀect. On the other
hand, respondents also had to rank the alternatives from the most preferred to the least
preferred one, this is a known as ranking CBC. It is commonly accepted that the ﬁrst
two or three ranks as well as the last two or three reﬂect real preferences.5 As the GRET
survey contains ﬁve ranks, we are conﬁdent that they reﬂect real preferences.
As we trust both rating and ranking are reliable in our setting, we will use both
interpretations in our analysis. Note that tied rates/ranks are allowed, i.e. an individual
may give the same rate/rank to several alternatives. Indeed, there are 8 alternatives
for only 5 possible rates/ranks. Table 1.16 in Appendix illustrates the importance of
tied ranks. For instance, on average, consumers give a note 5 (most preferred) to 2.6
products and a note 1 (least preferred) to 1.7 products. We will interpret tied rates/ranks
as follows: when a consumer gives the same note for two products, we consider he is
5See for instance Wilson and Corlett (1995: 77).
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indiﬀerent between them. But it could also be considered that a ranking for these goods
exists, but is unknown.
Table 1.5 gives some descriptive results from the CBC data. The hypothetical product
that receives the highest average note (4.10) is the product D that costs 275 CFA and
has the following characteristics: individually packed (sachet), with sugar and made with
fresh milk. 56.75% of the interviewed consumers gave a note 5 (the highest note) to this
product. The product that receives the lowest average note (2.59) is product A. 39.75%
of the respondents gave it a note 1 (the lowest note).
Table 1.6: Contingent Valuation descriptive results
Question: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
What is a reasonable price for a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk 312.72 120.62 125 1500
made with powder?
At what price do you think a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk 406.45 154.19 200 2000
made with powder is expensive but you still buy it?
At what price do you think a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk 563.41 262.36 250 3000
made with powder is so expensive that you do not buy it?
At what price do you think a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk 240.12 90.66 125 1000
made with powder is cheap but you still buy it?
At what price do you think a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk made 178.38 48.41 125 500
with powder is so cheap that you doubt about its quality
and you do not buy it?
Number of observations: 399 households.
Question: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
What is a reasonable price for a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk 339.56 121.02 100 1000
made with fresh milk?
At what price do you think a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk 438.56 166.80 150 1500
made with fresh milk is expensive but you still buy it?
At what price do you think a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk 602 234.64 200 1800
made with fresh milk is so expensive that you do not buy it?
At what price do you think a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk 247.94 101.88 75 800
made with fresh milk is cheap but you still buy it?
At what price do you think a sachet of 1/2 l of sour milk made 150.5 62.96 25 500
with fresh milk is so cheap that you doubt about its quality
and you do not buy it?
Number of observations: 400 households.
In addition to the CBC data, the GRET survey contains information about contingent
valuation. Indeed, consumers were asked to answer to various questions about the price
they ﬁnd reasonable for sour milk made with powder and made with fresh raw material
(see table 1.6 for descriptive results). Figure 1.1 is based on the cumulative density
for the questions what is a reasonable price for ...? and at what price do you think
... is expensive but you still buy it?. The curves for fresh raw material are above the
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corresponding one for powder, indicating that, for any given price p, a higher proportion
of the consumers ﬁnd p reasonable (resp. expensive) for sour milk made with fresh
milk than for sour milk made with powder. For any proportion of the consumers, the
price that is found reasonable (resp. expensive) for fresh raw material is higher that the
reasonable (resp. expensive) price for powder.
Figure 1.1: Contingent valuation of reasonable and expensive prices
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Table 1.7: Deﬁnition of contingent valuation measures
Variable Deﬁnition
PremiumR Reasonable price for sour milk with fresh raw material
- Reasonable price for sour milk with powder
PremiumE Expensive price for sour milk with fresh raw material
- Expensive price for sour milk with powder
Premium% (Reasonable price for sour milk with fresh raw material
- Reasonable price for sour milk with powder)
/Reasonable price for sour milk with powder
As already explained, CBC analysis as well as contingent valuation tend to overes-
timate the WTP due to the presence of an hypothetical bias. As individuals are not
in a real situation of purchase, they tend to report higher stated WTP than the actual
one. As CBC mimics consumers' behavior, it is assumed to reduce the bias (while not
eliminating it, especially in the evaluation of WTP for private goods). For that rea-
son CBC is generally preferred to contingent valuation. However, contingent valuation
measures in the GRET survey provide reliable estimates of the WTP for the fresh raw
material. Indeed, individual were asked, separately, to determine a reasonable price for
sour milk made with powder and then made with fresh raw material. It can be reason-
ably assumed that the hypothetical bias acts the same way on both answers. Using the
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diﬀerence between them as a measure of the WTP for fresh raw material eliminates the
bias, assuming it is additive. We used various measures, based on that diﬀerence, that
are summarized in table 1.7. Histograms of the frequency distribution are presented for
two of them on ﬁgure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Contingent valuation measures (histograms)
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Table 1.8: Deﬁnition of socio-economic and demographic variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Department Department Dakar=0
Pikine=1
Ruﬁsque=2
Ethnicity Respondent's ethnicity Wolof=0
Peul/Toucouleur=1
Other(ethn. minority)=2
Size Number of members Small: less than 5 members
in the household Big: more than 10 members
High education Respondent's education Secondary or more=1
Others=0
Food expenses Household's food expenses Low: ≤75000 CFA
per month High: >150000 CFA
Housing Housing type Regular (with or without ﬂoor)=0
High standing=1
Social or provisional=2
TV Color TV ownership No=0 Yes=1
The survey also includes data about respondents and households' socio-economic
and demographic characteristics such as department, ethnicity, education, size of the
household, food expenses, etc. The deﬁnitions of the variables we use are presented
in table 1.8. Some descriptive statistics are given in table 1.9. Households from Dakar
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department as well as medium size households are slightly overrepresented in the sample.
It has to be noted that only households who consume sour milk were surveyed.
Table 1.9: Descriptive statistics
Populationa Sampleb
(Dakar Region)
Department Dakar 42%d 48.5%
Pikinec 45.4%d 40.25%
Ruﬁsque 12.6%d 11.25%
Age (chief of household) 15 to 24 0.94% 0.75%
25 to 34 10.45% 5.75%
35 to 44 22.28% 19.5%
45 to 54 28.09% 28.25%
55 to 64 19.9% 21.75%
65 and more 16.78% 15%
Don't know/answer 1.56% 9%
Household size Less than 5 23.15% 10.5%
5 to 10 43.06% 62.5%
More than 10 33.79% 27%
Housing ownership Owner 62.39% 65.75%
Tenant 33.85% 30%
Free housing 3.32% 4.25%
Others 0.44%
Mean annual food expenses (CFA) 1 291 085 1 220 022
aESPS (2005), 1598 households in the Region of Dakar.
bGRET (2002), 400 households in the Region of Dakar.
cSince 2002, the department of Pikine has been divided into department of Guédiawaye and
the new department of Pikine. Pikine population data for 2006 are calculated as the sum of
the population of both new departments.
dANSD (2006).
In spite of this, we trust there is no selection bias. Firstly, when doing inference,
the population we are interested in is the population of sour milk consumers. Indeed,
we would like to assess the additional price that those consumers are willing to pay
to consume a local product rather than an imported one. We can reasonably believe
that individuals who currently do not consume any kind of sour milk are not willing to
consume local milk-based sour milk, and a fortiori, to pay an additional premium for
it. Secondly, even if we do not know how non-consumers value the various kinds of sour
milk, this only has a minor impact on the entire population behavior, as they represent
a very small part of this population. Indeed, virtually all households do consume sour
milk. For instance, in a survey of 82 households from Dakar, Duteurtre and Broutin
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(2006)6 have observed that all of them consume sour milk during the month following
Ramadan.
1.4 Model speciﬁcations and hypotheses
1.4.1 Choice-based-conjoint analysis
Respondents' choices to the CBC questionnaire are modeled according to McFadden's
Random Utility Model (RUM) (see for instance Anderson et al., 1992 or Louviere
et al., 2000). We assume that, given a set of alternatives, the consumers choose the al-
ternative that maximizes their utility. The utility Uij that individual i gets by choosing
alternative j is unobservable (latent variable) but can be deﬁned by a deterministic com-
ponent (Vij) which is observable and a stochastic error term (ij) which is not observable:
Uij = Vij + ij (1.4.1)
We assume Vij can be represented by the following additive linear function:
Vij = γZj + θpj (1.4.2)
where Zj is a vector of attributes of the product j, pj is the price of the product j, γ is a
vector of coeﬃcients to be estimated, θ is a coeﬃcient to be estimated (expected to be
negative).7 This simple utility function (1.4.2) provides the main eﬀects of the model.
It indicates how each attribute aﬀects the level of utility, when isolated from the other
attributes. Indeed γk (element k of vector γ) represents how the attribute zk (element k
in each vector Zj) contributes to the individual's utility.
From this expression, one can easily deﬁne the (deterministic) willingness-to-pay for
an attribute (Champ et al., 2003: 189). Indeed, by diﬀerentiating equation (1.4.2),
we see that the coeﬃcient γk is nothing else that the marginal utility provided by the
attribute zk (i.e. ∂Vij/∂zk). θ may be interpreted in a same way as the marginal utility
of money (∂Vij/∂pj), such that the ratio −γk/θ = −(∂Vij/∂zk)/(∂Vij/∂pj) represents the
marginal rate of substitution between the attribute zk and money.
8 Facing any change
in attribute zk which would increase the utility Vij, the individual is willing to pay the
premium −γk/θ that keeps utility constant. Alternatively, he has to be paid −γk/θ to
accept a change in attribute zk that would decrease his utility.
6Referenced by Dia et al. (2008: 39).
7Note that a product-speciﬁc intercept (to be estimated) would have been included. Such an intercept
αj would represent the eﬀect of non included (maybe non observable, such as quality) attributes of
product j. As in the data, products are precisely deﬁned by their four attributes, we assume αj = 0. An
intercept to be estimated may be useful when alternatives are, for example, various brands of products,
which implicitly represent their attributes.
8We expect that −γk/θ has the sign of γk, as θ is expected to be negative.
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In particular, we estimate the following empirical speciﬁcation:
Vij = γ1Packagej + γ2Tastej + γ3RawMaterialj + θpj (1.4.3)
in order to evaluate, among others, the WTP for fresh raw material −γ3/θ.
To control for heterogeneity among consumers, we include socio-economic and demo-
graphic variables in the speciﬁcation:
Vij = γZj + θpj + δXi (1.4.4)
where Xi is a vector of individual i 's characteristics and δ is a vector of coeﬃcients to be
estimated. In that model, the utility is not only aﬀected by the attributes of the product
but also by the individual's own characteristics.
Consumers' characteristics may not only aﬀect their utility but also their preferences
for the attributes of the products. To treat this, we include interactions eﬀects:
Vij = γZj + θpj + δXi + β(XiZj) (1.4.5)
where β is a vector of coeﬃcients to be estimated.
The WTP for an attribute zk can still be deﬁned as the marginal rate of substitution
between attribute zk and money. That is:
− ∂Vij/∂zk
∂Vij/∂pj
= −βXi + γk
θ
(1.4.6)
Here, the WTP for an attribute depends on socio-economic variables and diﬀers thus
among individuals.
Precisely, we are interested in measuring the eﬀect of socio-economic variables such
as income, education and household's size on the WTP for fresh raw material rather
than powder. This has two main implications. Firstly, it will allow to identify niche
markets of consumers that are willing to pay relatively more than others to consume fresh
milk. Local producers should specially target these consumers to sell their diﬀerentiated
product at a higher price. Secondly, as it is generally admitted9 that richer individuals
have a preference for higher quality goods, wealthier households' preferences provide
interesting information about the perception of the products. If they preferred fresh milk
even more than poorer households, this would be a strong indication that fresh milk has
a higher perceived quality. It is not clear, a priori, which raw material, from the powder
or the fresh milk, is perceived to have the highest quality. Indeed, fresh milk may be
collected in poor sanitary conditions, but comes from local cows, and corresponds more
to Senegalese rural habits, while powder production is assumed to be more controlled
but consumers may think that nutritive properties or taste have been altered.
In the particular model
Vij = γ1Packagej+γ2Tastej+γ3RawMaterialj+θpj+δXi+β(Wealthi∗RawMaterialj)
(1.4.7)
9See for instance Bils and Klenow (2001) or Manig and Moneta (2009).
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(where Wealth=1 if the household is in the wealthier category), we expect γ3 to be
positive (i.e. consumers are willing to pay more for fresh raw material). If γ3 was not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, consumers would just be indiﬀerent between powder
or fresh raw material. However, we have no particular expectation on the eﬀect of
wealth β. If β is positive, fresh raw material can be assimilated to high quality product,
and wealthier individuals are willing to pay even more than other individuals for this
attribute. If β is negative, then powder represents quality and wealthier individuals,
who have a higher preference for quality, are willing to pay less than other individuals
for fresh raw material.
For other major socio-economic characteristics, we expect the following results. Edu-
cation should have a positive eﬀect on the WTP for fresh raw material as more educated
individuals may be more informed of the social and nutritional implications of consuming
fresh milk. Being Peul, as opposed to other ethnicities, may also aﬀect positively this
WTP, as Peuls, traditionally involved in the livestock sector, should be more concerned
by local producers' diﬃculties. Finally, we expect small and big households to have a dif-
ferent WTP for local raw material as preference for feeding the children may be diﬀerent
from adults' taste.
Ordered Logit and Probit Models (Random Utility Models) are suitable to evaluate
the WTP.10 However, Ordered Logit requires that the assumption of independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) holds. The relative probability of choosing alternative j
versus alternative l has to be independent of which other alternatives are available as
well as of which alternatives have been already chosen (Long and Freese, 2006: 341).
Using a Hausman test and comparing the full model with a reduced model on a subset
of alternatives, we can show that IIA assumption does not hold. For example comparing
the full model with a model excluding proﬁle G, Hausman test (not reported) rejects
the null hypothesis of IIA (χ24 = 13.65, p < 0.01). We choose to use an Ordered Probit
Model as it does not rely on the IIA assumption. Nevertheless, using an Ordered Logit
Model doesn't change much the results (not reported).
The dependent variable we focus on is the note m given by the individual i to the
hypothetical product j.11 Ordered Probit Model assumes that the alternative j receives
a note m if the utility from this product crosses an unknown threshold:
note(j) = m if αm−1 < Uij ≤ αm
As Uij crosses increasing thresholds (from α0 = −∞ to αM =∞), the note attributed to
j moves up. The probability that individual i gives a note m (=1,...,5) to the product j
is given by:
Pijm = Prob[αm−1 < Vij + ij ≤ αm] = Prob[αm−1 − Vij < ij ≤ αm − Vij]
10The rating/ranking nature of the data allows us to use both Ordered and Rank-Ordered Models.
We have compared both types in the Logit case. As they provide similar results (not reported), we use
the simplest one, that is, the Ordered Model.
11The database contains 3200 observations (400 households i* 8 alternatives j to be rated) for that
dependent variable.
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Using 1.4.5,
Pijm = Φ(αm − β(XiZj)− γZj − θpj)− Φ(αm−1 − β(XiZj)− γZj − θpj) (1.4.8)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative density function for standard normal distributed errors.
1.4.2 Contingent valuation
Based on various contingent valuation measures from the survey (see table 1.7), we
estimate the stated WTP for fresh raw material depending on socio-economic and de-
mographic characteristics, using the following linear regression:
Premiumi = a+ bXi + ei (1.4.9)
where Premiumi is the measure of the additional amount that individual i is willing to
pay to consume sour milk made with fresh raw material rather than with powder, Xi is
a vector of socio-economic and demographic variables, b is a vector of coeﬃcients to be
estimated, a is a constant to be estimated and ei is the error term.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Choice-based-conjoint analysis
Table 1.10: Ordered Probit Model
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) WTPa
Package (per weight=1) γ1 -0.630
∗∗∗ (0.050) -357.8
Taste (Sugar=1) γ2 0.205
∗∗∗ (0.045) 116.5
Raw material (Fresh=1) γ3 0.402
∗∗∗ (0.049) 228.3
Price θ -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
α1 -1.345
∗∗∗ (0.114)
α2 -0.979
∗∗∗ (0.114)
α3 -0.651
∗∗∗ (0.115)
α4 0.024 (0.114)
Log-Likelihood: -4690.959. Number of observations: 3200 (400 groups).
Standard errors are clustered. *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level.
a WTP estimates are given by −γk/θ.
Table 1.10 reports the results from the Ordered Probit Model with speciﬁcation
(1.4.3). All the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level. As expected, individ-
uals seem to prefer a sour milk with the following characteristics: individually packed
(sachet), with sugar and made with fresh raw material.
The packaging has the most crucial importance (|γ1| = 0.63). Preference for fresh
milk is also major: keeping other attributes (package and taste) unchanged, the marginal
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WTP for fresh raw material −γ3/θ is around 228 CFA. It means that, all other things
being equal, the representative household is willing to pay 228 CFA more to consume a
product made with fresh milk rather than a product made with powder.
Table 1.11: Ordered Probit Model (heterogeneity among consumers)
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) WTPa dy/dxb (Std. Err.)
Package (per weight=1) γ1 -0.633
∗∗∗ (0.051) -355.2 -0.209∗∗∗ (0.015)
Taste (Sugar=1) γ2 0.206
∗∗∗ (0.045) 115.6 0.068∗∗∗ (0.015)
Raw material (Fresh=1) γ3 0.405
∗∗∗ (0.049) 227.5 0.134∗∗∗ (0.016)
Price θ -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Pikine δ1 0.157
∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.016)
Ruﬁsque δ2 0.231
∗∗ (0.098) 0.076∗∗ (0.032)
Ethn. minority δ3 0.020 (0.048) 0.007 (0.016)
Peul δ4 0.065 (0.064) 0.021 (0.021)
Small household δ5 -0.096 (0.066) -0.032 (0.022)
Big household δ6 -0.048 (0.050) -0.016 (0.016)
High education δ7 -0.054 (0.045) -0.0178 (0.015)
Low expenses δ8 0.024 (0.053) 0.008 (0.017)
High expenses δ9 0.032 (0.057) 0.011 (0.019)
α1 -1.277
∗∗∗ (0.117)
α2 -0.910
∗∗∗ (0.117)
α3 -0.580
∗∗∗ (0.119)
α4 0.101 (0.118)
Log-Likelihood: -4676.2297. Number of observations: 3200 (400 groups). Std. err. are clustered.
*** and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% level.
a WTP estimates are given by −γk/θ.
b Average marginal response of the probability of giving a note 5 to the product when a regressor
changes and the others are unchanged. Average probability of note 5 is 0.3217.
Controlling for individuals' characteristics does not change much the results (table
1.11). With speciﬁcation (1.4.4), the marginal WTP for fresh raw material −γ3/θ is
around 227 CFA.
The average marginal eﬀects from the Ordered Probit Model are also illustrated in
table 1.11. The average probability that a respondent gives a note 5 to the proposed
hypothetical product increases by 13 points if the product is made with fresh raw ma-
terial. Adding sugar increases the probability of a note 5 by 6.8 points and going to an
individual packaging increases it by 21 points, all other things equal.
The eﬀects reported in table 1.11 are the marginal eﬀects averaged for all individuals.
They have to be distinguished from the marginal eﬀects for an average individual (not
reported here). Indeed an average individual (that is, with the following characteristics:
from Dakar, Wolof, medium size household, low education and medium food expenses)
has a probability of 52.6% of giving a note 5 to the product that has the following
attributes: sachet, sugar, fresh raw material, i.e. the product with all the most preferred
attributes when its price is 250 CFA (a common market price). At the same price, the
28
product with all the least preferred attributes (per weight, without sugar, made with
powder) receives a note 5 with a probability of 11.9%. If the most preferred product
was free (price was zero), the probability of receiving a rate 5 would be 69.5%.
Table 1.12: Ordered Probit Model (with interactions)
Model a Model b Model c
Variable Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.)
Package (per weight=1) γ1 -0.634
∗∗∗ (0.051) -0.636∗∗∗ (0.051) -0.634∗∗∗ (0.051)
Taste (Sugar=1) γ2 0.206
∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.206∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.206∗∗∗ (0.045)
Raw material (Fresh=1) γ3 0.374
∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.489∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.340∗∗∗ (0.060)
Price θ -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
Pikine δ1 0.157
∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.048)
Ruﬁsque δ2 0.231
∗∗ (0.098) 0.231∗∗ (0.098) 0.232∗∗ (0.098)
Ethn. minority δ3 0.020 (0.048) 0.021 (0.048) 0.020 (0.048)
Peul δ4 0.064 (0.065) 0.065 (0.065) 0.064 (0.064)
Small household δ5 -0.096 (0.066) -0.191
∗ (0.101) -0.096 (0.066)
Big household δ6 -0.049 (0.050) 0.138
∗ (0.072) -0.048 (0.050)
High education δ7 -0.053 (0.045) -0.054 (0.045) -0.136
∗∗ (0.067)
Low expenses δ8 0.042 (0.075) 0.024 (0.053) 0.024 (0.053)
High expenses δ9 -0.082 (0.086) 0.032 (0.057) 0.032 (0.057)
Low exp.*Raw material β1 -0.037 (0.107)
High exp.*Raw material β2 0.234
∗ (0.132)
Small hh*Raw material β3 0.194 (0.159)
Big hh*Raw material β4 -0.375
∗∗∗ (0.108)
High educ.*Raw material β5 0.168
∗ (0.101)
α1 -1.295
∗∗∗ (0.120) -1.240∗∗∗ (0.117) -1.310∗∗∗ (0.118)
α2 -0.927
∗∗∗ (0.120) -0.872∗∗∗ (0.117) -0.942∗∗∗ (0.119)
α3 -0.596
∗∗∗ (0.122) -0.540∗∗∗ (0.119) -0.611∗∗∗ (0.120)
α4 0.085 (0.121) 0.144 (0.119) 0.070 (0.119)
Log-Likelihood: model a: -4672.7878, model b: -4664.3479, model c: -4673.9821.
Number of observations: 3200 (400 groups). Standard errors are clustered.
***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table 1.12 presents the results obtained from the Ordered Probit Model that includes
interaction eﬀects (speciﬁcation (1.4.5)). Model a corresponds to the particular speciﬁ-
cation (1.4.7). The WTP for fresh raw material, for the base category household (that
is with monthly food expenses between 75 000 and 150 000 CFA) is 210 CFA (−γ3/θ).
The interaction between food expenses and raw material is quite interesting. The
WTP for fresh raw material, for a family with a low level of food expenses (less than
75 000 CFA/month) is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the reference household's one.
However, wealthier households (with food expenses higher than 150 000 CFA/month)
have a WTP for this attribute of 341 CFA (−(γ3 + β2)/θ). Subject to the assumption
we have adopted, this seems to indicate that sour milk made with fresh raw material is
considered to have a higher perceived quality than sour milk made with powder. One
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may criticize the use of food expenses as a measure of wealth. Nevertheless, using another
usual wealth indicator (the ownership of a color TV) does not aﬀect the results (see table
1.18 (b) in Appendix), indicating their robustness. Comparing the wealthiest households
with the poorest (instead of the one who has medium expenses) even increases a bit the
importance and signiﬁcance of the eﬀect (table 1.18 (c) in Appendix).
Model b in table 1.12 shows that medium size households have a WTP for fresh raw
material of 275 CFA (−γ3/θ). Smaller families (less than 5 members) are not diﬀerent
from them. Bigger households, however, have a quite smaller WTP for fresh raw material:
64 CFA (−(γ3 + β4)/θ). This may be partially explained by an income eﬀect as, ceteris
paribus, bigger households have a lower income per capita and the control variable Food
expenses only represents total income. With lower income per capita, bigger households
are willing to pay less for fresh raw material. This intuitive interpretation is similar to
the previous one about poorer versus wealthier households. Income eﬀect is only part of
the story however. Using a proxy12 of the income per capita as control variable instead
of Food expenses, β4 is still signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that bigger households are
ready to pay less for fresh raw material, certainly due to diﬀerences in taste between the
members of big and small families.
Model c in table 1.12 indicates that consumers with a high education (superior to
secondary school) are willing to pay more for fresh raw material (β5 is signiﬁcantly
positive) than less educated ones. They have a marginal WTP of 285 CFA for this
attribute (−(γ3+β5)/θ), while less educated consumers have a WTP of 191 CFA (−γ3/θ).
We see that the WTP for fresh raw material greatly depends on the characteristics
of the households. There clearly exist some niche markets (i.e. wealthier and educated
consumers), that milk producers may target to sell the local milk-based dairy products.
The interaction eﬀect of being Peul on the preference for raw material is not signiﬁcant
(β6 in table 1.17 in Appendix) indicating that Peuls do not seem to be willing to pay
more for fresh raw material. This may be an indication that the choice of the preferred
raw material is dictated by taste and quality considerations more than by a wish to
support local producers.
We suspect that the rating/ranking CBC data overestimate the willingness-to-pay
because individuals are not in a real situation of purchase (they do not have to spend
money), or because of the diﬃculty of the ranking task. Indeed, saying that individuals
are willing to pay 228 CFA more for a product that already costs 250 CFA, that is, saying
that they are ready to pay almost the double of the current price, seems unrealistic.
However, the results show that individuals are willing to pay a signiﬁcantly positive
premium for fresh raw material. We can use the lower bound of a 95% conﬁdence
interval as the lower limit for the WTP, interpreting that the true value of the WTP has
a probability 0.975 to be above this limit.
Conﬁdence intervals for the main estimates of the WTP for fresh raw materials are
reported in table 1.13. They are calculated using the delta method, assuming that the
WTP is normally distributed. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that the coeﬃcients of
12Food expenses/(number of children +2).
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Table 1.13: WTP for fresh raw material: estimates and conﬁdence intervals
Model WTP Lower bound Upper bound
estimate of CIa at 95% of CIa at 95%
Ord. Probit on (1.4.3) (table 1.10) 228.32 113.82 342.82
Ord. Probit on (1.4.4) (heterog., table 1.11) 227.48 114.33 340.64
Ord. Probit on (1.4.5) (interact., table 1.12):
Model a (base category household) 209.63 86.08 333.17
Model b (base category household) 274.61 140.78 408.44
Model c (base category household) 190.96 84.22 297.69
aConﬁdence intervals at 95% level calculated with delta method.
an Ordered Probit Model are normally distributed when the sample is large. As the WTP
is a ratio of two normally distributed variables, its distribution is approximately normal
when the coeﬃcient of variation of the denominator is small13(Hole, 2006). Conﬁdence
intervals are quite large, indicating that the estimation of mean WTP is imprecise.
While we may easily trust that products receiving note 5 are the most preferred and
that products receiving note 1 are the least preferred, it may be argued that consumers
may not be able to rank intermediate products in accordance with their real preferences.
To test for the robustness regarding this point we use two alternative speciﬁcations.
First, we gather middle classes (notes 2, 3 and 4) and use an Ordered Probit Model with
only three categories instead of ﬁve. Table 1.19 in Appendix indicates that main results,
in terms of signiﬁcance and sign, are not aﬀected. Second, we use a Binary Probit Model
where the product is considered to be chosen (choice=1) if it receives the note 5 and
not chosen (choice=0) if it receives a note lower than 5 (i.e. 1, 2, 3 or 4). Table 1.20 in
Appendix indicates also that main results are not altered, neither in terms of signiﬁcance
or sign, except for the interaction eﬀect between education and raw material.
Table 1.14 reports average marginal eﬀects from the Ordered Probit Model with
interactions. Going from a powder raw material to a fresh one increases the probability
of receiving a note 5 by 11 to 16 points of probability, depending on the speciﬁcation.
Interaction eﬀects must be interpreted with caution as, in non-linear models, a rig-
orous test for those eﬀects must be based on the estimated cross-partial derivative14,
which is not the case in table 1.14. To test for the robustness of the results concerning
these eﬀects, we have checked their signiﬁcance using the method proposed by Norton
et al. (2004). Results from the Binary Probit Model in table 1.21 in Appendix indicate
that, for models a and b, signiﬁcance is not aﬀected. Estimated interaction eﬀects are
even bigger with this method. The interaction eﬀect between high education and raw
material (model c) is no longer signiﬁcant.
13Precisely, it has to be less than 0.39 (Hayya et al., 1975). In our case, for instance in the simple
model presented in table 1.10, s.e.(θ)/θ = 0.262 < 0.39.
14For the same reason, only one interaction eﬀect is included in each model in table 1.12. Nevertheless,
including the three interactions terms in the same model does not change much the results, expect for
the education eﬀect (see table 1.22 in Appendix).
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Wealthiest households' probability of choosing a product is increased by 9.5 points
if the product is made with fresh raw material instead of powder. This eﬀect is even
stronger for products whose predicted probability of being chosen is high (see ﬁgure 1.3
in Appendix). For big households, the probability of choosing a product decreases by 17
points when it is made with fresh raw material and this negative eﬀect is even stronger
for products that have higher predicted probability of being chosen (see ﬁgure 1.4 in
Appendix).
Table 1.14: Marginal eﬀects from Ordered Probit Model (heterogeneity among con-
sumers)
Model a Model b Model c
Variable dy/dxa (s.e.) dy/dxa (s.e.) dy/dxa (s.e.)
Packageb (per weight=1) -0.210∗∗∗ (0.015) -0.209∗∗∗ (0.015) -0.209∗∗∗ (0.015)
Tasteb (Sugar=1) 0.068∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.068∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.068∗∗∗ (0.015)
Raw materialb (Fresh=1) 0.124∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.161∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.112∗∗∗ (0.020)
Price -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Pikineb 0.052∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.016)
Ruﬁsqueb 0.076∗∗ (0.032) 0.076∗∗ (0.032) 0.076∗∗ (0.032)
Ethn. minorityb 0.007 (0.016) 0.007 (0.016) 0.007 (0.016)
Peulb 0.021 (0.021) 0.021 (0.021) 0.021 (0.021)
Small householdb -0.032 (0.022) -0.062∗ (0.033) -0.032 (0.022)
Big householdb -0.016 (0.0164) 0.045∗ (0.024) -0.016 (0.016)
High educationb -0.017 (0.015) -0.018 (0.015) -0.045∗∗ (0.022)
Low expensesb 0.014 (0.0246) 0.008 (0.017) 0.008 (0.017)
High expensesb -0.027 (0.028) 0.011 (0.019) 0.011 (0.019)
Low exp.*Raw materialb -0.012 (0.035)
High exp.*Raw materialb 0.077∗ (0.044)
Small hh*Raw materialb 0.064 (0.052)
Big hh*Raw materialb -0.123∗∗∗ (0.035)
High educ.*Raw materialb 0.055∗ (0.033)
Number of observations: 3200 (400 groups). Standard errors are clustered.
***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
a Average marginal response of the probability of giving a note 5 to the product when a regressor
changes and the others are unchanged.
b dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
1.5.2 Contingent valuation
The results from the linear regression (1.4.9), using various measures of Premium
(see table 1.7), are presented in table 1.15. Some results are consistent with the CBC
analysis, particularly, wealthier households have a higher willingness-to-pay for fresh
raw material (b9 > 0 and signiﬁcant in all the three models). Consumers from Pikine
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are ready to pay much less for this attribute than consumers from Dakar (b1 negative
and highly signiﬁcant) which did not appear in the CBC results (see table 1.17 (b) in
Appendix where β7 is not signiﬁcant). Households in Pikine are, on average, bigger and
poorer than other households. However, as we control for households' size and wealth,
this does not explain the important impact of the regional dummy.
Table 1.15: Contingent valuation : linear regressions
(a) PremiumR (b) PremiumE (c) Premium%
Variable Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.)
Pikine b1 -50.491
∗∗∗ (14.072) -63.180∗∗∗ (17.240) -0.161∗∗∗ (0.040)
Ruﬁsque b2 -4.095 (21.392) -2.362 (26.209) -0.002 (0.060)
Ethn. minority b3 -12.257 (14.834) 0.103 (18.174) 0.020 (0.042)
Peul b4 8.736 (17.110) 4.841 (20.964) 0.014 (0.048)
Small household b5 6.592 (21.241) 18.261 (26.025) 0.035 (0.060)
Big household b6 -7.669 (14.514) -6.931 (17.783) -0.043 (0.041)
High education b7 10.119 (13.578) 11.177 (16.635) 0.034 (0.038)
Low expenses b8 28.081
∗ (14.814) 33.221∗ (18.150) 0.035 (0.042)
High expenses b9 30.024
∗ (17.395) 49.217∗∗ (21.313) 0.102∗∗ (0.049)
Constant a 30.043∗∗ (14.888) 29.397 (18.240) 0.164∗∗∗ (0.042)
Number of observations: 400 households.
***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Based on model (a), consumers from the base category are, on average, willing to pay
a premium of 30 CFA for fresh raw material. For wealthier households, this premium is
around 60 CFA. Results from the other models are similar. Based on model (c), reference
households are willing to pay a premium of 16.4% above the initial price. For instance, if
sour milk made with powder costs 250 CFA, they are willing to pay 291 CFA for a product
made with fresh milk, that is 41 CFA more. For wealthier individuals, this premium is
26.6%, or 66.5 CFA if the initial price is 250 CFA. One may think that the WTP is
better represented by the threshold price above which the consumers stops to buy the
product. Linear regressions from premiums based on this threshold are represented in
table 1.23 in Appendix and present results similar to table 1.15.
Those results conﬁrm our previous observations. Firstly, CBC results are upward
biased, certainly due to the diﬃculty of the ranking task as well as to the hypothetical
nature of the questions. While contingent valuation analyses are generally more biased
than the CBC ones, the transformation we use here permits to give reliably unbiased
estimates with the contingent valuation method. Secondly, we may be conﬁdent that
consumers are willing to pay a positive premium for fresh raw material, even if we can
not unequivocally quantify this premium. Thirdly, wealthier individuals are willing to
pay even more than other consumers to get a product made with fresh milk rather than
powder.
1.5.3 Discussion
The previous analysis seems to assess that consumers are willing to pay a positive
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premium for local milk based products. We suspect that this preference is not transfered
to market prices because consumers are not able to distinguish both kinds of products.
As it has been suggested by our analysis of observed prices, it means that the consumers
agree to pay a positive premium for products they think are local but that are actually
made with imported powder.
We check that this misinformation has no impact on the WTP, that is, that better
informed consumers are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from other consumers regarding the
way they value the local origin. We do this by including the following indicator of
knowledge as control variable in the various model speciﬁcations we used:
Ki =
# of (powder-based) brands consumed and correctly known by individual i
# of (powder-based) brands consumed by individual i
It turns out that this indicator is not signiﬁcant neither when included in the Ordered
Probit Model, with and without interactions (CBC analysis), neither when included in
the linear regression of the contingent valuation analysis (results are not reported here).
The same applies for a dummy variable indicating that the score Ki (between 0 and 1)
is higher than a threshold value, say for instance 0.5.
As a better knowledge does not seem to inﬂuence the WTP, improving this knowledge
would permit that consumers agree to pay more for products that are actually made
with fresh milk. A clear implication of this analysis is that any policy that leads to
a better information could allow local producers to sell their products on the market
at a higher price, while still ﬁnding a demand. Such policies include improving local
products advertising, creating certiﬁcation for the local origin or improving and enforcing
regulations about the packaging of powder based products.
1.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we estimated the Senegalese consumers' willingness-to-pay for a fresh
(or local) raw material in the composition of sour milk. Using choice-based-conjoint data,
we found that consumers are, on average, willing to pay a premium around 220 CFA,
depending on the speciﬁcation. An Ordered Probit Model that controls for consumers
heterogeneity, estimates this WTP at 227 CFA with a large conﬁdence interval (from
104 to 351 CFA at 95% level). It means that, on average, a household from the base
category is ready to pay 227 CFA more to obtain sour milk made with fresh milk rather
than with powder.
This estimation is suspected to be upward biased due to the hypothetical nature of
the question. It is generally assumed that contingent valuation analyses lead to an over-
estimation of the WTP even larger that the CBC does. However, using a transformation
of two direct contingent valuation questions, we obtain an indirect contingent valuation
measure that seems to give unbiased (or less biased) estimation of the WTP. With this
method, the willingness-to-pay for the fresh raw material is estimated to 30 CFA, or 16%
above the initial price, depending on the speciﬁcation.
The willingness-to-pay greatly depends on the characteristics of the households and
there clearly are some niche markets that milk producers may target to sell the local
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milk-based dairy products. Wealthier households are willing to pay more than the other
households, indicating that fresh raw material may be assimilated to superior perceived
quality. This higher willingness-to-pay from the wealthier households is conﬁrmed by
both CBC and contingent valuation analyses. Big households are ready to pay much
less than the base category ones, certainly due to diﬀerence in taste between children
and adults. Highly educated respondents have a higher WTP than less educated ones.
Surprisingly, being Peul does not aﬀect the WTP for fresh raw material in spite of Peuls'
traditional implication in the livestock sector.
It has been shown that consumers are not currently able to distinguish powder-based
products from those made with fresh milk. This implies that market prices are not
diﬀerentiated despite the fact that consumers are willing to pay more for the second
ones. A better regulation for dairy products made with powder, coupled with a good
marketing of local products, targeted to the niche markets we deﬁned, might allow local
producers to sell their product at a higher price, which could compensate the higher
transport costs they face and hence improve their incomes and livelihood.
We are aware of the weaknesses of the present analysis, that may be improved in
future researches, mainly by constructing new databases that better ﬁt our objectives.
First, GRET database only contains information about fresh raw material which is a
proxy for local raw material. Hence we are not able to distinguish the valuation of
taste due to freshness from the pure eﬀect of locality. Second, we suspect that the
rating/ranking CBC data overestimate the willingness-to-pay because individuals are
not in a real situation of purchase (they do not have to spend money), or because
of the diﬃculty of the ranking task. The present analysis gives us an indication that
consumers are willing to pay a positive premium for local products. The existence of
this signiﬁcantly positive premium is conﬁrmed by contingent valuation measures that
are assumed to be unbiased. However, we should not trust the CBC evaluation of the
magnitude of the premium. Reliable estimation of the WTP should be obtained by
observing individuals in a real environment, such as in an experimental framework or
by observing real purchase behavior on the market. In spite of these restrictions, this
chapter gives a ﬁrst insight of consumers' preferences for local milk-based dairy products
and encouraging results for future researches.
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Appendices
Table 1.16: Tied ranks
note 1 note 2 note 3 note 4 note 5
% who gave the note to 0 product 16.50 41.50 37.25 9.00 1.50
% who gave the note to 1 product 33.75 36.25 37.75 32.75 19.75
% who gave the note to > 1 product 49.75 22.25 25.00 58.25 78.75
Average number of products 1.675 0.8825 0.920 1.9475 2.575
Table 1.17: Ordered Probit Model (with interactions)
Model a Model b
Variable Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.)
Package (per weight=1) γ1 -0.633
∗∗∗ (0.051) -0.633∗∗∗ (0.040)
Taste (Sugar=1) γ2 0.206
∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.206∗∗∗ (0.039)
Raw material (Fresh=1) γ3 0.404
∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.417∗∗∗ (0.055)
Price θ -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
Pikine δ1 0.157
∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.156∗∗∗ (0.060)
Ruﬁsque δ2 0.231
∗∗ (0.098) 0.286∗∗∗ (0.092)
Ethn. minority δ3 0.020 (0.048) 0.020 (0.046)
Peul δ4 0.061 (0.085) 0.065 (0.053)
Small household δ5 -0.096 (0.066) -0.096 (0.066)
Big household δ6 -0.048 (0.050) -0.049 (0.045)
High education δ7 -0.054 (0.045) -0.054 (0.042)
Low expenses δ8 0.024 (0.053) 0.0240 (0.046)
High expenses δ9 0.032 (0.057) 0.032 (0.054)
Peul*Raw material β6 0.007 (0.120)
Pikine*Raw material β7 0.003 (0.082)
Ruﬁsque*Raw material β8 -0.112 (0.128)
α1 -1.278
∗∗∗ (0.118) -1.272∗∗∗ (0.137)
α2 -0.911
∗∗∗ (0.118) -0.905∗∗∗ (0.137)
α3 -0.580
∗∗∗ (0.119) -0.574∗∗∗ (0.136)
α4 0.100 (0.119) 0.107 (0.136)
Log-Likelihood: model a: -4676.2272, model b: -4675.8071. Standard errors are clustered.
Nb of observations: 3200 (400 groups). *** and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% level.
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Table 1.18: Robustness: other income related variables (ordered probit)
Model a Model b Model c
Variable Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.)
Package (per weight=1) γ1 -0.634
∗∗∗ (0.051) -0.634∗∗∗ (0.051) -0.634∗∗∗ (0.039)
Taste (Sugar=1) γ2 0.206
∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.206∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.206∗∗∗ (0.039)
Raw material (Fresh=1) γ3 0.370
∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.219∗∗ (0.092) 0.337∗∗∗ (0.061)
Price θ -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
Pikine δ1 0.171
∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.175∗∗∗ (0.047) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.044)
Ruﬁsque δ2 0.242
∗∗ (0.098) 0.231∗∗ (0.098) 0.231∗∗∗ (0.067)
Ethn. minority δ3 0.021 (0.048) 0.025 (0.048) 0.0202 (0.046)
Peul δ4 0.068 (0.064) 0.073 (0.064) 0.064 (0.053)
Small household δ5 -0.094 (0.065) -0.093 (0.067) -0.096 (0.066)
Big household δ6 -0.046 (0.050) -0.049 (0.050) -0.049 (0.045)
High education δ7 -0.055 (0.046) -0.067 (0.046) -0.053 (0.042)
Low type housing 0.030 (0.069)
High type housing -0.200 (0.124)
TV -0.059 (0.066)
Medium expenses -0.042 (0.063)
Large expenses -0.124 (0.076)
Low housing*Raw mat. 0.039 (0.102)
High housing*Raw mat. 0.418 (0.262)
TV*Raw material 0.246∗∗ (0.107)
Medium exp.*Raw mat. 0.037 (0.086)
High exp.*Raw mat. 0.270∗∗ (0.107)
α1 -1.285
∗∗∗ (0.117) -1.335∗∗∗ (0.129) -1.336∗∗∗ (0.140)
α2 -0.918
∗∗∗ (0.117) -0.967∗∗∗ (0.129) -0.969∗∗∗ (0.139)
α3 -0.587
∗∗∗ (0.118) -0.636∗∗∗ (0.130) -0.638∗∗∗ (0.139)
α4 0.094 (0.118) 0.046 (0.131) 0.043 (0.138)
Log-Likelihood: model a: -4673.1, model b: -4671.9676, model c: -4672.7878.
Number of observations: 3200 (400 groups). Standard errors are clustered.
*** and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% level.
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Table 1.20: Probit Model
Model a Model b Model c
Variable Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.)
Package (per weight=1) γ1 -0.584
∗∗∗ (0.056) -0.587∗∗∗ (0.056) -0.584∗∗∗ (0.055)
Taste (Sugar=1) γ2 0.273
∗∗∗ (0.054) 0.274∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.273∗∗∗ (0.054)
Raw material (Fresh=1) γ3 0.400
∗∗∗ (0.066) 0.594∗∗∗ (0.071) 0.413∗∗∗ (0.075)
Price θ -0.001∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.001∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.001∗∗∗ (0.001)
Pikine 0.222∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.229∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.224∗∗∗ (0.056)
Ruﬁsque 0.225∗ (0.132) 0.226∗ (0.132) 0.226∗ (0.131)
Ethn. minority 0.054 (0.059) 0.054 (0.060) 0.055 (0.060)
Peul 0.077 (0.072) 0.077 (0.073) 0.079 (0.073)
Small household -0.059 (0.082) -0.060 (0.082)
Big household -0.086 (0.062) 0.189∗∗ (0.090) -0.087 (0.061)
High education -0.003 (0.056) -0.009 (0.056) -0.065 (0.091)
Low expenses -0.010 (0.066) -0.007 (0.066)
High expenses -0.140 (0.104) 0.015 (0.071) 0.015 (0.070)
High exp.*Raw material β2 0.290
∗ (0.148)
Big hh*Raw material β4 -0.509
∗∗∗ (0.126)
High educ.*Raw material β5 0.114 (0.123)
α -0.281∗ (0.161) -0.383∗∗ (0.163) -0.284∗ (0.161)
Log-Likelihood: model a: -1856.9146, model b: -1848.8712, model c: -1859.1067.
Number of observations: 3200 (400 groups). Standard errors are clustered.
***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table 1.21: Norton et al. (2004)'s method for interaction eﬀects
Model a Model b Model c
Variable Int. eﬀect (s.e.) Int. eﬀect (s.e.) Int. eﬀect (s.e.)
High exp.*Raw material 0.095∗∗ (0.048)
Big hh*Raw material -0.171∗∗∗ (0.042)
High educ.*Raw material 0.037 (0.040)
Number of observations: 3200 (400 groups).
*** and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% level.
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Figure 1.3: Interaction eﬀect High exp.*Raw material from Probit Model
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Figure 1.4: Interaction eﬀect Big hh*Raw material from Probit Model
-.2
-.15
-.1
-.05
In
te
ra
c
ti
o
n
 E
ff
e
c
t 
(p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 p
o
in
ts
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted Probability that y = 1
Correct interaction effect Incorrect marginal effect
Interaction Effects after Probit
40
Table 1.22: Ordered Probit Model with three interactions
Variable Coeﬀ. (s.e.)
Package (per weight=1) γ1 -0.637
∗∗∗ (0.039)
Taste (Sugar=1) γ2 0.207
∗∗∗ (0.039)
Raw material (Fresh=1) γ3 0.425
∗∗∗ (0.078)
Price θ -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
Pikine δ1 0.157
∗∗∗ (0.044)
Ruﬁsque δ2 0.232
∗∗∗ (0.067)
Ethn. minority δ3 0.021 (0.046)
Peul δ4 0.064 (0.053)
Small household δ5 -0.193
∗∗ (0.092)
Big household δ6 0.137
∗∗ (0.063)
High education δ7 -0.081 (0.059)
Low expenses δ8 0.036 (0.063)
High expenses δ9 -0.093 (0.075)
Low expenses*Raw mat. β1 -0.024 (0.088)
High expenses*Raw mat. β2 0.257
∗∗ (0.107)
Small hh*Raw mat. β3 0.197 (0.132)
Big hh*Raw mat. β4 -0.374
∗∗∗ (0.090)
High educ.*Raw mat. β5 0.057 (0.084)
α1 -1.273
∗∗∗ (0.140)
α2 -0.905
∗∗∗ (0.139)
α3 -0.572
∗∗∗ (0.139)
α4 0.113 (0.139)
Log-Likelihood: -4659.95.
Number of observations: 3200 (400 groups). Standard errors are clustered.
*** and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% level.
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Table 1.23: Contingent valuation : linear regressions
(a) PremiumSE (b) Premium%E (c) Premium%SE
Variable Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.) Coeﬀ. (s.e.)
Pikine b1 -39.802 (28.298) -0.159
∗∗∗ (0.037) -0.110∗∗∗ (0.040)
Ruﬁsque b2 40.015 (43.019) 0.016 (0.056) 0.061 (0.061)
Ethn. minority b3 -19.425 (29.830) 0.0488 (0.039) 0.004 (0.042)
Peul b4 -18.351 (34.409) 0.006 (0.045) -0.010 (0.049)
Small household b5 8.113 (42.717) 0.055 (0.056) 0.056 (0.061)
Big household b6 8.834 (29.188) -0.019 (0.038) 0.014 (0.042)
Low expenses b8 7.032 (29.791) 0.043 (0.039) 0.014 (0.042)
High expenses b9 48.728 (34.982) 0.134
∗∗∗ (0.046) 0.091 (0.050)
High education b7 12.318 (27.305) 0.025 (0.036) 0.027 (0.039)
Constant a 38.209 (29.939) 0.116∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.124∗∗∗ (0.043)
PremiumSE = Price so expensive that the consumer does not buy sour milk with fresh raw
material - Price so expensive that the consumer does not buy sour milk with powder
Premium%E = (Expensive price for sour milk with fresh raw material - Expensive price for
sour milk with powder)/Expensive price for sour milk with powder
Premium%SE = (Price so expensive that the consumer does not buy sour milk with fresh
raw material - Price so expensive that the consumer does not buy sour milk with powder)/
Price so expensive that the consumer does not buy sour milk with powder
Number of observations: 400 households.
***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Chapter 2
Intermediaries, transport costs and
interlinked transactions∗†
2.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the potential poverty alleviation eﬀect from an increased pro-
duction and commercialization of dairy products in Senegal, due to the emergence of
intermediaries in this sector. As in most African countries, increased domestic dairy
production could generate income for a large part of the population (Staal et al., 1997,
Delgado et al., 1999). Indeed, in Senegal 48.12% of the population (73.48% in rural
areas) own cattle (ESPS, 2005), most of them being poor: 63.28% of the households in-
volved in agriculture, livestock and forest employments face poverty compared to 37.82%
in other employments. In that sense, the development of the dairy sector has the poten-
tial to reduce poverty.
Although milk consumption in Africa is still low compared to the rest of the world,
dairy products make now part of the consumption habits of most African households.
In Senegal, the quantity consumed has quadrupled during the period 1961-1993. Nev-
ertheless, despite this increased demand, the domestic milk production has risen by less
than 40% during the same period, most of the demand being satisﬁed by the increased
imports (FAOstat, 2009).
This stagnation of the domestic milk production is partly due to the characteristics
of the livestock sector: generally, each peasant has only some cows and each one provides
between 0.5 and 2 liters of milk per day. Both elements lead to small quantities of milk
produced, between 2 and 10 liters per day (Duteurtre, 2006). The productivity per
animal is determined by its breed (local cattle breeds, Zebu Gobra, Taurine N'Dama or
D'jakoré are known to have low productivity) but also to the quantity of feeds available.
∗Mélanie Lefèvre (CREPP, HEC-ULg, Université de Liège) and Joe Tharakan (Université de Liège,
CORE and CEPR).
†We are grateful to Axel Gautier, Knud Munk and Pierre Pestieau for useful comments and sugges-
tions.
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Around 70% of the Senegalese livestock sector take place in an agro-pastoral system
where cattle are raised on pasture but feed supplements are provided by the use of
organic manure and harvest residues, notably from cotton and sesame. One of the main
constraints for improving milk production is the diﬃculty for the farmers to obtain these
cattle feeds (Dieye et al., 2005, Dieye, 2003).
Another factor which hampers the increase of production are high transport costs.
The nature of the milk makes it diﬃcult to transport on large distances. However, while
production is distributed on most of the rural areas in the country, consumption is mainly
concentrated in Dakar, sometimes at more than 300 kilometers from the producers.
Inadequate transport infrastructure also contribute to increase the transport costs.
As incurring large costs for transporting small quantities of milk may turn to be
unproﬁtable, farmers often prefer not to take part to the market, or to participate only
sometimes, resulting in very low quantities of milk commercialized on the market. Hol-
loway et al. (2000) found that, in Ethiopia, each additional minute walk to the collec-
tion center reduces the marketable quantity of milk by 0.06 liters per day. In a region
where milk yields per day are less than 4 liters, this is of considerable importance. High
transport costs also have a negative impact on the use of feed supplements. In Kenya,
Staal et al. (2002) have found that an additional 10 kilometers between the farmer and
Nairobi decreases the probability of using concentrate feeding by more than 1%. More
isolated farmers are also poorer. Figure 2.1 shows how poverty increases with the time
necessary to reach the market.
Figure 2.1: Senegal: poverty increases with distance
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Since the nineties, we have seen the emergence of small-scale processing units called
mini-dairies (see ﬁgure 1, page 8) that play an intermediary role between the farmers
and the market (Dieye et al., 2005, Corniaux et al., 2005). These intermediaries
have some kind of advantage over the farmers to sell the products on the market. They
use more eﬃcient transport devices, such as trucks, they own bulk cooling tanks, such
that they can stock the milk and do not have to transport it every day, etc. This cost
advantage requires a ﬁxed cost, which for isolated farmers with a low income (of which
a large part is used to buy food) is important and cannot be borne by each farmer on
his own.
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In this chapter we investigate the impact of the presence of such intermediaries on
production, farmers' income and poverty. On ﬁgure 2 (page 9), one may note that the
domestic milk production, that have stagnated for 30 years, has begun to increase in
the nineties. One possible explanation for this evolution lies in the emergence of the
so-called mini-dairies. In what follows, we design a model that determine how the
presence of intermediaries could help to increase small farmers' production, and examine
under which conditions poor households could beneﬁt from it.
Contracts between intermediaries and farmers often involve interlinked transactions.
In the region of Kolda, Dieye et al. (2005) report that processing units provide credit
and cattle feeds to the farmers in order to increase commercial links. The two most
important milk processing units in this region (Bilaame Puul Debbo and Le Fermier)
use three diﬀerent mechanisms for linking milk purchase and feeds selling: credit for
feeds purchase, direct feeds purchase for the farmer, or guarantee to the feeds seller in
case of non-payment by the farmer (Dieye, 2006). In the North, La Laiterie du Berger
buys large quantities of cattle feeds and resells it to the farmers at 50 percent of the
market price (Bathilly, 2007).
While these interlinked contracts have been shown to be eﬃcient, it has also been
shown that any eﬃciency gain is completely appropriated by the intermediary. This
means that interlinked contracts do not allow the farmer to beneﬁt from the interme-
diary's cost advantage. For instance, Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) analyze
how the trader's cost advantage on the input market induces him to provide inputs at
a low price, and to extract all the surplus from the producer by setting a low price for
the output, such that the producer ﬁnally obtains his reservation income. Extrapolating
this result to our setting, this would imply that the presence of intermediaries has little
eﬀect on the reduction of poverty amongst farmers in rural areas. However, these results
from the interlinked contracts literature have been obtained under the assumptions that
the intermediary is a proﬁt maximizer and sets a diﬀerent contract for each farmer.
In practice, we observe that there is a lot of diversity regarding the nature of the
mini-dairies. Intermediaries are not necessarily proﬁt maximizers and we observe that
local producers' associations, NGOs, cooperatives or even public organizations set up
trading structures whose aim is to improve farmers' living conditions and income (Chau
et al., 2009). In addition, a recent report from the United Nations encourages farmers
to develop cooperative structures, in order to realize economies of scale (De Schutter,
2010). The Directory of Women in Livestock DINFEL (Directoire National des Femmes
en Elevage) is an example of such a non-proﬁt mini-dairy. It collects around 400 liters of
milk per day in the region of Dahra, transforms it and sells it in the region of Dakar. Even
for-proﬁt processing units seem to have non-proﬁt secondary objectives. For instance La
Laiterie du Berger claims that one of its objectives is to increase farmers' income (own
interview, 2009).
Interlinked contracts have been extensively analyzed in a non-spatial context. How-
ever, the spatial dimension plays a key role in agricultural sectors in developing countries.
In Senegal, areas of milk production are located far from the capital city (360 km for
Richard-Toll where La Laiterie du Berger operates, 250 km for Dahra where is the
DINFEL collection area), while most of the consumers are located in Dakar. On aver-
age, households' expense for milk consumption is 218 CFA per day in Dakar whereas
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it is 107.5 CFA in other regions (ESPS, 2005). Even at the rural level, transport cost
is important compared to the price received by the farmers. In Kolda, where the price
received by the producers ranges between 75 and 150 CFA, transport by bicycle costs
between 20 and 25 CFA per liter (Dia, 2002). Motorized transport is even more costly,
according to one of the managers of La Laiterie du Berger (personal interview, 2009),
average transport cost on its collection area is 100 CFA per liter, while farmers receive
200 CFA per liter.
The interlinked contracts literature assumes that the ﬁrm is able to oﬀer diﬀerent con-
tracts to diﬀerent agents (Gangopadhyay and Sengupta, 1987). In a spatial context,
this would correspond to assuming that the intermediary perfectly price discriminates
between spatially dispersed farmers. Spatial price discrimination is only one possible
pricing policy. It implies that the intermediary collects the product himself from the
farmers. There are, however, other modes of collection and hence other pricing policies
that the intermediaries may choose. For instance, La Laiterie du Berger organizes milk
collection and pays all the farmers the same price, independent of the distance. This
corresponds to uniform pricing. In Le Fermier however, farmers are responsible for
transport, such that the ones who are located far from the processing unit receive a
considerably lower net price than the closer ones. This corresponds to mill pricing.
For a farmer at a given location, the choice of a particular pricing policy may be
important. Mill pricing, where farmers have to support transport cost, is disadvantageous
for those located far away. Uniform pricing may seem fairer, as all the producers receive
the same price. However, the closest ones may receive a lower net price than if they were
themselves responsible for the transport.
In this chapter, we develop an interlinked contract model in which the intermediary
has a transport cost advantage. Regarding interlinked transactions literature, our con-
tribution is threefold. First, we develop a contract model where interlinkage is motivated
by the trader's advantage in transport costs. While various rationales for the existence
of such transactions have been analyzed1, to our knowledge, diﬀerence in transport costs
has not be considered.
Second, when heterogeneity amongst farmers is taken into account, it is generally
done by assuming that the reservation incomes are diﬀerent for each farmer with these
reservation incomes being exogenously determined (for instance, Gangopadhyay and
Sengupta, 1987). In our model, the heterogeneity amongst farmers is due to their
spatial dispersion. It means that the location aﬀects the farmer's income both in and
outside the contract. It implies that the agents' rents (what they obtain above their
reservation utility) may fail to be monotonic and that nonmonotonic rents could emerge
(Jullien, 2000). Since standard contract theory relies heavily on the monotonicity of
the rent, we have to use alternative methods to characterize the optimal contract.
1From rationed or imperfect rural credit (Gangopadhyay and Sengupta, 1987; Chakrabarty
and Chaudhuri, 2001), output market price uncertainty (Chaudhuri and Gupta, 1995), risk aversion
(Basu, 1983; Basu, Bell and Bose, 2000), unobservable tenant eﬀort (Braverman and Stiglitz,
1982; Mintra, 1983) to the inability to collude (Motiram and Robinson, 2010).
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Third, as opposed to the literature that only looks at situations in which the trader is
able to perfectly price discriminate among heterogeneous farmers, we explore the eﬀects
of other spatial price policies, namely uniform and mill pricing. In this context, we show
that one of the main results of this literature still holds: the intermediary has an interest
in providing the input at a price under the market price, in order to extract as much as
possible the generated surplus from the farmer. However, when intermediaries are not
allowed to discriminate perfectly, the farmers may gain from the contract, such that the
presence of an intermediary may help to reduce their poverty.
We compare the outcomes of the diﬀerent policies (discriminatory, mill and uniform
pricing) in terms of income, poverty and regional disparities in order to arrive at some
policy recommendations as to the type of spatial pricing policy that should be used. In
particular, we look at what a benevolent policy maker who wants to decrease poverty
but is unable to impose a complex tax and subsidy scheme should impose as a spatial
pricing policy to be used by intermediaries. Alternatively, our results regarding the
recommended pricing policy can be seen as the pricing policy that an external donor
which helps set up agricultural intermediaries with a view of reducing rural poverty
should impose as a condition to those intermediaries.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the model and its
assumptions. Sections 3, 4 and 5 develop the interlinked transaction model for a for-
proﬁt intermediary in the cases of spatial price discrimination, uniform pricing, and mill
pricing. Section 6 extends the model to the case of a non-proﬁt organization. Section
7 discusses the implications of pricing policy choice for proﬁt, farmers' income, level of
production, regional diﬀerences among farmers, poverty and so on. Finally, section 8
concludes.
2.2 Model
We analyze the impact of transport costs and interlinked transactions on poverty
in the following theoretical framework. Geographical locations are represented along a
linear segment of size r+R. A ﬁnal good market is located at the origin 0. We consider
one agricultural good whose price p is set on this market. We assume that the diﬀerent
agents in our model do not have an impact on this price.2 This good is consumed at
location 0 which can be assumed to be an urban center. At a distance r from this urban
center, there is a rural area which has a geographical extend R. Farmers are uniformly
distributed over this area. Each farmer produces the agricultural good according to the
same production function f(k), where k is the quantity of input he uses. This input
is sold at price i on the market at location 0. The production function has the usual
properties: f(.) is continuously diﬀerentiable, f(0) = 0, fk =
df
dk
> 0, limk→0 fk = ∞,
limk→∞ fk = 0 and
d2f
dk2
< 0. Farmers are assumed to be proﬁt maximizers. A farmer
located at x facing prices pF (x) and iF (x) maximizes his income y(x, pF (x), iF (x)) by
2This can be the case for example because we are in a small open economy and the price of this good
is determined on world markets.
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using the optimal quantity k(x, pF (x), iF (x)) (for simplicity, as long as it does not cause
any confusion, shortcut notations y(x) and k(x) will be used):
max
k(x)
y(x) = pF (x)f(k(x))− iF (x)k(x) (2.2.1)
The existence of an interior solution to this problem is guaranteed by the above as-
sumptions regarding the production function. The choice of input quantity satisﬁes the
following necessary condition:
df
dk
=
iF (x)
pF (x)
(2.2.2)
To transport the agricultural good to the market, farmers face high transport costs.
These costs are assumed to be linear in distance for the output. To simplify the analysis
we assume that transport costs are negligible for the input and set them equal to zero.
A farmer located at a distance x from the market faces a transport cost τx and hence
this farmer can obtain a net price pF (x) = p− τx for the good he produces. All farmers
are assumed to be able to sell proﬁtably on the market which implies the following
restriction, p > p ≡ τr + τR.
An intermediary is located at r.3 This trader oﬀers interlinked contracts to the
geographically dispersed producers. There is an input-output interlinked relationship
between them: on the one hand he buys the output from the farmers and, on the other
hand, sells them an input necessary for their production. Prices for both input and
output are simultaneously ﬁxed in the contract between the trader and the farmer. The
trader sells the agricultural output from the farmers and buys input for them on the
market located in 0, at market price p and i. The intermediary is assumed to have a
cost advantage. Here, we assume that the trader has an advantage to transport the good
between r and 0. Transport costs for the trader are given by t(x) = θr + τ(x − r) per
unit of output transported with θ < τ .
The sequence is the following. In a ﬁrst step, the trader proposes a contract (pC(x),
iC(x)) to each farmer located on the segment [r, r + R].
4 Very often, the quantities
produced by each individual farmer are small. We assume that contract prices do not
depend on the quantity sold. The farmer located at x receives pC(x) per unit of output
3In developing countries, poor infrastructures in rural area reduce the incentives for ﬁrms to locate
within this area. By locating just outside of the rural area, the trader has a better access to roads,
electricity, water, etc. Because of the limited number of farmers involved and the potentially large
investment costs, the intermediary is assumed to have monopoly/monopsony power when he trades
with the farmers. On the ﬁnal market, however, the intermediary is price-taker.
4The limit r + R can be seen has a physical limit for the production area. It can be due to the
existence of a national border, to the absence of farmers beyond a certain distance, or to technical limits
for transporting perishable goods over long distances. For social reasons, the trader may not be able to
contract only with some farmers of a local community. Hence we impose that the trader contracts with
all farmers located before r + R. There are parameters values for which it is proﬁtable for the trader
to do so. A suﬃcient condition for this to be the case is that τr − θr > 3τR/2. Indeed, we will see in
chapter 3 that the optimal size of the production area, should the intermediary be able to choose it, is
given by (3.4.9), (3.4.16) or (3.4.29). This is larger than R when τr − θr > 3τR/2 is satisﬁed.
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and pays iC(x) per unit of input. Each farmer can individually accept or reject the
contract. In a second step, the farmer chooses his optimal quantity of input, which
determines his level of production. If he has accepted the contract, he faces prices
(pC(x), iC(x)) and chooses optimal input use k
∗(x) = k(x, pC(x), iC(x)). If he rejects
the contract, he sells his production directly to the ﬁnal market. The same applies to
the purchase of inputs. In this case, he chooses the optimal amount of inputs k0 as a
function of market prices (p, i) as well as of the transport cost he has to support, that
is k0(x) = k(x, p − τx, i). In a last step, output is produced and is sold on the market,
directly by the farmer (if he has rejected the contract) or via the trader (if the farmer
has accepted the contract).
This means that the trader's problem can be characterized as follows:
max
pC(x),iC(x)
Π =
∫ r+R
r
(p−θr−τ(x−r)−pC(x))f(k∗(x))+(iC(x)− i)k∗(x)dx−F (2.2.3)
where F is the ﬁxed cost necessary to obtain the transport cost advantage5, subject to
the demand for input (2.2.2) and the following participation constraint:
y(x) ≡ pC(x)f(k∗(x))− iC(x)k∗(x) ≥ y0(x) ≡ (p− τx)f(k0(x))− ik0(x) (2.2.4)
One of the questions we will be looking at in the following sections is whether, without
state intervention, the diﬀerent outcomes are socially optimal. Due to the farmer's cost
disadvantage compared to the trader, his stand-alone production is not socially eﬃcient.
Indeed, the eﬃcient input use k#(x) maximizes the sum of trader's proﬁt and farmer's
incomes
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k(x))− ik(x)dx and satisﬁes
df
dk
=
i
p− θr − τ(x− r) (2.2.5)
Given θ < τ and the concavity of production function, this implies that k0(x) < k#(x) ∀x.
In the following sections we will look at diﬀerent ways in which the trader can set
contracts with farmers who are geographically dispersed.
2.3 Spatial price discrimination
The trader proposes a contract (pD(x), iD(x)) to the farmer located in x. This con-
tract can be diﬀerent, depending on the location of the farmer and the diﬀerence in two
farmers' contracts does not necessarily represent the diﬀerence in transport costs between
them. Each farmer can individually accept or refuse the contract proposed. Hence, to
maximize his total proﬁt, the trader chooses a contract which maximizes the proﬁt he
makes at each location.
5Hereafter, we omit this cost F as it has no inﬂuence on the optimization result. We assume that F
is not too high with respect to the proﬁt that can be made by the intermediary.
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From equations (2.2.3) and (2.2.4), the trader's problem may be written as:
max
pD(x),iD(x)
pi(x) = (p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)− (pD(x)f(k∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x))
(2.3.1)
s.t. g(x) ≡ pD(x)f(k∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x)− y0(x) ≥ 0 (2.3.2)
The Lagrangian is given by:
L = (p−θr−τ(x−r))f(k∗(x))−ik∗(x)+(λ(x)−1)(pD(x)f(k∗(x))−iD(x)k∗(x))−λ(x)y0(x)
(2.3.3)
Noting that at equilibrium df
dk
= iD(x)
pD(x)
and applying the envelop theorem to the income
of the farmer, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be written as:
∂L
∂pD(x)
=
(
(p− θr − τ(x− r)) iD(x)
pD(x)
− i
)
∂k∗(x)
∂pD(x)
+ (λ(x)− 1)f(k∗(x)) = 0 (2.3.4)
∂L
∂iD(x)
=
(
(p− θr − τ(x− r)) iD(x)
pD(x)
− i
)
∂k∗(x)
∂iD(x)
+ (λ(x)− 1)(−k∗(x)) = 0 (2.3.5)
λ(x) ≥ 0, g(x) ≥ 0, λ(x)g(x) = 0 (2.3.6)
From (2.3.5),
λ(x)− 1 =
(
(p− θr − τ(x− r)) iD(x)
pD(x)
− i
)
∂k∗(x)
∂iD(x)
1
k∗(x)
(2.3.7)
Substituting (2.3.7) in (2.3.4) we have:(
(p− θr − τ(x− r)) iD(x)
pD(x)
− i
)(
∂k∗(x)
∂pD(x)
+
∂k∗(x)
∂iD(x)
f(k∗(x))
k∗(x)
)
= 0 (2.3.8)
If the second term was equal to zero, it can be shown that y(x) = 0 so that g(x) < 0,
which contradicts (2.3.6).6 Thus, the ﬁrst term has to be equal to zero, that is:
iD(x)
pD(x)
=
i
p− θr − τ(x− r) (2.3.9)
Equation (2.3.9) characterizes the optimal contract (pD(x), iD(x)). This contract
induces the farmer to increase his level of input (as well as his level of output) with
respect to the levels he would have chosen in the stand-alone case, even though he
receives the same income, as it is stated in the following proposition.
6Indeed, implicit function theorem applied to equation (2.2.2) gives (omitting the argument (x)):
dk
dpF
= −
df
dk
pF
d2f
dk2
and dkdiF = − −1pF d2fdk2
. By the envelop theorem, we know that dkdpF =
∂k
∂pF
∣∣∣
k=k∗
and
dk
diF
= ∂k∂iF
∣∣∣
k=k∗
that we call ∂k
∗
∂pF
and ∂k
∗
∂iF
. Thus, ∂k
∗
∂pF
= −
df
dk
pF
d2f
dk2
and ∂k
∗
∂iF
= − −1
pF
d2f
dk2
, which implies
−∂k∗/∂pF∂k∗/∂iF =
df
dk . By (2.2.2), this is equal to
iF
pF
. If the second term in (2.3.8) was equal to zero, we
would have −∂k∗/∂pF∂k∗/∂iF =
f(k∗)
k∗ , thus
f(k∗)
k∗ =
iF
pF
⇔ pF = iF k∗f(k∗) . Substituting in the farmer's income
would give y(x) = pF f(k
∗)− iF k∗ = 0.
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Proposition 1. Under spatial price discrimination, when the trader is proﬁt
maximizer, each farmer's income is pushed down to his reservation level
(y(x) = y0(x) ∀x), while each farmer uses the eﬃcient quantity of inputs,
which is larger than in his stand-alone situation: k∗(x) = k#(x) > k0(x).
Proof of proposition 1: As the ratio of input price to output price is given by
(2.3.9), this tells us, by using (2.2.2) and comparing it to (2.2.5), that the farmer will
choose the eﬃcient level of input: k∗(x) = k#(x). Given that τ > θ and that f(k) is
strictly concave and using (2.2.2) with respectively (pF (x), iF (x)) = (pD(x), iD(x)) and
(pF (x), iF (x)) = (p − τx, i), we have that k∗(x) > k0(x). Substituting (2.3.9) in (2.3.7)
gives λ(x) = 1. From (2.3.6), this implies that the individual rationality constraint is
binding: g(x) ≡ pD(x)f(k∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x)− y0(x) = 0.
Substituting (2.3.9) in the binding participation constraint g(x) = 0 gives:
pD(x) = (p− θr − τ(x− r)) (p− τx)f(k
0(x))− ik0(x)
(p− θr − τ(x− r)) f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ηD(x)
(2.3.10)
iD(x) = i
(p− τx)f(k0(x))− ik0(x)
(p− θr − τ(x− r)) f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δD(x)
(2.3.11)
Proposition 2. Under spatial price discrimination, the proﬁt maximizing con-
tract is characterized by ηD(x) = δD(x) < 1 which implies iD(x) < i and
pD(x) < p − θr − τ(x − r): the trader loses on the input trading and gains
on the output trading.
Proof of proposition 2: As k∗(x) = k#(x) (proposition 1), ηD(x) = δD(x) may be
written as:
ηD(x) = δD(x) =
max
k
(p− τx)f(k)− ik
max
k
(p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k)− ik
Using the envelop theorem and since by assumption θ < τ , this implies that ηD(x) =
δD(x) < 1. Using this result with (2.3.10) and (2.3.11) this implies that pD(x) <
p− θr − τ(x− r) and iD(x) < i.
Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) obtain similar results. They analyzed inter-
linked contracts when input market is characterized by an imperfection, such that the
farmer faces a higher input price than the ﬁrm. They show that the trader has an inter-
est to subsidize the input and tax the output, and that this type of contract allows
him to appropriate himself all the eﬃciency gain (i.e. farmers' incomes are pushed down
to their reservation income). In our context, the diﬀerence between the trader and the
farmer lies in the (output) transport costs, and the previous analysis shows that their
results remain valid in this context. If the trader did not propose an interlinked contract
but only proposed a contract regarding the output price, he would not have been able
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to push all the farmers' incomes down to their reservation level.7 Both instruments,
output and input prices, are necessary for the trader to capture completely the eﬃciency
gain. The strategy of La Laiterie du Berger that sells cattle feed to farmers at 50%
of the market price (personal interview, 2009) is thus constistent with our analysis. In
other contexts also, evidence suggests that in interlinked contracts the input is sold at a
discount.8
It can be easily seen, as it is done in Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987), that,
if there was no diﬀerence between the trader and the farmer (i.e. τ = θ), the optimal
contract would be characterized by ηD(x) = δD(x) = 1, and the role of the trader
would be irrelevant. If he has no cost advantage, the trader is not able to organize the
production in a more eﬃcient way than farmers do.
Proposition 3. Under spatial price discrimination, iD(x) < i and pD(x) < p−τx:
each farmer loses on the output trading and gains on the input trading.
Proof of proposition 3: From (2.3.10), pD(x) < p− τx if
f(k0(x))− i
p− τxk
0(x) < f(k∗(x))− i
p− θr − τ(x− r)k
∗(x)
From (2.2.2), (2.2.5) and proposition 1, this is equivalent to
f(k0(x))− df
dk
∣∣∣∣
k(x)=k0(x)
k0(x) < f(k#(x))− df
dk
∣∣∣∣
k(x)=k#(x)
k#(x)
This is true provided that the production elasticity df
dk
k
f(k)
is constant or decreasing in k.
The result iD(x) < i follows from proposition 2.
When involved in the interlinked transaction, each farmer receives a price for the
output which is lower than the net price he would have received in the stand-alone
situation. This loss on the output trading is compensated by a gain on the input
trading, such that, as proposition 1 states, each farmer gets an income y(x) from the
contract which is exactly equal to his reservation income y0(x).
The results show that farmers are treated diﬀerently depending on their location.
On the one hand, farmers located far from the market receive a lower price for their
output, but on the other hand they also pay a lower price for input. Moreover, those
farmers receive a smaller share of the net price received by the trader on the market for
the output and pay a lower part of the input price. Indeed, from (2.3.10) and (2.3.11),
7In particular, with f(k) = 2
√
k, it can be shown that only the farmers located before p+θrτ − r
receive their reservation income. Farmers further away get a positive surplus from such a contract.
8In Kenya, British American Tobacco Ltd delivers input to farmers at prices that are in most cases
lower than the Nairobi wholesale prices for similar products, while Kenya Tea Development Agency
Ltd supplies bags of fertilizer at a price signiﬁcantly lower than the wholesale price in Nairobi and
much lower than the retail price oﬀered to the smallholders by the village-level stockists (IFAD, 2003).
Sometimes, input is even given for free (Koo, 2011, IFAD, 2003).
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it can be shown9 that pD(x), iD(x), and ηD(x) = δD(x) are decreasing in x. Contract
prices pD(x) and iD(x) are increasing with the output market price p.
10 We also have
that ηD(x) (= δD(x)) increase with p which means that trader's mark-up on the output
and discount on the input are lower when p is higher.
2.4 Uniform pricing
Under uniform pricing policy, the trader is constrained to propose the same con-
tract (pU , iU) to all farmers (where pU and iU are independent of x). Each farmer can
individually accept or refuse the contract proposed.
The trader's problem can be written as:
max
pU ,iU
Π =
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗)− ik∗ − (pUf(k∗)− iUk∗)dx
s.t. g(x) ≡ pUf(k∗)− iUk∗ − y0(x) ≥ 0 ∀x
Note that k∗ is the same for all farmers, independent of their location (see (2.2.2) where
pF (x) = pU and iF (x) = iU are independent of x). As farmers are distributed on the
interval [r, r+R], there is a continuum of participation constraints g(x) with x ∈ [r, r+R].
The satisfaction of the constraint for the ﬁrst farmer (located at r) is suﬃcient to ensure
that it is satisﬁed for all farmers located further (in x ∈]r, r + R]). Indeed, as k∗ is
constant for all x and y0(x) is strictly decreasing in x, g(x) is strictly increasing in x.
Thus, we can replace the continuum of constraints g(x) ≥ 0 by the unique constraint
g(r) ≥ 0 (see for instance Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005: 82). The problem is now
the following:
max
pU ,iU
Π = R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗ − (pUf(k∗)− iUk∗)
)
s.t. g(r) ≡ pUf(k∗)− iUk∗ − y0(r) ≥ 0
The Lagrangian is given by:
L = R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗
)
+ (λ−R) (pUf(k∗)− iUk∗)− λy0(r) (2.4.1)
9First derivative of ηD(x) with respect to x is negative if f(k
∗(x))[(p− τx) f(k0(x)) − ik0(x)] <
f(k0(x))[(p− θr − τ(x− r)) f(k∗(x)) − ik∗(x)]. As θ < τ , a suﬃcient condition is k0(x)/f(k0(x)) >
k∗(x)/f(k∗(x)) which is ensured by the concavity of the production function and the fact that k∗(x) >
k0(x) from proposition 1. As ηD(x) is decreasing in x, it follows that pD(x) and iD(x) are also decreasing
in x since ∂pD(x)∂x =
∂ηD(x)
∂x (p− θr − τ(x− r))− τηD(x) < 0 and ∂iD(x)∂x = ∂ηD(x)∂x i < 0.
10For instance, Strohm and Hoeffler (2006) have reported that Deepa Industries in Kenya paid a
higher price to potatoes producers than originally agreed because the market price had risen.
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Noting that at equilibrium df
dk
= iU
pU
and applying the envelop theorem to the income
of the farmer, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be written as:
∂L
∂pU
= R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
iU
pU
− i
)
∂k∗
∂pU
+ (λ−R) f(k∗) = 0 (2.4.2)
∂L
∂iU
= R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
iU
pU
− i
)
∂k∗
∂iU
+ (λ−R) (−k∗) = 0 (2.4.3)
λ ≥ 0, g(r) ≥ 0, λg(r) = 0 (2.4.4)
From (2.4.3),
λ−R = R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
iU
pU
− i
)
∂k∗
∂iU
1
k∗
(2.4.5)
Substituting (2.4.5) in (2.4.2) we have:
R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
iU
pU
− i
)(
∂k∗
∂pU
+
∂k∗
∂iU
f(k∗)
k∗
)
= 0 (2.4.6)
As R is strictly positive, the ﬁrst and/or second term between brackets has to be
equal to zero. If the last term was equal to zero, it can be shown11 that y(x) = 0 ∀x so
that g(x) < 0 ∀x, which contradicts (2.4.4). Thus, the ﬁrst term has to be equal to zero,
that is:
iU
pU
=
i
p− θr − τ R
2
(2.4.7)
Equation (2.4.7) characterizes the optimal contract (pU , iU). This contract implies
that each farmer receives the same income from the contract as the stand-alone income
of the ﬁrst farmer.
Proposition 4. Under uniform pricing, when the trader is proﬁt maximizer,
if the trader's cost advantage is large enough (τr − θr > τ(R/2)) the closest
farmer's income is pushed down to his reservation level (y(r) = y0(r)) while
the others obtain a positive surplus from the contract. Each farmer increases
his quantity of inputs with respect to the stand-alone situation (k∗(x) > k0(x)).
If his cost advantage is too small (τr− θr ≤ τ(R/2)), the trader is not able to
make a positive proﬁt.12
Proof of proposition 4: Substituting (2.4.7) in (2.4.5) gives λ = R. From (2.4.4), this
implies that the individual rationality constraint is binding: g(r) ≡ pUf(k∗) − iUk∗ −
y0(r) = 0. If τr − θr > τ(R/2), given that that f(k) is strictly concave and using
(2.2.2) with respectively (pF (x), iF (x)) = (pU , iU) and (pF (x), iF (x)) = (p − τx, i), we
11Indeed, we have shown (see footnote 6) that −∂k∗(x)/∂pF∂k∗(x)/∂iF =
f(k∗(x))
k∗(x) , implies y(x) = 0.
12If the intermediary had the possibility to collect the good only on a part of collection area R, he
would do so, this strategy leading to a positive proﬁt. Here, we assume this is not possible. For a
discussion about the optimal size of the collection area, see chapter 3.
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have that k∗ > k0(x). If τr − θr ≤ τ(R/2), we have that k∗ ≤ k0(x). Given that
g(r) = 0, the proﬁt is Π = R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗ − [(p− τr)f(k0(r))− ik0(r)]).
From k∗ ≤ k0(r) and τr ≤ θr + τ(R/2), we have that Π ≤ 0.
Contrary to the spatial price discrimination case, when the trader is able to operate
proﬁtably under uniform pricing, all the farmers except the ﬁrst one see an increase in
their income with respect to their stand-alone situation. Using this policy,  La Laiterie
du Berger claims that its presence has allowed to triple the income of the farmers
involved (PhiTrust, 2011).13
Substituting (2.4.7) in the binding participation constraint g(r) = 0 gives:
pU =
(
p− θr − τ R
2
)
(p− τr)f(k0(r))− ik0(r)(
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
ηU
(2.4.8)
iU = i
(p− τr)f(k0(r))− ik0(r)(
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
δU
(2.4.9)
Proposition 5. Under uniform pricing, when τr− θr > τ(R/2), the proﬁt max-
imizing contract is characterized by ηU = δU < 1 which implies iU < i and
pU < p − θr − τ(R/2): the trader loses on the input trading and gains on
average on the output trading.
Proof of proposition 5: Note, from (2.4.7) and (2.2.5), that k∗ = k#(r+(R/2)). Thus,
ηU = δU may be written as:
ηU = δU =
max
k
(p− τr)f(k)− ik
max
k
(p− θr − τ(R/2))f(k)− ik
Using the envelop theorem, τr − θr > τ(R/2) implies that ηU = δU < 1. Using this
result with (2.4.8) and (2.4.9) implies that pU < p− θr − τ(R/2) and iU < i.
Propositions 4 and 5 imply that, only if there exists a suﬃcient diﬀerence in transport
costs (τr − θr > τ(R/2)), the trader is able to make a positive proﬁt. In this case, he
loses on the input trading and gains on the output trading, as the average net price he
receives on the market is higher than the price he pays to each farmer, similarly to what
happens in the spatial price discrimination case. However, if his cost advantage is too
13Higher income due to the contract is also consistent with empirical evidence in other contexts.
Indeed, Warning and Key (2002) have estimated an increase in gross agricultural income of 207000
CFA for Senegalese peanut producers that have accepted a contract with arachide de bouche. Similarly,
Simons et al. (2005) have found that the contracts for seed corn in East Java and for broilers in Lombok
made signiﬁcant contributions to farmers' capital returns.
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small, he is not able to proﬁtably induce farmers to organize production in a more eﬃcient
way. This result is in contrast with the result obtained under price discrimination, where
the trader is able to exploit his cost advantage, even if the advantage is very small.
As it was the case with spatial price discrimination, when the trader's cost advantage
is large enough, contract prices under uniform pricing pU and iU are increasing with the
output market price p. The same applies for ηU = δU , which means that farmers receive
a higher share of trader's gain on the output transaction, but pay a higher share of the
input price, when p is higher.
2.5 Mill pricing
Under a mill pricing policy, the trader pays the same mill price to all farmers. He has
to propose the same contract (pM , iM) to all farmers (where pM and iM are independent
of x) but farmers have to support the transport costs. Thus, the net price received by
the farmer for the output is pF (x) = pM − τ(x− r).
From equations (2.2.3) and (2.2.4), the trader's problem may be written as:
max
pM ,iM
Π =
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr − pM)f(k∗(x)) + (iM − i)k∗(x)dx (2.5.1)
s.t. g(x) ≡ (pM − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− iMk∗(x)− y0(x) ≥ 0 ∀x
As farmers are distributed on the interval [r, r + R], there is a continuum of par-
ticipation constraints g(x) with x ∈ [r, r + R]. Contrary to the uniform pricing case,
which constraint(s) will be binding at the optimum is not obvious. Indeed, one cannot
determine a priori if the contract income decreases at a faster rate with distance than
the reservation income. As Jullien (2000) shows, when both reservation and contract
utility depend on the agent's type (in our case, his location), it may be the case that
the constraint is binding at one end of the interval of agent's type, but it may also be
the case that one or several interior agents face binding participation constraints while
extreme agents do not. In the proof of lemma 1 (appendix 2.A), we show that, if the
production function is homogeneous, the latter does not occur. Indeed, we show that
the outcome may only be characterized by one of the four following cases: (1) the last
participation constraint is binding and only the most distant farmer's income is pushed
down to the reservation level. Other farmers get a positive surplus. This happens if
contract prices pM and iM are such that the income from the contract decreases less
rapidly with distance than the reservation income. (2) the ﬁrst participation constraint
is binding and only the ﬁrst farmer's income is pushed down to the reservation level while
other farmers get a positive surplus. This is possible if contract prices pM and iM are
such that the income from the contract decreases more rapidly with distance than the
reservation income. (3) all constraints are binding and all the farmers are pushed down
to their reservation income. This is the case if the trader decides to set pM = p− τr and
iM = i. (4) no constraint is binding.
Lemma 1. Under mill pricing, if the production function is homogeneous of
degree h < 1, g(r) ≥ 0 and g(r+R) ≥ 0 are suﬃcient to ensure that g(x) ≥ 0 ∀x.
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Proof of lemma 1: See appendix 2.A.
Using lemma 1, the problem can be written as:
max
pM ,iM
Π =
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr − pM)f(k∗(x)) + (iM − i)k∗(x)dx
s.t. g(r) ≡ pMf(k∗(r))− iMk∗(r)− y0(r) ≥ 0
and g(r +R) ≡ (pM − τR)f(k∗(r +R))− iMk∗(r +R)− y0(r +R) ≥ 0
In lemma 2, we prove that the case where contract prices are such that only the ﬁrst
farmer's income is pushed down to the reservation level (case (2) above) is dominated
by the replication of the stand-alone situation (case (3)). Indeed, in the ﬁrst case, the
trader induces all the farmers to decrease their production, compared to their stand-alone
level, which is not optimal from the trader's point of view. Hence, if the ﬁrst farmer's
participation constraint is binding at the optimum this implies that all the participation
constraints are binding at the optimum and that iM = i and pM = p− τr.
Lemma 2. Under mill pricing, if the production function is homogeneous of
degree h < 1 and g(r) = 0 at the optimum, this implies that g(x) = 0 at the
optimum for all x.
Proof of lemma 2: See appendix 2.B.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the results from lemmas 1 and 2, when f(k) = 2
√
k. Binding
constraints g(x) = 0 are represented by curves with the form iM =
(pM−τ(x−r))2
(p−τx)2 i. They
cross at the point (p − τr, i). When pM > p − τr the curve corresponding to the con-
straint of the farmer located in r is below all the other curves, while when pM < p− τr
the curve corresponding to the constraint of the farmer located in r+R is below all the
other curves. Lemma 1 implies that the couple (pM , iM) resulting from the maximization
(2.5.1) is located either within the colored area, either on one of its borders. Lemma 2
implies that this outcome can not be located on the dashed curve.
2.5.1 Model with a speciﬁc production function
In what follows, we use a particular production function to derive some characteristics
of the equilibrium.
Assumption 1. f(k) = 2
√
k.
If the participation constraint of the most remote farmer is binding, this implies that
iM < i. If it was not the case, the binding participation constraint would imply that
pM > p − τr, and this, in turn, would not respect the participation constraint for the
other farmers. However, the unconstrained equilibrium could be such that iM > i and
pM > p−τr. Indeed, a priori one could think that it would be possible to ﬁnd a contract
such that each farmer losses on the input but gains on the output, while no participation
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Figure 2.2: Continuum of constraints
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constraint is binding (this corresponds to the dark gray area on ﬁgure 2.2). In what
follows, we show that the trader has no interest to do so, such that, at the optimum,
iM ≤ i always holds. On ﬁgure 2.2, proposition 6 implies that the couple (pM , iM)
resulting from the maximization (2.5.1) is located within the light gray area, or on one
of its borders.
Proposition 6. Under mill pricing and assumption 1, the proﬁt maximizing
contract is characterized by iM ≤ i. The trader loses on the input trading.
Proof of proposition 6: See appendix 2.D.
Corollary 1. Under mill pricing and assumption 1, the proﬁt maximizing
interlinked contract implies that each farmer increases the quantity of inputs
he uses, and hence increases his production, compared to his stand-alone
alternative.
Proof of corollary 1: The participation constraint has to be satisﬁed for all x. As the
production function is homogeneous, that means iMk
∗(x)−ik0(x) ≥ 0 (see also appendix
2.A). From proposition 6, iM ≤ i, which implies k∗(x) ≥ k0(x) for the participation con-
straints to be satisﬁed.
The result of farmers increasing their output (also obtained under discriminatory and
uniform pricing) is consistent with what is observed in the milk sector in Senegal. In
particular, La Laiterie du Berger claims that the feed supplements it provides to the
farmers have helped them to increase their production, especially during the dry season
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(own interview, 2009). This is also observed in other sectors using interlinked contracts.14
Using lemma 2 and proposition 6, the problem can be written as:
max
pM ,iM
Π =
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr − pM)f(k∗(x)) + (iM − i)k∗(x)dx
s.t. g(r +R) ≡ (pM − τR)f(k∗(r +R))− iMk∗(r +R)− y0(r +R) ≥ 0
and i− iM ≥ 0
The Lagrangian is given by:
L =
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr − pM)f(k∗(x)) + (iM − i)k∗(x)dx
+ λ
(
(pM − τR)f(k∗(r +R))− iMk∗(r +R)− y0(r +R)
)
+ µ(i− iM) (2.5.2)
Noting that at equilibrium df
dk
= iM
pM−τ(x−r) and applying the envelop theorem to the
income of the farmer, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be written as:
∂L
∂pM
= λf(k∗(r+R))+
∫ r+R
r
(
(p− θr − pM) iM
pM − τ(x− r) + iM − i
)
∂k∗
∂pM
−f(k∗(x))dx = 0
(2.5.3)
∂L
∂iM
= −λk∗(r+R)−µ+
∫ r+R
r
(
(p− θr − pM) iM
pM − τ(x− r) + iM − i
)
∂k∗
∂iM
+k∗(x)dx = 0
(2.5.4)
λ ≥ 0, g(r +R) ≥ 0, λg(r +R) = 0 (2.5.5)
µ ≥ 0, i− iM ≥ 0, µ(i− iM) = 0 (2.5.6)
Contrary to uniform pricing and spatial price discrimination, under mill pricing the
optimum is not always constrained. Whether the optimum is constrained or uncon-
strained depends on the output price p as well as on the trader's cost advantage τ − θ.
Proposition 7. Under mill pricing and assumption 1:
• If the trader has a large cost advantage (τr−θr > τR), if the output price
is large (p > p¯ with p¯ unique) the most distant farmer's income is pushed
down to his reservation level (g(r+R) = 0) while other farmers obtain a
positive surplus from the contract. For a lower output price (p ∈ [p, p¯]),
all the farmers, including the last one, obtain a positive surplus from
the contract (g(x) > 0 ∀x).
14In the Indian poultry sector, Ramaswami et al. (2006) have found that contract production is more
eﬃcient than noncontract one and that the eﬃciency surplus is largely appropriated by the processor.
In Ethiopia, Tadesse and Guttormsen (2009) have estimated that producers of haricot bean who are
in relational (interlinked) contract supply about 27% more than farmers in spot markets.
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• If τR/2 < τr− θr ≤ τR, then the most distant farmer's income is pushed
down to his reservation level (g(r+R) = 0) while other farmers obtain a
positive surplus from the contract ∀ p > p.
• If τR/3 < τr−θr ≤ τR/2, if the output price is large (p > p˜ with p˜ unique)
then all the farmers' incomes (including the last one's) are pushed down
to their reservation level (g(x) = 0 ∀x) and the stand-alone situation is
simply replicated. For a lower output price (p ∈ [p, p˜]), only the most
distant farmer's income is pushed down to his reservation level (g(r +
R) = 0) while other farmers obtain a positive surplus from the contract.
• If the trader has a small cost advantage (τr − θr ≤ τR/3), then all the
farmers' incomes (including the last one's) are pushed down to their
reservation level (g(x) = 0 ∀x) and the stand-alone situation is simply
replicated, ∀ p > p.
Proof of proposition 7: See appendix 2.E.
These results (illustrated by the stylized ﬁgure 2.3) show that under mill pricing the
optimal pricing by the trader is not always to simply charge farmers the prices they face
in a stand-alone situation and to make a proﬁt from the transport cost advantage he
has. In particular, if his cost advantage is large enough, the trader uses it to introduce a
distortion in the prices in order to induce farmers to produce more and hence increase
his proﬁt even more.
Figure 2.3: Proposition 7
 
  
g(x)>0 for all x 
g(x)=0 for all x 
g(r+R)=0 
g(x)>0 for all x<r+R 
 
τR/3 
τR/2 
τr-θr 
p 
τR 
 
̅ 
 
60
Note that for some values of the parameters (τr−θr > τR and p < p¯) all the farmers
can beneﬁt from contracting with a trader. In a context where agricultural output prices
are often driven down by international competition, this result is particularly interesting.
In contrast, under the two other pricing policies (discrimination or uniform pricing), there
is always at least one farmer who is pushed down to his reservation income, for any p.
If the trader's transport cost advantage is large, but the output price is low, the
optimum is unconstrained, meaning that the contract which is optimal from the trader's
point of view leads to incomes for the farmers that are higher than their stand-alone
incomes. This is due to the low level of the stand-alone income which is a consequence of
both low output price and high farmer's transport cost. When the output price is larger,
this is no longer possible. Indeed, as θ is bounded at 0, the trader's cost advantage
cannot be larger than τ , and cannot compensate the increase in the reservation income
due to a higher output price.
On the contrary, if the trader's transport cost advantage is low, if the output price
is large, the contract which is optimal from the trader's point of view leads to incomes
for the farmers that are lower than their stand-alone incomes. Indeed, the high output
price lead to large reservation incomes that cannot be compensated by the trader's cost
advantage, as it is too small. In this case, the best the trader is able to do in order that
the farmers accept the contract, is to replicate their stand-alone situation.
2.6 The case of a non-proﬁt trader
Most of the literature about spatial price policies and/or about interlinked transac-
tions assumes that the trader is a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm. However in agriculture and
livestock sector in developing countries, several local producers' associations and NGOs
try to increase the income and welfare of producers. In order to take this into account,
we look at the case in which the trader is a non-proﬁt organization. When the trader
defends the interest of farmers, the objective function can take diﬀerent forms. Following
the literature, we look at two diﬀerent cases: a ﬁrst case where the trader maximizes the
sum of farmers's incomes and a second case where the trader maximizes total earnings
(i.e. the sum of proﬁt and farmers' income) assuming that the proﬁt can be distributed
to members (see for instance Royer, 2001).
2.6.1 Spatial price discrimination
When the trader maximizes total farmers' income, subject to a non-negative proﬁt
and participation of all farmers, his problem is the following:
max
pD(x),iD(x)
y(x) = pD(x)f(k
∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x)
s.t. g(x) ≡ pD(x)f(k∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x)− y0(x) ≥ 0
and pi(x) ≡ (p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)− (pD(x)f(k∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x)) ≥ 0
The Lagrangian is given by:
L = µ(x) ((p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x))+(1−µ(x)+λ(x))(pD(x)f(k∗(x))−iD(x)k∗(x))
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Noting that at equilibrium df
dk
= iD(x)
pD(x)
and applying the envelop theorem to the income
of the farmer, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be written as:
∂L
∂pD(x)
= µ(x)
(
(p− θr − τ(x− r)) iD(x)
pD(x)
− i
)
∂k∗(x)
∂pD(x)
+ (1−µ(x) +λ(x))f(k∗(x)) = 0
(2.6.1)
∂L
∂iD(x)
= µ(x)
(
(p− θr − τ(x− r)) iD(x)
pD(x)
− i
)
∂k∗(x)
∂iD(x)
+(1−µ(x)+λ(x)) (−k∗(x)) = 0
(2.6.2)
λ(x) ≥ 0, g(x) ≥ 0, λ(x)g(x) = 0 (2.6.3)
µ(x) ≥ 0, pi(x) ≥ 0, µ(x)pi(x) = 0 (2.6.4)
Optimal contract is characterized by µ(x) = 1, λ(x) = 0 and:
iD(x)
pD(x)
=
i
p− θr − τ(x− r) (2.6.5)
This price ratio is the same as for the proﬁt maximizing trader (see (2.3.9)). This
implies that the optimal level of input chosen by each farmer k∗(x) is the same, whether
the trader is proﬁt maximizer or not. The same applies for the output production level
f(k∗(x)). Under this pricing policy, both non-proﬁt and for-proﬁt traders induce farmers
to choose the eﬃcient level of inputs. This means that maximizing farmers' income does
not lead to any eﬃciency loss compared to maximizing proﬁt.
From (2.6.4), and µ(x) = 1, we know that, at the optimum, the proﬁt is equal to zero
(the constraint on proﬁt is binding). Substituting (2.6.5) in pi(x) = 0 gives:
pD(x) = p− θr − τ(x− r), iD(x) = i
Comparing these expressions to the for-proﬁt case ((2.3.10) and (2.3.11)), we see that
when the trader is an income maximizer, he does not make any gain nor loss neither on
the input nor on the output. The trader transfers the net prices he faces to the farmers.
It has to be noted that when the trader maximizes farmers' income under price dis-
crimination, while he has the possibility of setting for diﬀerent farmers diﬀerent contracts
which do not reﬂect the diﬀerence in transport costs, it is not optimal for him to do so.
The optimal contracts for diﬀerent farmers will reﬂect the diﬀerences in transport costs
and hence are the same as the optimal contracts under mill pricing.
The price ratio (2.6.5) is the result of proﬁt maximization or farmers' income max-
imization or even the maximization of the sum of proﬁt and farmers' income. Indeed,
assume a cooperative maximizes such a function. The problem is then the following:
max
pD(x),iD(x)
(p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)
s.t. g(x) ≡ pD(x)f(k∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x)− y0(x) ≥ 0
and pi(x) ≡ (p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)− (pD(x)f(k∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x)) ≥ 0
The Lagrangian is given by (for ease of notation, we drop the argument (x)):
L = (1 + µ) ((p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗)− ik∗) + (λ− µ)(pDf(k∗)− iDk∗)− λy0
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The Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst-order conditions imply that λ(x) = µ(x) = 0 and that the
optimal contract is characterized by (2.6.5). As pD and iD enter the objective func-
tion only through k∗ and not separately, there exists a continuum of pD and iD (which
satisfy (2.6.5)) which maximizes this objective function. This leads us to the following
proposition:
Proposition 8. Under spatial price discrimination, when total earnings are
maximized, the optimal contract is deﬁned by (pD(x), iD(x)) = (ψD(x)(p − θr −
τ(x−r)), ψD(x)i) where ψD(x) ∈ [ηD(x), 1], ηD(x) is deﬁned in (2.3.10). If ψD(x) =
ηD(x), then g(x) = 0 and the proﬁt is maximized. If ψD(x) = 1, then pi(x) = 0
and farmer's income is maximized.
Whether the trader maximizes proﬁt, farmers' income or total earnings, the optimal
contract is always deﬁned by the same price ratio, implying that the eﬃcient outcome is
reached. Only the distribution of the eﬃciency gain between agents is diﬀerent. Proﬁt
maximization and income maximization can be seen as two particular cases of the total
earnings maximization. If proﬁt is maximized, the trader acquires all the eﬃciency gain,
while if income is maximized, it is acquired by the farmers.
2.6.2 Uniform pricing
Under uniform pricing, as k∗ is independent of x, the trader's problem, when he
maximizes total farmers' income subject to non-negative proﬁt and participation of all
farmers, is the following:
max
pU ,iU
R(pUf(k
∗)− iUk∗)
s.t g(r) ≡ pUf(k∗)− iUk∗ − y0(r) ≥ 0
and Π = R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗ − (pUf(k∗)− iUk∗)
)
≥ 0
The Lagrangian is given by:
L = µR
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗
)
+ (R− µR + λ)(pUf(k∗)− iUk∗)
Noting that at equilibrium df
dk
= iU
pU
and applying the envelop theorem to the income
of the farmer, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be written as:
∂L
∂pU
= µR
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
iU
pU
− i
)
∂k∗
∂pU
+ (R− µR + λ)f(k∗) = 0 (2.6.6)
∂L
∂iU
= µR
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
iU
pU
− i
)
∂k∗
∂iU
+ (R− µR + λ) (−k∗) = 0 (2.6.7)
λ ≥ 0, g(r) ≥ 0, λg(r) = 0 (2.6.8)
µ ≥ 0, Π ≥ 0, µΠ = 0 (2.6.9)
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The optimal contract is characterized by R− µR + λ = 0 and:
iU
pU
=
i
p− θr − τ R
2
(2.6.10)
This price ratio is the same as for the proﬁt maximizing trader (see (2.4.7)). This
implies that the optimal level of input chosen by farmers, k∗, is the same, whether the
trader is a proﬁt maximizer or an income maximizer. Hence, as it was the case for the
for-proﬁt, if he has a suﬃcient cost advantage, the income maximizer trader is able to
induce each farmer to increase his production with respect to his stand-alone alternative.
From (2.6.8), (2.6.9) and R − µR + λ = 0, we know that, an optimum exists only if
τr − θr ≥ τ(R/2). At the optimum, the proﬁt is equal to zero (the constraint on proﬁt
is binding). Substituting (2.6.10) in Π = 0 gives:
pU = p− θr − τ(R/2), iU = i
Comparing these expressions to the for-proﬁt case ((2.4.8) and (2.4.9)), we see that when
the trader is an income maximizer, he does not make any gain nor loss neither on the
input nor on the output.
It has to be noted that with those prices, when τr − θr < τ(R/2) the trader is not
able to induce participation of the ﬁrst farmers. Only if the diﬀerence in transport cost is
large enough all farmers accept the contract proposed by the income-maximizer trader.
Here again, the price ratio (2.6.10) also corresponds to total earnings maximization.
Indeed, assuming a cooperative maximizes the sum of proﬁt and farmers' income, the
problem is the following:
max
pU ,iU
R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗
)
s.t g(r) ≡ pUf(k∗)− iUk∗ − y0(r) ≥ 0
and Π ≡ R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗ − (pUf(k∗)− iUk∗)
)
≥ 0
The Lagrangian is given by:
L = (1 + µ)R
((
p− θr − τ R
2
)
f(k∗)− ik∗
)
+ (λ− µ)(pUf(k∗)− iUk∗)− λy0(r)
The Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst-order conditions imply that λ = µ and that the optimal con-
tract is characterized by (2.6.10). As pU and iU enter the objective function only through
k∗ and not separately, there exists a continuum of pU and iU (which satisfy (2.6.10)) which
maximizes this objective function. This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 9. Under uniform pricing and τr − θr > R/2, when total earn-
ings are maximized, the optimal contract is deﬁned by (pU , iU) = (ψU(p − θr −
τ(R/2)), ψU i) where ψU ∈ [ηU , 1], ηU is deﬁned in (2.4.8). If ψU = ηU , then g(r) = 0
and the proﬁt is maximized. If ψU = 1, then Π = 0 and total farmers' income
is maximized.
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2.6.3 Mill pricing
When the trader maximizes total farmers' income subject to non-negative proﬁt and
participation of all farmers, his problem is the following15:
max
pM ,iM
∫ r+R
r
((pM − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− iMk∗(x))dx
s.t. Π ≡
∫ r+R
r
(p−θr−τ(x−r))f(k∗(x))−ik∗(x)−((pM−τ(x−r))f(k∗(x))−iMk∗(x))dx ≥ 0
and g(r) ≡ pMf(k∗(r))− iMk∗(r)− y0(r) ≥ 0
and g(r +R) ≡ (pM − τR)f(k∗(r +R))− iMk∗(r +R)− y0(r +R) ≥ 0
As it was shown that under spatial price discrimination the optimal pricing policy is
a mill pricing policy, the result regarding the optimal mill pricing one is immediate:
pD(x) = p− θr − τ(x− r) = pF (x) = pM − τ(x− r)⇔ pM = p− θr
iD(x) = i = iF (x) = iM ⇔ iM = i
Π = 0
Proposition 10. Under mill pricing, when farmers' income is maximized, the
optimal contract is characterized by pM = p− θr and iM = i. This equilibrium
is equivalent to the one obtained from spatial price discrimination, in terms
of farmer's income as well as input choice and output production.
Contrary to the two other pricing policies, under mill pricing, the optimal contract will
be diﬀerent depending on whether the trader maximizes farmers' income or proﬁt. Only
income maximization corresponds to total earnings maximization. Indeed, assuming
a cooperative maximizes the sum of proﬁt and farmers' income, the problem is the
following16:
max
pM ,iM
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)dx
s.t. Π ≡
∫ r+R
r
(p−θr−τ(x−r))f(k∗(x))−ik∗(x)−((pM−τ(x−r))f(k∗(x))−iMk∗(x))dx ≥ 0
and g(r) ≡ pMf(k∗(r))− iMk∗(r)− y0(r) ≥ 0
and g(r +R) ≡ (pM − τR)f(k∗(r +R))− iMk∗(r +R)− y0(r +R) ≥ 0
15If the production function is homogeneous of degree h < 1 (see lemma 2).
16If the production function is homogeneous of degree h < 1 (see lemma 2).
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The Lagrangian is given by:
L = (1 + µ)
∫ r+R
r
((p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)) dx
− µ
∫ r+R
r
((pM − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− iMk∗(x))dx
+ λ1(pMf(k
∗(r))− iMk∗(r)− y0(r)) + λ2((pM − τR)f(k∗(r +R))− iMk∗(r +R)− y0(r +R))
From the Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst-order conditions, either Π = 0 or µ = 0. In the ﬁrst
case, the problem is similar to the total farmers' income maximization case, while in
the second, it is similar to proﬁt maximization. As the ﬁrst case is similar to non-proﬁt
spatial price discrimination, which has been shown to provide the highest sum of proﬁt
and farmers' income, the ﬁrst case is preferred to the latter one. Contrary to other
policies, under mill pricing, only one contract leads to maximized total earnings and this
contract corresponds to farmers' income maximization.
While imposing a mill pricing policy to a for-proﬁt trader leads to a loss of eﬃciency,
this is not the case for a non-proﬁt trader. Indeed, the latter induces farmers to produce
eﬃciently, and all the eﬃciency gain (compared to the stand-alone farmers' situation) is
acquired by the farmers.
2.7 Poverty and policy implications
As explained before, Senegalese milk production is characterized by a low production
and a low quantity of input (cattle feeds) used. Milk producers have low income and most
of them can be considered as poor. Empirical literature on various agricultural sectors
in developing countries shows that these elements are worsening with distance, remote
farmers using less inputs (Staal et al., 2002), producing or selling less (Holloway et
al., 2000, Stifel and Minten, 2008) and having lower income (Jacoby, 2000) than
the less isolated ones. Improving their living conditions may contribute to reduce rural
poverty and boost socio-economic development in rural areas. In this context, we look
at the measures that can be adopted by policy makers to increase farmers' production,
input use and income.
It has been shown that, whatever the pricing policy chosen, the use of an interlinked
contract by an intermediary who has a suﬃcient transport cost advantage incites each
farmer to increase the level of input he uses, compared to what he used in the stand-
alone case and hence to increase his production. However, farmers are not always able to
improve their income, as all the eﬃciency gain can be acquired by the trader. A policy
maker or an external donor may use appropriate regulations on the spatial pricing policy
to be used in the interlinked contract in order to improve farmers' livelihoods.
In particular, we look at what a benevolent policy maker who wants to decrease
poverty but is unable to impose a complex tax and subsidy scheme should impose as a
spatial pricing policy to be used by intermediaries. Similarly, we look at the conditions
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an external donor should impose to the intermediaries he promotes, when his aim is
reducing rural poverty.
Following Foster et al. (1984), we adopt the following poverty indicator:
Povα =
1
R
∫ r+R
r+q
(
z − y(x)
z
)α
dx (2.7.1)
where z > 0 is poverty line (z−y(x) is the income shortfall of the farmer located in x), q
is the number of poor farmers (having income no greater than z) and α can be seen as a
measure of poverty aversion, a larger α giving greater emphasis to the poorest farmers.
Larger is Povα, higher is the poverty. We will compare the outcomes of the diﬀerent
pricing policies in terms of this indicator, in order to derive which policy used by the
intermediary performs better in reducing poverty with respect the stand-alone situation.
We also use the squared coeﬃcient of variation as a measure of the inequality amongst
the poor (Foster et al., 1984):
Inequality =
1
(R− q)
∫ r+R
r+q
(
y¯ − y(x)
y¯
)2
dx (2.7.2)
where y¯ = 1
(R−q)
∫ r+R
r+q
y(x)dx is the average income for the poor farmers. This measure
of the inequality is associated with Pov2 in the sense that it is obtained when R− q and
y¯ are substituted for R and z in the deﬁnition (2.7.1) with α = 2. The indicator deﬁned
in (2.7.2) ranges between 0 and 1, being equal to 0 when perfect equality is satisﬁed.
Particular attention has to be given to the observed diversity regarding the nature of
the intermediaries. As policy recommendations are diﬀerent for non-proﬁt traders and
for-proﬁt traders, we analyze them separately.
2.7.1 For-proﬁt trader
If discrimination is possible and costless, in a laissez-faire situation, the for-proﬁt
trader will choose to discriminate, as it leads to the highest proﬁt. In this situation, the
eﬃcient optimum is reached. However, no farmer's poverty is reduced, as they all get
the same income as in their stand-alone initial situation. While the presence of a trader
who has a transport cost advantage is beneﬁcial from an eﬃciency point of view, it is
not from a poverty reduction one.
A policy maker whose aim is to increase farmers' incomes may want to tax trader's
proﬁt in order to distribute it among farmers. However, it is possible that the public
authorities in developing countries do not have the power of doing so. In what follows,
we assume the policy maker is only able to impose a pricing policy.
If the trader's transport cost advantage is large enough, imposing uniform pricing
leads to an increased income for the poorest farmers, while richer ones are not worse
oﬀ. Indeed, under this policy, only the farmer the closest to the market, that is, the one
who has the highest initial income, is not able to increase his revenue. All the others are
able to obtain a positive surplus from the contract, and hence to increase their income.
Equality among farmers is ensured, as they all receive the same income and produce the
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same quantity. However, if the diﬀerence in transport cost between the trader and the
farmers is small, imposing uniform pricing does not allow the trader to make a positive
proﬁt and to exploit his cost advantage to increase production.
If the trader has a suﬃciently large cost advantage, imposing him to use mill pricing
also increases the revenue of most of the farmers. But, contrary to the uniform pricing,
farmers far from the trader, who were already poor, gain less than the one close to the
trader. Mill pricing increases inequality among farmers, with respect to their stand-alone
situation, but also with respect to a situation where the trader is allowed to spatially
discriminate.
The previous discussion is illustrated by ﬁgure 2.4, which represents farmers' income
and output as a function of the distance, under the three pricing policies when τr−θr >
τR and p > p¯. Both uniform and mill pricing policies have positive eﬀects on the income
of most of farmers. Hence, if the policy maker is concerned only by farmers' revenue,
spatial price discrimination should be prohibited. The choice of the proﬁt-maximizing
trader among the two remaining policies is not obvious. Numerical simulations show that
the trader tends to prefer mill pricing when the output price p is large. However, when
p is small, situations may occur where trader's proﬁt is higher under uniform pricing.
This is particularly true when r is large or τ − θ is large, that is, when the trader has an
important cost advantage compared to farmers.
Figure 2.4: Comparison of spatial pricing policies
(a) Farmer's income y(x) (b) Output produced f(k(x))
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* Choice of the parameters: r = 300, R = 100, p = 700, τ = 1, i = 100 and θ = 0.2. Note that parameters are
such that the uniform pricing contract is proﬁtable for the trader and such that the mill pricing contract is
constrained for the last farmer.
Producers' organizations in developing countries and NGOs argue that prices for
agricultural goods are too low and claim that they remain low due to unfair inter-
national competition caused by subsidized exports from industrialized countries. This
is seen as one of the reasons which keeps small producers in poverty (see for instance
Oxfam (2002) or CFSI (2007) on the milk sector). In a context in which p is very low,
imposing mill pricing to a trader who has a large cost advantage may result in increasing
all farmers' income, including the most distant one. Numerical simulations also show
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that, when p is small, mill pricing may be preferred to uniform pricing by a majority of
farmers 17 and that the sum of all farmer's incomes may be higher under mill pricing.
If the policy-maker's objective is to choose a policy that increases farmers' total income
and/or is preferred by the majority of them, then imposing mill pricing in a context of
low output price is relevant. When the output price is large, however, uniform pricing is
preferred by a majority of farmers and leads to a higher total farmers' income, even if
the ﬁrst farmer's income is always pushed down to his reservation level.
Figure 2.5: Comparison of spatial pricing policies: poverty
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* Stand-alone situation corresponds to spatial price discrimination. Choice
of the parameters: z = 1000, r = 300, R = 100, τ = 1.5, i = 100 and
θ = 0.2. Note that parameters are such that the uniform pricing contract
is proﬁtable for the trader.
Regarding poverty, measured by the indicator deﬁned in (2.7.1), spatial price dis-
crimination does not contribute to poverty reduction, as it does not permit to increase
farmers' income. Numerical simulations (see ﬁgure 2.5) show that mill pricing tends to
perform better in reducing poverty for low values of p while uniform pricing dominates
when the output price is larger. Note that, when poverty aversion is large, that is α is
large (not represented here), uniform pricing dominated mill pricing in terms of poverty
reduction, as more emphasis is given to the poorest (the most distant farmers) who have
a larger income under uniform pricing. With very large α, Povα approaches a Rawlsian
measure which considers only the income of the poorest farmer. If the policy maker has
a Rawlsian objective, the uniform pricing policy should always be encouraged.
The eﬀect of the pricing policies on the inequality amongst the poor is illustrated in
ﬁgure 2.6. It can be seen that uniform leads to perfect equality, as all the farmers get the
17That is, the median farmer located in r +R/2 has a higher income under mill than under uniform
pricing.
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of spatial pricing policies: inequality
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* Stand-alone situation corresponds to spatial price discrimination. Choice
of the parameters: r = 300, R = 100, τ = 1.5, i = 100 and θ = 0.2. Note
that parameters are such that the uniform pricing contract is proﬁtable
for the trader.
same income, while mill pricing may lead to the highest level of inequality, the closest
farmers being favored with respect to the most distant ones.
Finally, if the trader's cost advantage is small, imposing uniform pricing implies that
he will not be able to play a role in poverty reduction given that in that case the proﬁt
that he would obtain is negative. Under mill pricing however, the trader is able to
contract proﬁtably with the farmers. Not only can he replicate the stand-alone situation
but when the output price is not too large, he can even propose a contract in which all
the farmers except the last one increase their income.
2.7.2 Non-proﬁt trader
Whatever the pricing policy used by the non-proﬁt trader, he uses his cost advantage
to improve all the farmer's income, compared to their stand-alone initial income. As in
the for-proﬁt case, the non-proﬁt intermediary who has a suﬃciently large cost advantage
incites all the farmers to increase the quantity of input they use as well as their level
of production. If the diﬀerence in transport costs between the trader and the farmers
is small, imposing an uniform pricing policy hampers the non-proﬁt trader to use his
advantage to increase farmers' income. Under mill pricing policy however, even if the
trader has a small advantage, he is able to promote increased production and input use.
In a laissez-faire situation, it is optimal for the non-proﬁt trader to use mill pricing.
Even if the trader is allowed to price discriminate he will choose to charge prices which
reﬂect the diﬀerence in transport costs. Hence, in this case mill pricing and discrimination
pricing are equivalent. If the trader's advantage is large enough, imposing uniform
pricing would serve the equality objective as in this case all farmers get the same income.
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Moreover, this policy allows to increase relatively more the income of the poorest (i.e.
the most distant) farmers, compared to the less remote ones. Compared to uniform
pricing, with a mill pricing policy, the most distant farmers receive a lower price for their
output, hence get a lower income. However, the diﬀerence in the price received exactly
reﬂects the diﬀerence in transport cost, and each farmer receives the same additional
income from the contract, compared to his initial income. This discussion is illustrated
by ﬁgure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Farmers' income maximization
(a) Farmer's income y(x) (up)
and trader's proﬁt pi(x) (down) (b) Output produced f(k(x))
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From the eﬃciency perspective, when the trader is non-proﬁt mill pricing is preferred
to uniform pricing since this generates the highest possible surplus. However, from a
poverty point of view, numerical simulations show that uniform pricing performs better
in reducing poverty than mill pricing. 18
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we develop a model of input-output interlinked contracts between
a trader and geographically dispersed farmers, and analyze the implications of diﬀerent
spatial pricing policies used by this trader. We look at three diﬀerent spatial price
policies, namely spatial price discrimination, uniform pricing and mill pricing.
We assume an agricultural output market that is characterized by large transport
costs. The intermediary has a (transport) cost advantage over the farmers from whom it
buys their production. This cost diﬀerence leads to an input-output interlinked contract
18In very extreme cases (very large poverty line and very low poverty aversion), mill pricing could
dominate for small p.
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between the intermediary and the farmer. A ﬁrst result is that the use of an inter-
linked contract by a trader who has a suﬃcient transport cost advantage leads to an
increase of the farmer' production, independently of the type of pricing policy used by
the intermediary.
If the for-proﬁt intermediary is able to perfectly discriminate contracts between farm-
ers, this would be his preferred option. This allows him to push all the farmers' incomes
down to their stand-alone initial income and hence appropriate all the eﬃciency gain
generated by the contract. If this is the case, the presence of the intermediary, while
improving agricultural eﬃciency, does not directly help to reduce rural farmers poverty.
In practice discriminatory pricing might not be feasible and other pricing policies ex-
ist, such as uniform pricing, where the trader bears the transport costs and concludes
the same contract with all the farmers, or mill pricing, where farmers are in charge of
transport, and receive the same price at the mill. If the trader's cost advantage is large
enough, we show that in both cases, most of the farmers get a positive surplus from the
contract, while the trader is still able to make a proﬁt. In the mill pricing case, under
some conditions we can have a situation in which all the farmers, including those located
the furthest from the market, see an increase in their income.
We show that imposing a uniform pricing policy to the trader who has a suﬃciently
large cost advantage leads to an increase of isolated farmers' income. Providing the same
income to all farmers, uniform pricing favors relatively more isolated farmers, since they
are the ones who initially receive a lower income. Moreover, when the output market
price is large enough, uniform pricing also leads to a reduction of farmers' poverty, that
we deﬁne by a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator. In this case, it is also preferred to mill
pricing by a majority of farmers, and it leads to higher total farmers' income.
In developing countries, agricultural market prices are often driven down by interna-
tional competition. If output market prices are very low, imposing mill pricing may be
relevant. Indeed, it may increase all farmers' income, including the closest and the most
distant one. This is not possible under uniform pricing, whatever the output market
price. When the output market price is low, mill pricing performs better in reducing
poverty than uniform pricing does. Moreover, there may be cases in which both total
farmers' income and median farmer's income are higher under mill than under uniform
pricing. Additionally, if the trader only has a small cost advantage, under mill pricing
he still may be able to increase most of the farmers' income, while under uniform pricing
he cannot proﬁtably contract with the farmers.
Since, in developing countries, there are several examples of NGOs and farmers'
associations setting up intermediaries, we also look at a situation in which the trader
maximizes total farmers' income. For a given pricing rule, such a trader is able to
generate at least the same level of eﬃciency surplus as the for-proﬁt does. We also show
that it is optimal, from the non-proﬁt ﬁrm's point of view, to use a mill pricing scheme,
also implying that, in this case, the eﬃcient outcome is reached under mill pricing. From
a poverty perspective however, uniform pricing seems to performs better.
Under mill pricing, maximizing the total earnings (the sum of trader's proﬁt and
farmers' income) implies that the proﬁt of the intermediary will be nil, while under the
other pricing policies, its proﬁt can be strictly positive. Under mill pricing, only one
vector of prices corresponds to total earnings maximization. Under discriminatory and
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uniform pricing, there is a continuum of prices which will maximize the total earnings.
Within this range, some prices favor more the farmers while others favor more the trader.
We also generalize the result found in Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) that
the trader has an interest in giving a discount to the farmer on the input price. If
the trader's cost advantage is suﬃciently large, this is true for all three pricing policies
considered.
The model developed here gives potential avenues for future research. First, in certain
cases, the choice of the size of the collection area may be important to the trader. In
that case, rather than considering the number of farmers as being ﬁxed, the number of
participants may constitute a choice variable for the trader. A possible extension of our
model would consider how the number of suppliers is endogenously chosen. This would
also allow to analyze the impact of pricing policy choice on the inclusion of isolated
farmers in a collection area. Secondly, it may be interesting to see whether besides the
pricing policies considered in this chapter, other spatial pricing policies such as two part
pricing would permit poverty reduction.
73
Appendices
2.A Proof of lemma 1
Using the envelop theorem, we have for a participation constraint at location x
∂g(x, pM , iM)
∂x
= −τ (f(k∗(x))− f(k0(x))) S 0⇔ k∗(x) T k0(x) (2.8.1)
If f(k) is homogeneous of degree h, then, using Euler's theorem, the farmer's income
is given by y(x) = iMk
∗(x)
(
1
h
− 1) while his reservation income is given by y0(x) =
ik0(x)
(
1
h
− 1). Thus g(x) = y(x)− y0(x) = (iMk∗(x)− ik0(x)) ( 1h − 1).
Deﬁne x˜ as a location where the participation constraint is binding for a couple
(pM , iM). We have g(x˜, pM , iM) = 0⇔ iMk∗(x˜)− ik0(x˜) = 0, or equivalently,
k∗(x˜) =
i
iM
k0(x˜) (2.8.2)
Substituting (2.8.2) in (2.8.1), we have that, if x˜ exists in [r, r +R]:
∂g(x, pM , iM)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=x˜
S 0 ⇔ iM S i (2.8.3)
(2.8.3) implies that, if iM < i, the only possible value for x˜ is x˜ = r+R. If iM > i, then
the only possible value for x˜ is x˜ = r. Finally, if iM = i, if the participation constraint is
binding somewhere, it has to bind everywhere: if x˜ exists, we have x˜ = x ∀x ∈ [r, r +R].
The optimum is thus characterized by one of the following cases: (1) x˜ = r + R ⇒
g(r + R) = 0 and g(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [r, r + R[, (2) x˜ = r ⇒ g(r) = 0 and g(x) > 0 ∀x ∈
]r, r + R], (3) x˜ = x ∀x ∈ [r, r + R]⇒ g(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ [r, r + R] and (4) x˜ does not exist
in [r, r + R] ⇒ g(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [r, r + R]. Hence g(r) ≥ 0 and g(r + R) ≥ 0 are suﬃcient
to ensure that g(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [r, r +R].
2.B Proof of lemma 2
We show that it is always possible to ﬁnd prices (pM , iM) such that the proﬁt is
higher than in case (2), which is characterized by pM > p − τr, iM > i and g(r) = 0
at the optimum. For the other constraints to be satisﬁed but not binding, we need
that ∂g(x,pM ,iM )
∂x
∣∣∣
x=r
> 0 and, from (2.8.3), iM > i. From (2.8.1), this would im-
ply k∗(r) < k0(r). As production function is concave, using (2.2.2), it would imply
pM
iM
< p−τr
i
. Subtracting τ(x−r)
i
on both sides and given that iM > i, this would
give pM−τ(x−r)
iM
< p−τx
i
, thus k∗(x) < k0(x) ∀x. Trader's proﬁt would be given by
Π =
∫ r+R
r
(p − θr − τ(x − r))f(k∗(x)) − ik∗(x) − y(x)dx. The trader could always
increase his proﬁt by replicating farmers' stand-alone situations (that is, proposing a
contract where pM = p − τr and iM = i, each farmer using exactly k0(x) and get-
ting his reservation income y0(x)). In this case the proﬁt is given by Π′ =
∫ r+R
r
(p −
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θr − τ(x − r))f(k0(x)) − ik0(x) − y0(x)dx. This is always higher than Π. Indeed,
from participation constraints, y(x) ≥ y0(x), and, given our assumptions on f(k),
the function (p − θr − τ(x − r))f(k(x)) − ik(x) is concave in k(x) and maximized in
k#(x) deﬁned by (2.2.5). Comparing with (2.2.2) we see that k#(x) > k0(x). Thus,
k#(x) > k0(x) > k∗(x), implying that k0(x) and k∗(x) lie in the increasing part of the
function, thus (p−θr−τ(x−r)f(k0(x)))−ik0(x) > (p−θr−τ(x−r)f(k∗(x)))−ik∗(x) ∀x.
As trader's proﬁt could always be increased, the case (2) cannot characterize the opti-
mum. Eliminating case (2) from the possible outcomes, the ﬁrst farmer's participation
constraint can never be the only one to be binding at the equilibrium.
2.C Mill pricing: unconstrained outcome
The unconstrained outcome is the solution to the maximization problem when λ = 0
and µ = 0. Replacing in (2.5.3) and (2.5.4) when f(k) = 2
√
k and simplifying gives:
(p− θr − pM)− i
iM
(
pM − τ R
2
)
= 0 (2.8.4)
(p− θr − pM)
(
pM − τ R
2
)
+
(
1
2
− i
iM
)(
p2M − pMτR +
τ 2R2
3
)
= 0 (2.8.5)
Characteristics of the unconstrained equilibrium
The two focs can be combined as
H (pM) ≡
(
pM − τR
2
)[(
pM − τR
2
)2
− τ
2R2
12
]
+
2τ 2R2
12
[
2
(
pM − τR
2
)
−
(
p− θr − τR
2
)]
= 0
We have H
(
τR
2
)
< 0 and H (p− θr) > 0. In addition, we have H ′ (pM) > 0 which means
that there is a unique value for pM between
τR
2
and p − θr such that H (pM) = 0. If
there is a solution such that pM > τR, then iM < i . To see this, note that whenever
pM > τR the term between the ﬁrst square brackets is positive which implies that
the term between the second square brackets has to be negative. Plugging this in the
equation (2.8.4) implies that iM < i.
To establish under what conditions pM = p− τr we evaluate H (pM) at pM = p− τr
which yields
n (p) ≡ H (p− τr) ≡
(
p− τr − τR
2
)3
+
τ 2R2
4
(
p− τr − τR
2
)
− τ
2R2
6
(
p− θr − τR
2
)
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We have
∂n (p)
∂p
= 3
(
p− τr − τR
2
)2
+
τ 2R2
4
− τ
2R2
6
> 0
n (0) =
(
−τr − τR
2
)3
+
τ 2R2
4
(
−τr − τR
2
)
− τ
2R2
6
(
−θr − τR
2
)
= −
(
τr +
τR
2
)3
+
τ 2R2
2
[
1
2
(
−τr − τR
2
)
− 1
3
(
−θr − τR
2
)]
= −
(
τr +
τR
2
)3
+
τ 2R2
2
[
1
2
(
−τr − τR
2
)
− 1
3
(
−θr − τR
2
)]
= −
(
τr +
τR
2
)3
+
τ 2R2
2
[
−τR
12
− 1
3
(
3
2
τr − θr
)]
< 0
n (p1) =
(
τr − θr + τR
2
)3
+
τ 2R2
4
(
τr − θr + τR
2
)
− τ
2R2
6
(
2τr − 2θr + τR
2
)
=
(
τr − θr + τR
2
)3
+
τ 2R2
4
(
τr − θr + τR
2
)
− τ
2R2
3
(
τr − θr + τR
4
)
> 0
where p1 = 2τr − θr + τR.
These three elements together imply that there is a unique p0 ∈ [0, p1] such that
n (p0) = 0 and pM = p0 − τr.
Proof of 0 < dpM/dp < 1 if the optimum is unconstrained
Taking total derivatives of (2.8.4) and (2.8.5), equalizing them to zero and rearranging:
−
(
1 +
i
iM
)
dpM
dp
+
i
i2M
(
pM − τR
2
)
diM
dp
= −1 (2.8.6)
(
p− θr − pM
pM − τR2
− 2 i
iM
)
dpM
dp
+
i
i2M
(
p2M − pMτR + τ
2R2
3
)
pM − τR2
diM
dp
= −1 (2.8.7)
Using Cramer's rule on this two-equations system, we can calculate dpM/dp as:
dpM
dp
=
−
i
i2
M
(
p2M−pM τR+ τ
2R2
3
)
pM− τR2
+ i
i2M
(
pM − τR2
)
−
(
1 + i
iM
) i
i2
M
(
p2M−pM τR+ τ
2R2
3
)
pM− τR2
− i
i2M
(
pM − τR2
) (
p−θr−pM
pM− τR2
− 2 i
iM
)
⇔ dpM
dp
=
τ2R2
12(
1 + i
iM
) (
p2M − pMτR + τ2R23
)
+
(
pM − τR2
)2 (p−θr−pM
pM− τR2
− 2 i
iM
)
From (2.8.4), i/iM = (p− θr − pM)/(pM − τR/2), thus:
⇔ dpM
dp
=
τ2R2
12(
1 + i
iM
) (
p2M − pMτR + τ2R23
)
+
(
pM − τR2
)2 (− i
iM
)
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⇔ dpM
dp
=
1
12
τ2R2
(
pM − τR2
)2
+ 1 + i
iM
(2.8.8)
From this expression, 0 < dpM
dp
< 1.
Proof of diM/dp < 0 if the optimum is unconstrained
Using Cramer's rule on the two-equations system (2.8.6)-(2.8.7), we can calculate
diM/dp as:
diM
dp
=
(
1 + i
iM
)
+
(
p−θr−pM
pM− τR2
− 2 i
iM
)
−
(
1 + i
iM
) i
i2
M
(
p2M−pM τR+ τ
2R2
3
)
pM− τR2
− i
i2M
(
pM − τR2
) (
p−θr−pM
pM− τR2
− 2 i
iM
)
From (2.8.4), i/iM = (p− θr − pM)/(pM − τR/2), thus:
diM
dp
=
pM − τR2
−
(
1 + i
iM
)
i
i2M
(
p2M − pMτR + τ2R23
)− i
i2M
(
pM − τR2
)2 (− i
iM
)
⇔ diM
dp
= − pM −
τR
2
i
i2M
((
pM − τR2
)2
+
(
1 + i
iM
)
τ2R2
12
) (2.8.9)
If pM is larger than
τR
2
(which is veriﬁed if the constrained are satisﬁed), diM
dp
is strictly
negative.
With the results that pM(p0) = p0 − τr and dpMdp < 1 we have that when p > (<) p0
then pM < (>) p0−τr. Another implication is that when p < p0 then pM > p0−τr > τR
which implies that i > iM .
2.D Proof of proposition 6
From lemmas 1 and 2, we have three possible outcomes: (i) the participation con-
straint is binding only for the last farmer at the equilibrium, (ii) the participation con-
straint is binding for all the farmers at the equilibrium, or, (iii) no constraint is binding
at the equilibrium.
(i) If g(r + R) = 0 and g(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [r, r + R[. This requires ∂g(x,pM ,iM )
∂x
∣∣∣
x=r+R
< 0
which implies by (2.8.3) that iM < i.
(ii) If g(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ [r, r + R], the stand-alone situation is replicated and we have
that iM = i.
(iii) If g(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [r, r + R], then pM > τR. From the previous section we know
that then iM < i.
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2.E Proof of proposition 7
Using (2.5.5) and (2.5.6) we can divide the possible outcomes into four categories
depending on which constraint is binding.
First possibility: g(r +R) > 0, iM < i:
Consider (p′M(p), i
′
M(p)) the solution to the unconstrained problem. Deﬁne G(p) ≡
y(r + R, p) − y0(r + R, p) where y(r + R, p) = y(r + R, p′M(p), i′M(p)) if p′M(p) ≥ τR
and y(r + R, p) = 0 if p′M(p) < τR, with (p
′
M(p), i
′
M(p)) the solution to the system
of equations (2.8.4)-(2.8.5). If G(p) > 0, (p′M(p), i
′
M(p)) respects the constraint, hence
given that iM < i from the proof of proposition 6, the equilibrium is unconstrained. If
G(p) < 0, however, (p′M(p), i
′
M(p)) does not respect the constraint and the equilibrium
has to be constrained.
In what follows, 1) we establish that when τr − θr > τR, G(p) is positive for small
values of p, i.e. for p < p0, and when τr − θr ≤ τR, G(p) is negative for all values of p;
2) we establish that G(p) is negative for large values of p, i.e. for p > p1; 3) We establish
that G(p) is strictly decreasing in p when p0 < p < p1.
Together this implies that when τr − θr > τR for small values of p the equilibrium
is unconstrained and that there exists a unique p¯ given by G(p¯) = 0 above which the
equilibrium is constrained. It also implies that when τr − θr ≤ τR the equilibrium is
constrained for all values of p.
We proceed by establishing several intermediate results: (i) p′M(p) < p − τr is a
suﬃcient condition for G(p) to be decreasing in p. (ii) G(p) < 0 for all p > p1. (iii)
There exists a unique p0, with 0 < p0 < p1, such that p
′
M(p0) = p0 − τr; (iv) for p S p0,
p′M(p) T p− τr; (v) If τr − θr S τR, then p T p0.
(i) We show that if p′M(p) < p − τr, then ∂G(p)∂p < 0. Note that as p > 0 we have
τR < p − τr. Suppose ﬁrst that τR ≤ p′M(p) < p − τr, using (2.8.8) and (2.8.9) we
have that ∂G(p)
∂p
=
2(p′M (p)−τR)
i
(
i
i′
M
(p)
+(p′M (p)−τR)(p′M (p)−τ(R/2)) 6τ2R2
)
1+ i
i′
M
(p)
+(p′M (p)−τ(R/2))2 12τ2R2
− 2(p−τr−τR)
i
. It can be
easily veriﬁed that the second ratio is lower that 1, thus it can be said that ∂G(p)
∂p
<
2(p′M (p)−τR)
i
− 2(p−τr−τR)
i
. This is strictly negative provided that p′M(p) < p− τr. Suppose
now that p′M(p) < τR, then
∂G(p)
∂p
= −2(p−τr−τR)
i
which is also negative.
(ii) Solving (2.8.4) for i′M(p) and substituting it into G(p) yields that G(p) < 0 if
(p′M (p)−τR)2
p′M (p)−τ(R/2) <
(p−τr−τR)2
p−θr−p′M (p) . A suﬃcient condition for that is:
(p′M(p)− τR)2
p′M(p)− τR
<
(p− τr − τR)2
p− θr − p′M(p)
⇔ (p′M(p)− τR)(p− θr − p′M(p))− (p− τr − τR)2 < 0
⇔ w(p′M(p)) ≡ −p′M(p)2 + (p− θr + τR)p′M(p)− (p− θr)τR− (p− τr − τR)2 < 0
w(p′M(p)) is a polynomial of degree two in p
′
M(p) where the leading coeﬃcient is strictly
negative. The discriminant is given by d(p) = (p − θr + τR)2 − 4((p − θr)τR) − 4(p −
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τr− τR)2. If this discriminant is negative then w(p′M(p)) is negative for all p′M(p), hence
G(p) < 0. d(p) is a polynomial (of degree two) in p where the leading coeﬃcient is
strictly negative. It is thus negative before the ﬁrst root (pa =
1
3
(2τr + θr) + τR) and
after the second one (pb = 2τr + τR − θr). As θ < τ , we have pa < p < pb. Thus
p > p1 ≡ pb = 2τr + τR− θr is a suﬃcient condition for w(p′M(p)) to be negative for all
p′M(p). Hence G(p) is negative for all p > p1.
(iii) From appendix 2.C there is a unique p0 ∈ [0, p1] such that such that p′M(p0) =
p0 − τr.
(iv) From appendix 2.C,
∂dp′M
∂p
< 1, hence p′M(p) S p − τr ∀p T p0. Substituting
p′M(p) ≥ p− τr into G(p), because i′M(p0) < i, we have that G(p) > 0 ∀p ≤ p0.
(v) The value of p0 with respect to p depends on the values of the parameters. To
see this:
n
(
p
)
=
τ 2R2
6
(τR− (τr − θr))
If τr− θr > τR, then n (p) < 0 and p < p0. If τr− θr ≤ τR, then n (p) > 0 and p > p0.
This implies that all (acceptable) values of p > p0.
From (v) if τr−θr ≤ τR, then all values of p are larger than p0. From (iv) this implies
that p′M(p) < p− τr for all values of p. This in turn implies that p′M(p) < p− τr = τR.
From the deﬁnitions we have that y(r+R, p) = 0 implying that G(p) < 0, this, together
with from (i), ∂G(p)
∂p
< 0 for p > p, is suﬃcient to ensure that G(p) < 0 ∀p > p.
From (v) if τr − θr > τR, then there are values of p ∈ [p, p0] such that G(p) > 0.
For values of p larger than p0,
∂G(p)
∂p
< 0 and with values larger than p1 G(p) < 0 which
implies that there is a unique p¯ such that G(p¯) = 0.
Second possibility: g(r +R) = 0, iM < i:
Let (p′′M(p), i
′′
M(p)) be the solution to the maximization problem when only last
farmer's participation constraint is binding, that is when µ = 0 and λ > 0. Solving
for λ in (2.5.4) and substituting it into (2.5.3), when f(k) = 2
√
k, gives:
iM = i
6p2M − 3pMτR + τ 2R2
6pM (p− τR− θr) + 2τ 2R2 (2.8.10)
The binding participation constraint g(r +R) = 0 gives:
iM = i
(pM − τR)2
(p− τr − τR)2 (2.8.11)
Prices (p′′M(p), i
′′
M(p)) are given by the intersection between the curves (2.8.10) and
(2.8.11), provided τR ≤ p′′M(p) ≤ p− τr. Simplifying:
h(p′′M(p)) ≡(
6p′′2M − 3p′′MτR + τ 2R2
)
(p− τr − τR)2 − (p′′M − τR)2
(
6p′′M (p− τR− θr) + 2τ 2R2
)
= 0
(a) h(p′′M(p)) is a polynomial of degree three in p
′′
M(p) where the leading coeﬃcient is
strictly negative. This implies that h(p′′M(p)) has an inverse N-shape. (b) Evaluated at
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p′′M(p) = τR, h(τR) > 0. (c) The ﬁrst derivative of h(pM), evaluated at τR is strictly
positive. This implies that τR lies in an increasing part of h(p′′M(p)). (d) If τr−θr > τR/2
holds, then h(p− τr) < 0 ∀p > p. If τr− θr ≤ τR/2 holds, then h(p− τr) S 0 holds for
p S p˜ with p˜ = τr + τ2R2
6(τ(R/2)−τr+θr) .
Elements (a) to (d) are suﬃcient to ensure that if τr − θr > τR/2, then h(pM) has
one unique root between τR and p−τr for all p > p. Hence, λ > 0 and µ = 0 are possible
for all the values of p we consider. If τr − θr ≤ τR/2, then h(pM) has one unique root
between τR and p − τr when p ≤ p˜ and no root between τR and p − τr when p > p˜.
Hence, λ > 0 and µ = 0 only occur for p ≤ p˜. Moreover, if τr − θr < τR/3, then p˜ < p
such that for all acceptable values of p, we have p > p˜.
Third possibility: g(r +R) = 0, iM = i:
If when g(r + R) = 0 and iM = i, with f(k) = 2
√
k we have that pM = p − τr.
Replacing iM by i and pM by p − τr in (2.5.3) and (2.5.4), solving for λ in (2.5.4) and
substituting it into (2.5.3), we have:
µ = −R
i2
(
(p− τr)
(
τr − θr − τ R
2
)
+
τ 2R2
6
)
(2.8.12)
If τr − θr > τR/2, then µ is always negative. If τr − θr ≤ τR/2, then µ S 0 if p S p˜
where p˜ = τr + τ
2R2
6(τ(R/2)−τr+θr) since µ = 0 when p = p˜ and
∂µ
∂p
> 0.
Fourth possibility: g(r +R) > 0, iM = i:
If g(r + R) > 0, from appendix 2.D (iii), we have that iM < i. This implies that
g(r +R) > 0 and iM = i never occurs.
Summarizing, this means that, if τr − θr > τR, then g(r + R) > 0 and iM < i for
p ∈ [p, p¯] while g(r + R) = 0 and iM < i for p > p¯. If τR/2 < τr − θr < τR then
g(r+R) = 0 and iM < i for any p > p. If τr− θr < τR/2 then g(r+R) = 0 and iM < i
for p ∈ [p, p˜] while g(r +R) = 0 and iM = i for p > p˜.
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Chapter 3
Can contract farming improve
smallholders' participation to the
market?∗
3.1 Introduction
The importance of smallholders' market participation for poverty alleviation in de-
veloping countries has been increasingly recognized (Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994,
Heltberg and Tarp, 2002, Barrett, 2008 etc.). However, due to inadequate trans-
port infrastructure and important distances between areas of production and areas of
consumption, rural households are often exposed to access diﬃculties and fail to take
part to the market. These eﬀects are even stronger for highly perishable products such
as milk. Metzger et al. (1995) report that less than 50% of milk production is com-
mercialized in Africa, less than 25% in Senegal. In Ethiopia, Holloway et al. (2000)
showed that transport cost is an important determinant for the participation to the milk
market. They found that transport time has to be reduced by almost two hours to induce
a representative non-participant to entry.1
Since the nineties, West Africa has seen the emergence of small-scale processing units
called mini-dairies that play an intermediary role between the farmers and the market
(Dieye et al., 2005, Corniaux et al., 2005). These intermediaries have some kind of
advantage over the farmers to sell the products on the market. They use more eﬃcient
transport devices, such as trucks, they own bulk cooling tanks, such that they can stock
the milk and do not have to transport it every day, etc. This cost advantage often requires
an important ﬁxed cost, which cannot be borne by each farmer alone. According to
Dieye (2003), the presence of such intermediaries seems to improve market participation.
∗Mélanie Lefèvre (CREPP, HEC-ULg, Université de Liège) and Joe Tharakan (Université de Liège,
CORE and CEPR).
1The same impact of transport costs on market participation is found in other sectors: see for instance
Ouma et al. (2010) on the banana market in Central Africa or Heltberg and Tarp (2002) on food
crops in Mozambique.
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The survey he conducted in the peri-urban region of Kolda (Senegal), where several mini-
dairies are established, show that the level of milk commercialization reaches 75% in
the wet season.
In this chapter we examine under which conditions the presence of an intermediary
could actually improve farmers' participation to the market. We develop a simple con-
tract model between geographically dispersed farmers and an intermediary who has a
transport cost advantage over them. Due to their spatial dispersion, an heterogeneity
exists among farmers, such that the intermediary has an interest to propose a diﬀerent
contract to each of them. Nevertheless, spatial price discrimination might not be fea-
sible. Notably, it implies that the intermediary collects the product himself from the
farmers. There are, however, other modes of collection and hence other pricing policies
that the intermediaries may choose. For instance, in Senegal, some processing units,
such as La Laiterie du Berger (LdB) in Richard-Toll, organize milk collection and pay
all the farmers the same price, independent of the distance. This corresponds to uniform
pricing. In others, such as Le Fermier in Kolda, farmers are responsible for transport,
such that the ones who are located far from the processing unit receive a considerably
lower net price than the closer ones. This corresponds to mill pricing.
We observe that contracts between mini-dairies and farmers often involve interlinked
transactions. Additionally to playing an intermediary role on the milk market, the dairy
also play this role on the input market, providing the farmer the cattle feeds that are
necessary for his production. In such a contract, both output and input prices are
determined jointly. In the region of Kolda, Dieye et al. (2005) report that processing
units provide credit and cattle feeds to the farmers in order to increase commercial links.
The two most important milk processing units in this region (Bilaame Puul Debbo and
Le Fermier) use three diﬀerent mechanisms for linking milk purchase and feeds selling:
credit for feeds purchase, direct feeds purchase for the farmer, or guarantee to the feeds
seller in case of non-payment by the farmer (Dieye, 2006). In Northern Senegal, La
Laiterie du Berger buys large quantities of cattle feeds and resells it to the farmers at
50 percent of the market price (Bathilly, 2007).2
These interlinked contracts have been shown to be eﬃcient, at least when the in-
termediary is able to discriminate between farmers (Gangopadhyay and Sengupta,
1987). One may wonder if they also permit to improve farmers' participation to the
market. Comparing an interlinked contract model with a simple one, we analyze if in-
terlinked transactions do or do not permit to give access to the market to more farmers
than a simple contract does.
Knowing under which conditions the presence of an intermediary could improve farm-
ers' participation to the market, one may ask when this actually helps to reduce poverty.
Using a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator, we compare the outcomes of the diﬀerent
2Numerous evidence of the use of interlinked contracts is found in other countries and sectors: see for
instanceWarning and Key (2002) for an analysis of the groundnut sector in Senegal, Jayne, Yamano
and Nyoro (2004) for examples in cash crops production in Kenya, Simmons,Winters and Patricks
(2005) for an examination of various Indonesian sectors, or Key and Runsten (1999) for a look at
Mexican frozen vegetable industry.
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types of contracts/pricing policies we consider, in terms of their poverty reduction im-
pact, in order to arrive at some policy recommendations as to the contract that should
be used. In particular, we look at what a benevolent policy maker who wants to decrease
poverty but is unable to impose a complex tax and subsidy scheme should impose as a
contract/pricing policy to be used by intermediaries. Alternatively, our results can be
seen as the contract/pricing policy that an external donor which helps set up agricul-
tural intermediaries with a view of reducing rural poverty should impose as a condition
to those intermediaries.
The chapter is structured as follows. Next section details the framework and the
assumptions linked to the model. Sections 3 develops the simple contract model for a
for-proﬁt trader who only buys the product to the farmers, in the cases of spatial price
discrimination, uniform pricing, and mill pricing. Section 4 presents the interlinked con-
tract model, where the trader is also provider of inputs, for the three pricing policies.
Section 5 discusses the implications of contract and pricing policy choices, related to
farmers' participation to the market and to poverty reduction. Finally, section 6 con-
cludes.
3.2 Framework
We analyze the impact of the contract choice made by the intermediary on the number
of farmers who can beneﬁt from it, in the following theoretical framework. Geographical
locations are represented along a linear segment. A ﬁnal good market is located at the
origin 0. We consider one agricultural good whose price p is set on this market. We
assume that the diﬀerent agents in our model do not have any impact on this price.3
This good is consumed at location 0 which can be assumed to be an urban center.
At a distance r from this urban center, there is a rural area over which farmers are
uniformly distributed. Each farmer produces the agricultural good according to the same
production function f(k), where k is the quantity of input he uses. This input is sold at
price i on the market at location 0. The production function has the usual properties:
f(.) is continuously diﬀerentiable, f(0) = 0, fk =
df
dk
> 0, limk→0 fk =∞, limk→∞ fk = 0
and d
2f
dk2
< 0. To obtain explicit solution for the contracts, we assume f(k) = 2
√
k.
Farmers are assumed to be proﬁt maximizers.
To transport the agricultural good to the market, farmers face high transport costs.
These costs are assumed to be linear in distance for the output. To simplify the analysis
we assume that transport costs are negligible for the input and set them equal to zero.
A farmer located at a distance x from the market faces a transport cost τx. At least
the ﬁrst farmer is assumed to be able to sell proﬁtably on the market, which implies the
following restriction: p > τr.
3This can be the case for example because we are in a small open economy and the price of this good
is determined on world markets.
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An intermediary is located at r.4 This trader oﬀers simple or interlinked contracts
to the geographically dispersed producers. In the simple contract case, the trader sells
the agricultural output from the farmers on the market located in 0, at market price p.
In the interlinked contract case, he also buys input for them on this market, at price i.
The intermediary is assumed to have a cost advantage. Here, we assume that the trader
has an advantage to transport the good between r and 0. Transport costs for the trader
are given by t(x) = θr + τ(x− r) per unit of output transported with θ < τ .
We consider two types of contract. When proposing a simple contract, the trader
only acts as a buyer of output and proposes a price for this output to the farmer. When
proposing an interlinked contract, the trader also acts as a seller of input and proposes
both prices, for the input and the output, at the same time, to the farmer. In both cases,
each farmer can individually accept or refuse the contract.
The sequence is the following. In a ﬁrst step, the trader proposes a simple contract
(pF ) or an interlinked contract (pF , iF ) to the farmer. The farmer can either accept or
reject the contract. In a second step, the farmer chooses the quantity of input k∗(x) it
is optimal for him to use depending on the prices he faces, which determines his level
of production. If he has accepted the simple contract, he faces prices (pF , i). In the
interlinked contract case, he faces prices (pF , iF ). If he has rejected the contract, his
production will no longer be sold to the trader, but directly to the ﬁnal market. The
same applies to purchase of inputs. In this case, he chooses the optimal amount of
inputs k0 as a function of market prices (p, i) as well as of the transport cost t0 he has to
support. In a last step, the production takes place and is sold on the market, directly by
the farmer (if he has rejected the contract) or via the trader (if the farmer has accepted
the contract).
As a buyer of output, the proﬁt maximizer trader pays a discriminatory price pD
(resp. uniform price pU , mill price pM) to the farmer. In the interlinked contract case,
as a provider of input, the trader also charges a price iD (resp. iU , iM) to the farmer
per unit of input provided. The interlinked contract is thus deﬁned by a couple (pF , iF )
where pF is the agricultural output price paid by the trader to the farmer (i.e. pD(x),
pU , or pM − τ(x − r)) and iF is the input price paid by the farmer to the trader (i.e.
iD(x), iU , or iM), while in the simple contract we have iF = i.
We solve this problem backward. The farmer located in x maximizes his income y(x)
such that he has the following objective:
max
k(x)
y(x) = pF (x)f(k(x))− iF (x)k(x) (3.2.1)
The existence of an interior solution to this problem is guaranteed by the above as-
sumptions on the production function. The choice of the input quantity satisﬁes the
4In developing countries, poor infrastructures in rural area reduce the incentives for ﬁrms to locate
within this area. By locating just outside of the rural area, the trader has a better access to roads,
electricity, water, etc. Because of the limited number of farmers involved and the potentially large
investment costs, the intermediary is assumed to have monopoly/monopsony power when he trades
with the farmers. On the ﬁnal market, however, the intermediary is price-taker.
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necessary condition df
dk
= iF (x)
pF (x)
, which, given the particular form of the production func-
tion (f(k) = 2
√
k), provides the following farmer's demand for the input
k∗(x) =
(
pF (x)
iF (x)
)2
(3.2.2)
If the farmer refuses the contract proposed by the trader, he obtains an alternative
income by directly selling the agricultural output at net price p − τx and buying the
input at price i on the market. In this case his input use k0(x) is characterized by
k0(x) =
(
p− τx
i
)2
(3.2.3)
All the farmers are not able to do so. Indeed, farmers located further than r + R0
(where R0 = (p− τr)/τ) are not able to take part to the market by themselves. Indeed,
the net price they would receive for the output is negative. Those farmers are assumed
to have a zero alternative income, such that y0(x) is deﬁned in two parts as:
y0(x) =
{
(p−τx)2
i
if x < r +R0
0 if x ≥ r +R0 (3.2.4)
The trader's objective function is:
max
pF (x),iF (x),R
Π =
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr− τ(x− r)− pF (x))f(k∗(x)) + (iF (x)− i)k∗(x)dx (3.2.5)
where k∗(x) is the farmer's demand for the input given by (3.2.2).
This objective is subject to the following participation constraint, for each farmer:
g(x) ≡ y(x, pF (x), iF (x))− y0(x) ≥ 0 ∀x. For the simple contract the constraint iF (x) =
i ∀x applies. When the uniform pricing policy is used, pF (x) = pU ∀x while under mill
pricing policy we have pF (x) = pM − τ(x− r) ∀x.
The number of farmers included may also be constrained by a physical limit of the
production area, for instance, the existence of a national border or simply the absence of
farmers beyond a certain distance. To take this into account we include the constraint
that R ≤ R¯ where R¯ is the maximum number of farmers who could be included (r + R¯
represents the physical limit). We are interested in the cases where R¯ > R0. Indeed,
with R¯ < R0, all the farmers would take part to the market by themselves and looking
at the intermediary's impact on the participation would be of little interest. If R¯ is large
enough, the constraint R ≤ R¯ will not be binding at the optimum, as the intermediary
has never interest in collecting the product until the farmer located in r+R¯. In particular,
when R¯ is such that p < θr + τR¯, the transport cost to reach the last farmer is larger
than the price that can be earned on his production, such that it is never optimal for
the intermediary to collect the product so far. For simplicity, hereafter we assumed that
this condition is satisﬁed.5
5One may check that the conditions under which the presence of the intermediary increases the
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3.3 Simple contract
Using a simple contract, the trader proposes a price pF (x) for the output to the
farmer located in x. Regarding the input, the farmer simply faces the market price i, as
the trader is not involved in the input trading. The trader's objective function is:
max
pF (x),R
Π =
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr − τ(x− r)− pF (x))f(k∗(x))dx (3.3.1)
s.t. y(x, pF (x))) ≥ y0(x) ∀x
3.3.1 Spatial price discrimination
The trader proposes a contract (pD(x)) to the farmer located in x. This contract
can be diﬀerent, depending on the location of the farmer and the diﬀerence between
two farmers' contracts does not necessarily represent the diﬀerence in transport costs
between them. Each farmer can individually accept or refuse the contract proposed.
The trader's problem may be written as:
max
pD(x),RD
Π =
∫ r+RD
r
(p− θr − τ(x− r)− pD(x))f(k∗(x))dx
s.t. g(x) ≡ pD(x)f(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)− y0(x) ≥ 0 ∀x
Using f(k) = 2
√
k, the Lagrangian is given by:
L =
∫ r+RD
r
2(p− θr − τ(x− r)− pD(x))pD(x)
i
+ λ(x)
(
pD(x)
2
i
− y0(x)
)
dx
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂pD(x)
= (p− θr − τ(x− r)− 2pD(x))2
i
+ 2λ(x)
pD(x)
i
= 0 ∀x (3.3.2)
∂L
∂RD
= 2(p−θr−τRD−pD(r+R))pD(r +RD)
i
+λ(r+RD)
(
pD(r +RD)
2
i
− y0(r +RD)
)
= 0
(3.3.3)
λ(x) ≥ 0, pD(x)
2
i
− y0(x) ≥ 0, λ(x)
(
pD(x)
2
i
− y0(x)
)
= 0 (3.3.4)
From (3.3.2) and (3.3.4) it can be shown that the unconstrained outcome pD(x) =
1
2
(p− θr − τ(x− r)) satisﬁes the participation constraint for x ≥ p+θr
τ
− r. For smaller
values of x, the participation constraint is binding and pD(x) =
√
iy0(x). This result is
illustrated by ﬁgure 3.1 while formal proof is given in Appendix 3.A.
participation to the market (i.e. the number of participants under the contract is higher than in the
stand-alone situation) are not aﬀected if this assumption it is not satisﬁed (that is, if R0 < R¯ < p−θrτ ).
This can be formally veriﬁed by including a constraint R ≤ R¯ in the optimization problem (3.2.5).
Nevertheless, the intensity of the intermediary's impact on the participation could be constrained by
the physical limit. This has to be kept in mind when comparing types of contracts and pricing policies.
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Figure 3.1: Spatial price discrimination
(simple contract)
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Thus the optimal contract is characterized6 by:{
(i) for x ≥ p+θr
τ
− r, pD(x) = 12(p− θr − τ(x− r)) and g(x) > 0
(ii) for x < p+θr
τ
− r, pD(x) =
√
iy0(x) and g(x) = 0
(3.3.5)
From that, we can establish the optimal size RD. Assume ﬁrst that λ(r + RD) > 0.
This implies pD(r+RD) =
√
iy0(r +RD). Substituting in (3.3.3) gives 2(p−θr−τRD−
pD(r + R))
pD(r+RD)
i
= 0, that is: pD(r + R) = p− θr − τRD. Given that the constraint
is binding in this case, p − θr − τRD=
√
iy0(r +RD)= p − τ(r + RD)⇔ θ = τ . Given
that by assumption τ > θ, this is a contradiction and hence we have that λ(r+RD) = 0.
From (3.3.5), we have pD(r + RD) =
1
2
(p − θr − τRD). Substituting it into (3.3.3), we
have:
2
(
p− θr − τRD − 1
2
(p− θr − τRD)
)
1
2
(p− θr − τRD)
i
= 0
⇔ RD = p− θr
τ
(3.3.6)
This means that for all possible parameter values we have RD > R
0: under spatial
price discrimination, the trader always chooses to include more farmers than the number
able to take part to the market in the stand alone situation. Note that, all the farmers
located in ]Max[r, p+θr
τ
−r], p+θr
τ
+r[ obtain a positive surplus. Hence, when p < 2τr−θr,
all the farmers, except the last one, obtain a positive surplus.
6It can be shown that arbitrage between farmers is impossible: for any location x, the farmer has
no interest in transporting the good by himself to another location z in order to beneﬁt from the price
pD(z). The potential gain from such a strategy is always more than compensated by the incurred
transport cost.
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3.3.2 Uniform pricing
Under uniform pricing policy, the trader is constrained to pay the same uniform price
to all the farmers, independent on their location. His problem may be written as:
max
pU ,RU
Π = RU
(
p− θr − τRU
2
− pU
)
f(k∗)
s.t. g(r) ≡ pUf(k∗)− ik∗ − y0(r) ≥ 0
Using f(k) = 2
√
k, the Lagrangian is given by:
L = 2RU
(
p− θr − τRU
2
− pU
)
pU
i
+ λ(pU − p+ τr)
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂pU
=
2RU
i
(
p− θr − τRU
2
− 2pU
)
+ λ = 0 (3.3.7)
∂L
∂RU
= 2
(
p− θr − τRU
2
− pU
)
pU
i
− τRU pU
i
= 0
⇔ τRU = p− θr − pU (3.3.8)
λ ≥ 0, pU ≥ p− τr, λ(pU − p+ τr) = 0 (3.3.9)
Figure 3.2: Uniform pricing (simple contract)
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It can be shown (see Appendix 3.A) that the unconstrained outcome (pU =
1
3
(p−θr),
RU =
2
3
p−θr
τ
) satisﬁes the participation constraint for low values of p. For larges values
of p, the participation constraint is binding and RU =
τr−θr
τ
. The optimal contract is
thus characterized by:
(i) pU =
1
3
(p− θr), g(r) > 0, RU = 23 p−θrτ > R0 if p < τr + 12(τr − θr)
(ii) pU = p− τr, g(r) = 0, RU = τr−θrτ
{
> R0 if τr + 1
2
(τr − θr) ≤ p < 2τr − θr
≤ R0 if p ≥ 2τr − θr
(3.3.10)
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Depending on the parameter values we have RU > R
0 or RU < R
0: the trader chooses
to include more farmers than the number able to take part to the market in the stand
alone situation, only if the market price is low compared to his advantage in transport
cost. Since for all x > r we have g(x) > g(r), all the farmers included (except the closest
one when p is large) obtain a positive surplus from dealing with the trader. Figure 3.2
illustrates these results.
3.3.3 Mill pricing
Under mill pricing policy, the trader pays the same mill price to all farmers, that
is the same ﬁxed price minus the transport cost from the farmer's location. He has
to propose the same contract (pM) to all farmers (where pM is independent of x) but
farmers have to support the transport costs. Thus, the net price received by the farmer
for the output is pF (x) = pM − τ(x− r). The trader's problem may be written as:
max
pM ,RM
Π =
∫ r+RM
r
(p− θr − pM) f(k∗(x))dx
s.t. g(x) ≡ pMf(k∗(x))− ik∗(x)− y0(x) ≥ 0
Using f(k) = 2
√
k, and noting that the satisfaction of the participation constraint for
the ﬁrst farmer is suﬃcient to ensure it is satisﬁed for all farmers7, the Lagrangian is
given by:
L = 2RM
i
(p− θr − pM)
(
pM − τRM
2
)
+ λ(pM − p+ τr)
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂pM
=
2RM
i
(
p− θr + τRM
2
− 2pM
)
+ λ = 0 (3.3.11)
∂L
∂RM
= 2 (p− θr − pM) (pM − τ(RM/2))
i
− τRM
i
(p− θr − pM) = 0 (3.3.12)
λ ≥ 0, pM ≥ p− τr, λ(pM − p+ τr) = 0 (3.3.13)
It can be shown (see Appendix 3.A) that the unconstrained outcome (pM =
2
3
(p−θr),
RM =
2
3
p−θr
τ
) satisﬁes the participation constraint for low values of p. For larges values
of p, the participation constraint is binding and RM =
p−τr
τ
. The optimal contract is
thus characterized by:{
(i) pM =
2
3
(p− θr), g(x) > 0 ∀x, RM = 23 p−θrτ > R0 if p < τr + 2(τr − θr)
(ii) pM = p− τr, g(x) = 0 ∀x, RM = p−τrτ = R0 if p ≥ τr + 2(τr − θr)
(3.3.14)
7Indeed, using f(k) = 2
√
k, y(x) = (pM−τ(x−r))
2
i . A suﬃcient condition for y(x) ≥ y0(x) is pM −
τ(x− r) ≥ p− τx⇔ pM ≥ p− τr.
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This means that for all possible parameter values we have RM ≥ R0: using the mill
price policy, the trader always chooses to include at least all the farmers who are able to
take part to the market in the stand alone situation. If the market price is low compared
to his advantage in transport cost, he chooses to include even more farmers. However,
the farmers obtain a positive surplus from dealing with the trader only when the market
price is low enough. Otherwise, they receive from the trader exactly their reservation
price. Figure 3.3 illustrates these results.
Figure 3.3: Mill pricing (simple contract)
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3.4 Interlinked contract
The trader proposes an interlinked contract (pF (x), iF (x)) to the farmer located in
x. His objective function is:
max
pF (x),iF (x),R
Π =
∫ r+R
r
(p− θr− τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− pF (x)f(k∗(x)) + (iF (x)− i)k∗(x)dx
(3.4.1)
s.t. y(x, pF (x), iF (x)) ≥ y0(x) ∀x
3.4.1 Spatial price discrimination
The trader's problem may be written as:
max
pD(x),iD(x),RD
Π =
∫ r+RD
r
(p−θr−τ(x−r))f(k∗(x))−ik∗(x)−(pD(x)f(k∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x)) dx
s.t. g(x) ≡ pD(x)f(k∗(x))− iD(x)k∗(x)− y0(x) ≥ 0 ∀x
Using f(k) = 2
√
k, the Lagrangian is given by:
L =
∫ r+RD
r
2(p− θr− τ(x− r))pD(x)
iD(x)
− i
(
pD(x)
iD(x)
)2
+ (λ(x)− 1)pD(x)
2
iD(x)
− λ(x)y0(x)dx
(3.4.2)
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Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂pD(x)
= (p− θr − τ(x− r)) 2
iD(x)
− 2i pD(x)
iD(x)2
+ 2(λ(x)− 1)pD(x)
iD(x)
= 0 ∀x (3.4.3)
∂L
∂iD(x)
= −(p− θr − τ(x− r))2 pD(x)
iD(x)2
+ 2i
pD(x)
2
iD(x)3
− (λ(x)− 1)pD(x)
2
iD(x)2
= 0 ∀x (3.4.4)
∂L
∂RD
= 2(p− θr − τRD)pD(r +RD)
iD(r +RD)
− i
(
pD(r +RD)
iD(r +RD)
)2
+ (λ(r +RD)− 1)pD(r +RD)
2
iD(r +RD)
− λ(r +RD)y0(r +RD) = 0 (3.4.5)
λ(x) ≥ 0, pD(x)
2
iD(x)
− y0(x) ≥ 0, λ(x)
(
pD(x)
2
i
− y0(x)
)
= 0 (3.4.6)
Solving (3.4.4) for λ(x) and substituting in (3.4.3) gives
iD(x)
pD(x)
=
i
p− θr − τ(x− r) (3.4.7)
Substituting (3.4.7) in (3.4.4) gives λ(x) = 1. Substituting λ(r+RD) = 1 and (3.4.7) in
(3.4.5) gives:
(p− θr − τRD)2
i
= y0(r +RD) (3.4.8)
Equation (3.4.8) has no solution for RD < R
0. Indeed, y0(r+RD) would be given by
(p− τr− τRD)2/i, which cannot be equal to (p− θr− τRD)2/i as θ < τ by assumption.
If RD ≥ R0, then we have y0(r + RD) = 0. Substituting in (3.4.8) gives the following
value for RD:
RD =
p− θr
τ
(3.4.9)
which is similar to (3.3.6). Under spatial price discrimination, the optimal number of
farmers RD is the same whatever the contract is simple or interlinked, and is larger than
R0. However, in the interlinked contract, as λ(x) = 1 ∀x, we have g(x) = 0 ∀x and no
farmer is able to obtain a positive surplus from dealing with the trader.8 Although more
farmers are able to take part to the market in the presence of the trader, this does not
increase their income. Indeed, using an interlinked contract, the trader who is able to
discriminate is able to capt all the eﬃciency gain, pushing all the farmers' incomes down
to their reservation levels.
8Note that it can be shown that arbitrage between farmers is impossible: for any location x, the
farmer has no interest in transporting the good by himself to another location z in order to beneﬁt from
the prices (pD(z), iD(z)). The potential gain from such a strategy is always more than compensated by
the incurred transport cost.
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3.4.2 Uniform pricing
The trader's problem may be written as:
max
pU ,iU ,RU
Π =
∫ r+RU
r
(p− θr − τ(x− r))f(k∗)− ik∗ − (pUf(k∗)− iUk∗)dx
s.t. g(x) ≡ pUf(k∗)− iUk∗ − y0(x) ≥ 0 ∀x
The continuum of constraints g(x) ≥ 0 may be replaced by the unique constraint
g(r) ≥ 0 (see chapter 2). Using f(k) = 2√k, the Lagrangian is given by:
L = RU
((
p− θr − τ RU
2
)
2
pU
iU
− i
(
pU
iU
)2)
+ (λ−RU) p
2
U
iU
− λy0(r) (3.4.10)
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂pU
= RU
((
p− θr − τRU
2
)
2
iU
− 2ipU
i2U
)
+ 2(λ−RU)pU
iU
= 0 (3.4.11)
∂L
∂iU
= RU
(
−
(
p− θr − τRU
2
)
2
pU
i2U
+ 2i
p2U
i3U
)
− (λ−RU)p
2
U
i2U
= 0 (3.4.12)
∂L
∂RU
=
((
p− θr − τ RU
2
)
2
pU
iU
− i
(
pU
iU
)2)
− τRU
2
2
pU
iU
− p
2
U
iU
= 0 (3.4.13)
λ ≥ 0, p
2
U
iU
− y0(r) ≥ 0, λ
(
p2U
iU
− y0(r)
)
= 0 (3.4.14)
Solving (3.4.12) for λ and substituting in (3.4.11) gives
iU
pU
=
i
p− θr − τRU
2
(3.4.15)
Substituting (3.4.15) in (3.4.12) give λ = RU . Substituting λ = RU and (3.4.15) in
(3.4.13) gives:
(p− θr − τ(RU/2))2
i
− τRU (p− θr − τ(RU/2))
i
− y0(r) = 0
As by assumption p > τr, the optimal number of farmers RU is characterized by:
(p− θr − τ(RU/2))2 − τRU (p− θr − τ(RU/2))− (p− τr)2 = 0
Depending on the parameters of the model, this leads to a number of farmers higher
or lower than in the stand-alone situation. Indeed, the optimal number of farmers is
given by:
RU =
4
3
p− θr
τ
− 2
3τ
√
(p− θr)2 + 3(p− τr)2
{
> R0 if p < τr + 2
√
5
5
(τr − θr)
≤ R0 if p ≥ τr + 2
√
5
5
(τr − θr)
(3.4.16)
As λ = RU > 0, we have g(r) = 0 by (3.4.14). Since for all x > r we have g(x) > g(r),
all the farmers included who are located further than r obtain a positive surplus from
dealing with the trader. Figure 3.4 illustrates this result.
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Figure 3.4: Uniform pricing (interlinked contract)
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3.4.3 Mill pricing
The trader's problem may be written as:
max
pM ,iM ,RM
Π =
∫ r+RM
r
(p− θr − pM)f(k∗(x)) + (iM − i)k∗(x)dx
s.t. g(x) ≡ (pM − τ(x− r))f(k∗(x))− iMk∗(x)− y0(x) ≥ 0 ∀x
From chapter 2, using f(k) = 2
√
k,
max
pM ,iM ,RM
Π =
∫ r+RM
r
(p− θr − pM)2pM − τ(x− r)
iM
+ (iM − i)
(
pM − τ(x− r)
iM
)2
dx
s.t. g(r +RM) ≡ (pM − τRM)
2
iM
− y0(r +RM) ≥ 0
and i− iM ≥ 0
The Lagrangian is given by:
L =
∫ r+RM
r
(p− θr − pM)2pM − τ(x− r)
iM
+ (iM − i)
(
pM − τ(x− r)
iM
)2
dx
+ λ
(
(pM − τRM)2
iM
− y0(r +RM)
)
+ µ(i− iM) (3.4.17)
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂pM
=
2
iM
(−i
iM
RM
(
pM − τRM
2
)
+RM(p− θr − pM) + λ(pM − τRM)
)
= 0 (3.4.18)
∂L
∂iM
= −2(p− θr − pM)RM
i2M
(
pM − τRM
2
)
+
(
p2M − pMτRM +
τ 2R2M
3
)
RM
i2M
(
2
i
iM
− 1
)
− λ(pM − τRM)
2
i2M
− µ = 0 (3.4.19)
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∂L
∂RM
= 2(p− θr − pM)(pM − τRM)
iM
+
(
1− i
iM
)
(pM − τRM)2
iM
+ λ
(
−2τ (pM − τRM)
iM
− ∂y
0(r +RM)
∂RM
)
= 0 (3.4.20)
λ ≥ 0, (pM − τRM)
2
iM
−y0(r+RM) ≥ 0, λ
(
(pM − τRM)2
iM
− y0(r +RM)
)
= 0 (3.4.21)
µ ≥ 0, i− iM ≥ 0, µ(i− iM) = 0 (3.4.22)
From (3.4.21) two cases are possible: either g(r + RM) > 0, either g(r + RM) = 0.
Assume g(r +RM) > 0 hence λ = 0. Substituting in (3.4.18) and (3.4.20) gives:
(p− θr − pM) = i
iM
(
pM − τRM
2
)
(3.4.23)
2(p− θr − pM)(pM − τRM) +
(
1− i
iM
)
(pM − τRM)2 = 0 (3.4.24)
Suppose ﬁrst that pM = τRM . If RM ≥ R0, then g(r+RM) = 0 which is a contradiction.
If RM < R
0, then g(r+RM) = 0− p−τr−τRMi < 0, which is also a contradiction. Suppose
now that pM 6= τRM , substituting (3.4.23) in (3.4.24), we have:
τRM =
(
1 +
i
iM
)
pM (3.4.25)
Equation (3.4.25) implies τRM > pM . This implies that g(r +RM) < 0 for any value of
RM , which contradicts (3.4.21). Hence g(r +RM) > 0 is excluded, thus g(r +RM) = 0.
From (3.4.22) two cases are possible: either iM = i, either µ = 0. Suppose iM = i.
Suppose ﬁrst that RM > R
0. In that case, g(r + RM) = 0 implies that pM = τRM .
Substituting iM = i and pM = τRM in (3.4.18) gives RM =
2
3
p−θr
τ
. Substituting iM = i,
pM = τRM as well as the previous value for RM in (3.4.19) gives µ < 0 which contradicts
(3.4.22). Suppose now that RM < R
0. In that case, g(r + RM) = 0 and iM = i imply
that pM = p− τr. Substituting iM = i and pM = p− τr in (3.4.20) gives:
(τr − θr)(p− τr − τRM) = 0 (3.4.26)
As τ > θ, (3.4.26) implies that p−τr = τRM , that is RM = R0, which is a contradiction.
Suppose ﬁnally that RM = R
0. In that case, g(r + RM) = 0 implies that pM = τRM =
p− τr. Substituting iM = i, pM = p− τr and RM = (p− τr)/τ in (3.4.19) gives:
µ =
(p− τr)2
τi2
(
−(τr − θr) + p− τr
3
)
(3.4.27)
From (3.4.22), µ ≥ 0. This is only true for p ≥ τr + 3(τr − θr). Thus iM = i is only
possible for these values of the parameters and leads to RM = R
0.
Suppose now that µ = 0. Suppose ﬁrst that RM ≥ R0. In that case, g(r + RM) = 0
implies that pM = τRM . Substituting µ = 0 and pM = τRM in (3.4.19) gives:
2
3
τRM
(
i
iM
+ 1
)
= p− θr (3.4.28)
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Substituting (3.4.28) and pM = τRM in (3.4.18) gives iM = i/2. Substituting into
(3.4.28) gives RM =
p−θr
2τ
. From that, RM ≥ R0 is true for p ≤ 2τr − θr. Suppose now
that RM < R
0. Numerical simulations show that such a solution is only possible for
2τr − θr < p < τr + 3(τr − θr).
Hence the optimal size is characterized by:
RM

= p−θr
2τ
> R0 if p < τr + (τr − θr)
= R0 if p = τr + (τr − θr)
< R0 if τr + (τr − θr) < p < τr + 3(τr − θr)
= R0 if p ≥ τr + 3(τr − θr)
(3.4.29)
Depending on the parameter values, RM may be lower or larger than R
0: the trader
chooses to include more farmers than the number able to take part to the market in
the stand alone situation, only if the market price is low compared to his advantage in
transport cost. In any case, g(r + RM) = 0 which means that the last farmer included
do not obtain any surplus from dealing with the trader. Nevertheless, when p < τr +
3(τr − θr), all the farmers located before r + RM obtain a positive surplus from the
contract. When p is larger, then the trader simply replicates the stand alone situation
and all the farmers included are indiﬀerent between the trader's contract and their stand
alone initial situation. Figure 3.5 illustrates these results.
Figure 3.5: Mill pricing (interlinked contract)
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3.5 Discussion of the results
Due to high transport costs, remote farmers in developing countries are not able to
take part to the market by themselves. Concluding a contract with an intermediary, who
has a cost advantage over the farmers, may allow them to participate. In the previous
analysis, we look at the conditions under which the presence of an intermediary permit
the participation of farmers who were unable to take part to the market by themselves.
In particular, we look at what a benevolent policy maker who wants to increase
participation should impose as a type of contract or pricing policy to be used by inter-
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mediaries. Similarly, we look at the conditions an external donor should impose to the
intermediaries he promotes, when his aim is improving participation.
Remote farmers are generally poorer than the less isolated one (see for instance
Jacoby (2000) for an empirical example). By increasing participation, the intermediary
helps to reduce poverty as these farmers can get a positive income from selling their
production while they were unable to do so by themselves. Even in the case where
the intermediary does not improve participation, he may reduce poverty. Indeed, being
able to sell their production on the market does not prevent farmers to be poor. By
increasing the incomes of these farmers, the intermediary may also contribute to reduce
poverty. In the following analysis, we thus look separately at both aspects: participation
improvement and poverty reduction.
3.5.1 Participation
Table 3.1: Summary of results
Contract Optimal number of farmers RCP
** Condition for RCP > R
0***
Simple - Discrim. RSD =
p−θr
τ
∀p a ∈ [0,∞[
Simple - Uniform RSU =
{
2
3
p−θr
τ
if a ∈ [0, 1/2[
τr−θr
τ
if a ∈ [1/2,∞[ p < τr + (τr − θr) a ∈ [0, 1[
Simple - Mill RSM =
{
2
3
p−θr
τ
if a ∈ [0, 2[
p−θr
τ
if a ∈ [2,∞[ p < τr + 2(τr − θr) a ∈ [0, 2[
Linked - Discrim. RLD =
p−θr
τ
∀p a ∈ [0,∞[
Linked - Uniform RLU =
4
3
p−θr
τ
p < τr + 2
√
5
5
(τr − θr) a ∈ [0, 2√5/5[
− 2
3τ
√
(p− θr)2 + 3(p− τr)2
Linked - Mill RLM

p−θr
2τ
if a ∈ [0, 1]
< R0 if a ∈]1, 3[
= R0 if a ∈ [3,∞[
p < τr + (τr − θr) a ∈ [0, 1[
* a = (p− τr)/(τr − θr) is an indicator of the relative capacity for the farmers, as a whole, to take part
proﬁtably to the market by themselves. It is inversely related to trader's cost advantage.
** The superscript C stands for type of contract (i.e. linked (L) or simple (S)) and the subscript P stands for
the pricing policy (i.e. discrimination (D), uniform pricing (U) or mill pricing (M)).
*** Number of farmers that have access to the market in the absence of the trader is given by R0 = p−τrτ .
High transport costs in developing countries may impede remote farmers to take part
to the market by themselves. The presence of an intermediary, who has a cost advantage
over the farmers, may allow remote farmers to take part to the market, through a contract
with the intermediary. However, except if the trader is able to perfectly discriminate, this
is only the case when the diﬀerence in transport costs between the trader and the farmer
(i.e. τr − θr) is large compared to the output price. It is only when the intermediary
has a suﬃcient cost advantage over the farmers that he chooses to include more farmers
than those able to reach the market by themselves.
96
Nevertheless, the importance of the diﬀerence needed for the trader to improve market
participation depends on the type of contract as well as of the pricing policy used. In such
a situation, using appropriate regulations, a policy maker may be willing to encourage
the types of contracts that lead the for-proﬁt trader to contract with a higher number
of farmers.
These results are summarized in table 3.1. One may note that the conditions under
which the intermediary includes more farmers than those able to reach the market by
themselves depend on his cost advantage (τr−θr) relative to the ﬁrst farmer's reservation
price (p − τr). If the net price that farmers can get on the market is low and/or if the
intermediary's cost advantage is important, then he is able to give access to the market
to farmers who were not able to participate by themselves. For presentation purpose,
we deﬁne a = (p− τr)/(τr− θr) as a measure of the relative importance of alternatives
opportunities for the farmers on the market. 9
Figure 3.6: Optimal number of farmers
* Choice of the parameters: r = 300, τ = 1 θ = 0.2 and i = 100
Figure 3.6 illustrates the main results. It depicts, for both types of contracts and for
the three pricing policies, the number of farmers it is optimal for the trader to contract
with, as a function of the output price p. As it has been shown, under spatial price
9Note that 1/a may also be interpreted as the intrinsic importance of the space on the market, as
deﬁned by Zhang and Sexton (2001).
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discrimination, this number of farmers is the same, whenever the contract is simple or
interlinked. This number is also higher than R0, the number of farmers able to take part
to the market in the absence of the trader, and this is valid for any p.
Spatial price discrimination is not always feasible. And if it is, the policy maker may
want to avoid it. Indeed, while leading to the highest participation, this policy implies
that all the farmers' incomes are pushed down to their reservation levels. It allows to
include farmers that were excluded from the market in the stand-alone situation, but
except from potential spillover eﬀects, they are not better oﬀ than in the stand alone
situation.
Among the other possibilities, the simple mill pricing contract always leads to a par-
ticipation greater or equal than that with other contracts. It can be seen on ﬁgure 3.6 that
the number of farmers included in this contract constitutes an upper envelope of the set
of possibilities. Moreover, the simple mill pricing contract contributes to increase market
participation with respect to the stand alone situation, as long as p < τr + 2(τr − θr).
After this threshold, the number of farmers included in the contract is equal to R0, but
never below. However, the stand alone situation is simply replicated such that no farmer
is able to increase his income by dealing with the trader.
It is interesting to note that, in terms of participation, for any given pricing policy,
the interlinked contract is always dominated by the simple one. The interlinked contract,
while having various advantages, does not allow to increase the number of participants,
with respect to a simple contract. A policy maker interested in increasing the number of
farmers included may be willing to promote the simple contract against the interlinked
one. Obviously, the interlinked contract leads to a higher proﬁt for the trader10, hence
an intervention is needed to restrict the use of the interlinkage.
When interlinkage is allowed, uniform pricing dominates mill pricing in terms of
participation when p is low. Thus, when p is small, or alternatively, when the diﬀerence
in transport costs between the farmer and the trader is large (precisely, when a < 3
4
√
3−3),
uniform interlinked contract is preferred to the mill pricing one, in terms of market
participation. After this threshold, the reverse is true. When 2
√
5
5
< a < 1, uniform
pricing even leads to a number of farmers lower than R0 while mill pricing still allows to
increase market access. When a > 1 both policies implies R < R0 but mill pricing still
includes more farmers than uniform does.11
Nevertheless, when a > 3, the trader using the mill pricing policy simply replicates
the stand alone situation such that no farmer can obtain any surplus from dealing with
him. This does not occur under uniform pricing: although less farmers are included,
they are all (except the ﬁrst one) able to obtain a positive surplus from the contract.
10Otherwise, the optimal interlinked contract would look like a simple one.
11This last point cannot be proved formally, but is assessed by numerical simulation.
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3.5.2 Poverty
Following Foster et al. (1984), we adopt the following poverty indicator:
Pov =
1
R¯
∫ r+R¯
r+q
(
z − y(x)
z
)2
dx (3.5.1)
where z > 0 is poverty line, (z − y(x) is the income shortfall of the farmer located in
x), R¯− q is the number of poor farmers (having income no greater than z) and R¯ is the
maximum number of farmers to be considered (limited by any physical limit). Larger is
Pov, higher is the poverty.
We will compare the outcomes of the diﬀerent pricing policies in terms of this indica-
tor, in order to derive which policy used by the intermediary performs better in reducing
poverty with respect the stand-alone situation. In particular, we deﬁned the gain in
terms of poverty reduction as:
GCP = Pov
0 − PovCP (3.5.2)
where the superscript C stands for type of contract (i.e. linked (L) or simple (S)) and
the subscript P stands for the pricing policy (i.e. discrimination (D), uniform pricing
(U) or mill pricing (M)) while Pov0 represents the level of poverty in the stand-alone
situation and is deﬁned as: Pov0 = 1
R¯
∫ r+R¯
r+q0
(
z−y0(x)
z
)2
dx where R¯− q0 is the number of
poor in the absence of the intermediary.
As explained before, we only consider R¯ large enough such that p < θr+ τR¯. Under
this condition, it can be shown that the physical limit has no impact on the ranking
of the diﬀerent contracts considered in terms of poverty reduction. In particular, if the
limit is increased to R¯ + W , the diﬀerence in poverty reduction between two types of
contracts G1−G2 is decreased to R¯R¯+W (G1−G2), but, as R¯R¯+W > 0, the ranking between
G1 and G2 is not aﬀected. As we are only interested in this ranking, we can arbitrarily
choose R¯ in the following numerical analysis.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the poverty reduction eﬀect of the diﬀerent types of contracts
we consider. As expected, an interlinked contract with spatial price discrimination does
not contributes to poverty reduction, as it does not permit to increase the income of any
farmers. If the contract is simple, however, spatial price discrimination contributes to
poverty reduction. Indeed, under this policy, all the farmers located in [Max[r, p+θr
τ
−
r], p+θr
τ
] get a positive surplus from such a contract. As soon as some of them are poor,
the presence of the intermediary contributes to reduce poverty.
Numerical simulations show that the type of contract that has to be encouraged in
order to decrease poverty crucially depends on the output market price. In particular,
comparing uniform and mill pricing interlinked contracts, uniform pricing tends to per-
form better in reducing poverty for moderate values of p, while mill pricing tends to
perform better for low and large values of p.
The indicator G given by (3.5.2) (forgetting the subscripts and superscripts) can be
decomposed into two parts. On the one hand, the presence of the intermediary may
help to reduce poverty for farmers who were already able to take part to the market by
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Figure 3.7: Poverty reduction
* Choice of the parameters: r = 300, τ = 1, θ = 0.2, i = 100 and z = 1000.
themselves. On the other hand, poverty may also be reduced by the participation of
farmers who were unable to participate by themselves. Deﬁning the ﬁrst gain in poverty
reduction as G(in) and the latter as G(out), we have G = G(in) +G(out) with:
G(in) =
1
R¯
(∫ r+R0
r+q0
(
z − y0(x)
z
)2
dx−
∫ r+R0
r+q
(
z − y(x)
z
)2
dx
)
(3.5.3)
G(out) = 1− 1
R¯
∫ r+R
r+R0
(
z − y(x)
z
)2
dx (3.5.4)
Figure 3.8 illustrates this decomposition for uniform and mill pricing policies in the
interlinked contract case (the same pattern appears in the simple contract case). When
the output market price is low, the major part of the poverty reduction comes from the
increased participation. This part is progressively reduced as p increases such that for a
large p, the poverty reduction is only due to the increase of the incomes of the farmers
who were already able to take part to the market by themselves, as the presence of the
intermediary does not help to increase participation anymore.
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Figure 3.8: Decomposition of the poverty reduction eﬀect
(a) Uniform pricing (Linked) (b) Mill pricing (Linked)
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* Choice of the parameters: r = 300, τ = 1, θ = 0.2, i = 100 and z = 1000.
3.6 Conclusions
In a developing country context, where transport costs are high, remote farmers are
not able to take part to the market by themselves. The presence of a trader, who has
a cost advantage, may help them to participate to the market. In this chapter we show
that, except if the intermediary is able to perfectly discriminate, his presence helps to
increase market participation only if he has a suﬃcient cost advantage over the farmers.
Moreover, his impact on participation depends on the type of contract and on the
pricing policy used. With this respect, the mill pricing simple contract dominates all
other kinds of arrangements, except spatial price discrimination.
As it has been discussed in chapter 2, interlinked contracts have various advantages.
One may ask if they also permit to improve farmers' participation to the market. Com-
paring an interlinked contract model with a simple one, the previous analysis show it is
not the case: interlinked transactions do not permit to give access to the market to more
farmers than a simple contract does.
Based on a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator, we compare the diﬀerent types of con-
tracts/pricing policies in terms of their poverty reduction impact. The analysis show that
the arrangement that performs better in reducing poverty greatly depends on the output
market price, or alternatively, on the trader's cost advantage. Hence, no general policy
recommendation can be made regarding the arrangement that should be encouraged by
a policy maker willing to reduce poverty.
The link between participation improvement and poverty reduction is analyzed by
decomposing the poverty reduction eﬀect between an eﬀect for farmers who were already
able to take part to the market in the absence of the intermediary and farmers who
are able to participate thanks to the intermediary. It appears that, for low values of
the output price, most of the poverty reduction induced by the intermediary's presence
comes from the inclusion of newly participants. When p is larger, this eﬀect is reduced,
until a point where the poverty reduction only comes from the increase of the incomes
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of farmers who were already participating.
The present study gives elements for future researches. First, this model should
be extended to a more general production function, such as an iso-elastic one. We
expect that the results deduced here are not restrictive and also apply to more general
speciﬁcations. Second, more general, non linear, transport cost functions should be
considered, notably giving the possibility for economies when transporting both input
and output. Finally, rather than considering monopsony/monopoly intermediary, the
entry of competitors could be analyzed.
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Appendices
3.A Simple contract
Proof of (3.3.5)
From (3.3.4), for each x, two cases are possibles. (i) Either λ(x) = 0 which implies from
(3.3.2) that pD(x) =
1
2
(p−θr− τ(x− r)). This only respects the participation constraint
for x ≥ p+θr
τ
− r. (ii) Or λ(x) > 0 which implies that the participation constraint is
binding: pD(x)
2
i
= y0(x), that is pD(x) =
√
iy0(x). Substituting in (3.3.2), we have:
λ(x) = −p−θr−τ(x−r)−2
√
iy0(x)√
iy0(x)
. This is only positive for x ≤ p+θr
τ
− r.
Proof of (3.3.10)
From (3.3.9) two cases are possibles. (i) Assume λ = 0. From (3.3.7), we have pU =
1
2
(p− θr − τ(RU/2)). Substituting in (3.3.8), we have RU = 23 p−θrτ . Replacing in the
previous expression for pU , this gives pU =
1
3
(p − θr). This only respects the par-
ticipation constraint if p ≤ 1
2
(3τr − θr). (ii) Assume the participation constraint is
binding: pU = p − τr. From (3.3.8), τRU = τr − θr. Substituting in (3.3.7), we have
λ = τr−θr
τi
(2p+ θr − 3τr). This is only positive if p ≥ 1
2
(3τr − θr).
Proof of (3.3.14)
From (3.3.12), either pM = τRM or pM = p − θr. In this last case however, trader's
proﬁt is zero, which may be excluded. Thus:
pM = τRM (3.6.1)
From (3.3.13) two cases are possibles. (i) Assume λ = 0. From (3.3.11), pM =
1
2
(p− θr + τ(RM/2)). Substituting in (3.6.1), we have RM = 23 p−θrτ . Hence, pM =
2
3
(p− θr). This only respects the participation constraint if p ≤ 3τr − 2θr. (ii) Assume
the participation constraint is binding: pM = p − τr. From (3.6.1), τRM = p − τr.
Substituting in (3.3.11), we have λ = p−τr
τi
(p+ 2θr − 3τr). This is only positive if
p ≥ 3τr − 2θr.
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Chapter 4
Entry and expansion strategy of an
intermediary under uncertainty∗†
4.1 Introduction
In Senegal, as in other West African countries, rural households involved in the
livestock sector only obtain low income from the sale of the milk they produce. Indeed,
this production takes place in a pastoral or an agropastoral system in which each farmer
has only some cows and each one provides low quantity of milk (Duteurtre, 2006).
Moreover, due to inadequate transport infrastructure and important distances between
areas of production and areas of consumption, they face high transport costs. As the
milk is highly perishable, it has to be sold on a daily basis, which implies that transport
and transaction costs are important compared to the low quantity of product sold. In
some cases, these costs are so important that farmers fail to participate to the market
by themselves.
Since the nineties, we have seen the emergence of small-scale processing units, called
mini-dairies, that play an intermediary role between the farmers and the market (Dieye
et al., 2005, Corniaux et al., 2005). These intermediaries seem to rapidly expand (see
ﬁgure 1, page 8). They have some kind of advantage over the farmers to sell the products
on the market. They use more eﬃcient transport devices, such as trucks, they own bulk
cooling tanks, such that they can stock the milk and do not have to transport it every
day, etc. This cost advantage often requires an important ﬁxed cost, which cannot be
borne by each farmer alone.
The presence of such intermediaries has the potential to increase farmers' income (see
chapter 2) and participation to the market (see chapter 3). Hence we analyze under what
conditions these intermediaries will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter the market and whether
∗Mélanie Lefèvre (CREPP, HEC-ULg, Université de Liège) and Joe Tharakan (Université de Liège,
CORE and CEPR).
†We are grateful to the participants at the CRED and CREPP seminars for useful comments and
suggestions.
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policy recommendations can be made to a policy maker willing to encourage their entry.
On the one hand, they need to make costly irreversible investments in order to deal with
farmers who are geographically isolated and dispersed. On the other hand, prices of food
products are characterized by important volatility which leads to uncertainty and creates
an environment which tends to discourage investment by proﬁt-seeking agents. This is
particularly true in the milk sector, as it may be seen on ﬁgure 4.1 that represents the
evolution of the FAO dairy price index since the nineties.
Figure 4.1: FAO Dairy Price Index
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Once an intermediary decides to enter the market, another question is the number
of farmers who can beneﬁt from his entry, that is the size of the milk collection area the
mini-dairy decides to work with. This size can evolve with the time, hence we analyze
the factors that determines this size as well as its evolution in future periods.
In what follows we establish what is the optimal investment strategy for an inter-
mediary who buys an input from geographically dispersed farmers and who sells this
transformed input on a market characterized by price volatility. Uncertainty faced by
such intermediaries has been considered in the literature but more interest has been
given to the stochastic characteristic of farmer's supply (for instance, see Lofgren,
1992). When market price uncertainty is considered, the contract components, such as
the optimal input price, are investigated. For instance, Chaudhuri and Gupta (1995)
look at the eﬀect of the output market price uncertainty on the optimal credit-product
interlinked contract. However, the intermediary is assumed to be already installed and
few is done about the eﬀect of the uncertainty on his entry decision. In this chapter, we
determine at what price it is optimal for the intermediary to invest and, given that the
number of farmers will have an impact on the cost of investment, we also establish what
is the optimal initial size of collection area. The higher is this optimal price the less
106
likely is the entry by the intermediary on the market; the bigger the collection area, the
more farmers will beneﬁt from the presence of this intermediary. We will also establish
whether it is likely that the intermediary increases his collection area in the future.
Our analysis will determine what are the factors which inﬂuence the decision to
invest and whether it is likely or not to see these intermediaries appear on the market.
This means that we study the proﬁtability of an intermediary's investment project in
a context of market price uncertainty. Given the irreversible nature of the investment
and the uncertainty linked to the agricultural prices volatility, we use the real option
theory to deﬁne the optimal plan of investment for such a ﬁrm. Indeed, the net present
value rule leads to overoptimistic results in this context (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
Using data on the milk sector in Senegal, we check the proﬁtability of two existing mini-
dairies and explore whether the project of transforming local milk into powder could be
proﬁtable.
In a perspective of improving farmers' income and participation to the market, public
authorities or external donors may be interested in helping the ﬁrm to invest. In this
chapter, we compare the impact of various economic policies that can be implemented.
Policies that induce a larger number of farmers included in the project beneﬁt directly
to the marginal farmers. Policies that leads to a shorter investment delay beneﬁt more
rapidly to the farmers included. Depending on the donor's objective, we discuss the
relevance of policies such as help for initial investment or aid for incremental investment.
Using data on the milk sector in Senegal, we simulate these eﬀects in a real context.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section develops the theoretical model
regarding investment timing and size choice, taking into account the possibility of in-
cluding at a later date other farmers after the initial investment has been made. Section
3 discusses comparative statics results. Section 4 is devoted to study cases in the milk
sector in Senegal. Finally, section 5 concludes.
4.2 The model
We consider a situation in which farmers are geographically dispersed and produce
an agricultural product. Each farmer's supply is assumed to be price inelastic due to the
intrinsic characteristics of agricultural products, (namely, they are perishable while the
production period is long) and produces each period a quantity s of the product that
can be sold. Each farmer has the possibility to sell his product on the ﬁnal market which
can be, for instance, an urban center. For this, he has to incur a transport cost which is
increasing with distance. The farmer located at a distance x ≥ 0 from the ﬁnal market
faces a transport cost υ(x) per unit of product with ∂υ(x)/∂x > 0 and υ(0) = 0. On
the market, the farmer has to incur transaction costs due to imperfect information. We
assume these costs are proportional to the price and lower the price eﬀectively received by
the farmer on the market (Key et al., 2000) from pt to ψpt with ψ ∈ [0, 1]. The farmer's
expected net price per unit at each period is thus given by ψpt − υ(x). Formally, we
assume that farmers are uniformly distributed along a linear segment with origin at 0
and that the ﬁnal good market is located at the origin. The further away farmers are
from urban centers, the lower is their net expected income. This results for the farmers
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into lower incomes and higher risk of poverty.
In this chapter, we establish whether it is beneﬁcial for intermediaries to enter the
market and whether farmers will beneﬁt from this intermediary. The intermediary col-
lects the product from the farmers, pays each farmer the same price irrespective of his
location and sells the product on the ﬁnal goods market. The intermediary is located at
the origin 0 and hence does not face any transport cost for his output.1 Depending on the
transport cost for the input, the intermediary chooses the optimal size of the collection
area R, that is, the number of farmers from whom he buys the agricultural input. The
collection area is represented by the segment [0, R]. The price on the urban market for
the good is assumed to be stochastic and inﬂuenced by the price on world markets. We
assume that the market price evolves following a geometric Brownian motion:
dp = α pt dt+ σ pt dz (4.2.1)
where α is the drift and σ is the volatility of p. dz = t
√
dt, (where t ∼ N(0, 1) is a
white noise) is the Wiener increment, which satisﬁes E[dz] = 0. The deterministic part
αptdt represents the trend of world prices and the stochastic part σptdz represents the
volatility of the market price.
The assumption of the geometric Brownian motion seems reasonable for agricultural
products including milk. Turvey and Power (2006) have performed test for ordinary
Brownian motion on historical data from 17 commodity futures contracts and have found
that the null hypothesis of ordinary Brownian motion cannot be rejected for 14 of the
17 series. Fluid Milk is shown to be consistent with a geometric Brownian motion at all
conﬁdence levels.
We are interested in the optimal investment strategy for an intermediary who faces a
stochastic market price. This means that we establish when, that is, at what price, it is
optimal for the trader to invest in a plant as well as what is the optimal size of the area
on which the agricultural input will be collected. To set-up a collection area, investments
have to be made and these costs are assumed to be sunk and hence irreversible. After
entering the market with an initial size for the collection area, the trader can expand
this area in future periods by incurring additional costs.
Once installed, the intermediary gives the same price to all the farmers. As a farmer's
reservation price is decreasing with distance to the urban center, the trader has to give
all farmers a price at least equal to the reservation price of the farmer located the closest
to the urban center, that is ψpt. All the farmers further away obtain a positive surplus
from selling their product to the intermediary rather than themselves on the ﬁnal market.
The intermediary has a constant operating marginal cost c and faces a collection cost
T (Rt) per unit of agricultural input transported, with T (0) = 0 and T
′(R) > 0. The
ﬁrst cost c is independent of the distance and represents outlays such as, for instance,
electricity, output packaging, etc. Collection cost T (Rt) increases with the size of the
collection area and includes costs such as fuel, driver's wage, etc.
1The same reasoning holds for an intermediary who is located at a distance r > 0 from the market.
In that case, the operating cost c hereafter also includes the output transport cost from the location r
to the ﬁnal good market 0.
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The intermediary's operating proﬁt is given by Π(pt, Rt) = sRt (pt − ψpt − c− T (Rt)),
that is:
Π(pt, Rt) = sRt ((1− ψ)pt − c− T (Rt))
As farmers are distributed on a segment, each additional farmer included increases
the length of the segment, which increases the transport cost T (R). For simplicity, we
assume that this cost is linear in R such that T (Rt) = τRt with τ the unit transport
cost per unit of distance. In that case:
Π(pt, Rt) = sRt ((1− ψ)pt − c− τRt) (4.2.2)
Because the price is variable over time, we can have periods during which pt ≤ (c +
τRt)/(1− ψ), which implies that the operating proﬁt is negative.
The investment cost has two parts. First, building the plant costs a ﬁxed amount I.
Second, extending the collection area costs κ per unit of distance. Indeed, the decision
of including more farmers in the area is costly. In the milk sector for instance, one
way to attract farmers to the network is to encourage artiﬁcial inseminations in order
to increase their production. In that case, sheds have also to be constructed to protect
these animals that cannot resist to high temperatures. Formations about hygiene, animal
welfare, and animal health have to be organized to guarantee the quality of the product.
All these costs, as well as the search and information costs for concluding the contract are
represented by κ. Dudez and Broutin (2003) report that it is diﬃcult to enforce the
contract concluded with the farmers such that they supply milk to the processing unit
on a regular basis. One way to do this is by providing them with technical or medical
assistance. The initial cost is thus I + κR∗(p∗) and each expansion of the area costs κ
per additional unit.
As the proﬁt of the intermediary is uncertain and investment costs are irreversible,
we analyze this problem of investment strategy using real options theory (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994). The investment strategy of the trader describes the optimal price at
which the trader should enter the market, the optimal initial capacity and the optimal
future capacity expansion proﬁle. Several models of capacity choice have been developed.
We use insights of incremental investment models, such as Pindyck (1988) and Dixit
(1995), as well as models on ﬁxed capacity choice such as Dangl (1999) or Bøckman
et al. (2008).
The real options theory takes into account the fact that an investor with an op-
portunity to invest has the possibility to wait before investing in that project. When
investment costs are irreversible and future environment is uncertain, this option has a
certain value and any investment involves giving up that option. Once this option is
given up, the ﬁrm cannot disinvest if the market conditions change dramatically. This
lost option has to be included as a part of the total investment cost. When postponing
the investment (that is keeping the option to invest) the ﬁrm not only obtains the cap-
ital appreciation of the non-invested money, but also value the fact of avoiding future
losses. The real options theory says that, if the value of the option to invest is higher than
the net value of the project, the ﬁrm's best strategy is to wait. The project should be
undertaken when the stochastic price reaches the threshold at which the option to invest
has exactly the same value as the net value of the plant once constructed. To determine
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this threshold, we need an expression for the option to invest F and an expression for
the value of the project once installed V .
The ﬁrm not only faces this trade-oﬀ for the initial investment, but also for each
additional unit of size. Thus, in our model we take into account the value of the option
to increase this size in future periods, that is the value of postponing the incremental
investment. Given this, the value of the project once installed V depends on the value
on the size, as well as on the option to increase this size in the future.
The optimal investment strategy is described by three elements. First, a threshold
price p∗: it is optimal for the ﬁrm to invest in the project when the stochastic market
price is above this threshold. Second, the initial size of the collection area: when the
stochastic market price crosses the threshold p∗, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to invest in a
project with a size R∗. Third, the optimal size R∗(p) that will be installed depending
on the evolution of the market price. For instance, when the stochastic market price
increases from p to p¯ (with p¯ > p > p∗) it is optimal for the ﬁrm to increase the size from
R∗(p) to R∗(p¯).
The optimal investment strategy is determined as follows. First, we determine the
value V of the installed project and the value F of the option to invest. Then we calculate
the price at which F and the net value of the project V −I−κR are equal. This threshold
price p∗(R) depends on the size R of the installed project. Second, we determine the
optimal size R∗(p) as a function of the realization of the stochastic market price. Finally,
we use R∗(p) and p∗(R) to calculate the threshold p∗ at which it is optimal to make the
initial investment, as well as the initial size R∗.
4.2.1 Value of the installed project V
The value of the installed project Vt(pt, Rt) at time t is the sum of the current operat-
ing proﬁt over the interval (t, t+dt) and the continuation value (the expected discounted
value of future operating proﬁts) after t + dt. Note that, at period t, pt is known but
pt+dt is unknown and depends on pt by the stochastic process (4.2.1).
Vt(pt, Rt) = Πt(pt, Rt)dt+ Et[Vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt)e
−ρdt]
where e−ρdt is the discount factor (the present value in t of one monetary unit to be
received in t + dt) with ρ the ﬁxed continuously compounded discount rate. The term
Et[Vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt)] takes into account all the possible Vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt) and their re-
spective probabilities. From that, we have the following Bellman equation:
Vt(pt, Rt) = Πt(pt, Rt)dt+ e
−ρdtEt[Vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt)] (4.2.3)
Approximating e−ρdt by 1 − ρdt, adding and substracting Vt between the square
brackets, applying Ito's Lemma to Et[dV ] deﬁned as Et[Vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt) − Vt(pt, Rt)],
ignoring terms which are small relative to dt, reorganizing the terms, and ﬁnally dividing
by dt yields the following non-homogeneous diﬀerential equation:
1
2
σ2p2t
∂2Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p2
+ αpt
∂Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p
− ρVt(pt, Rt) + Πt(pt, Rt) = 0 (4.2.4)
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which is non-stochastic. Indeed, it depends only on pt and Rt which are known at time
t. From (4.2.2), this can be written as:
1
2
σ2p2t
∂2Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p2
+αpt
∂Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p
−ρVt(pt, Rt)+sRt ((1− ψ)pt − c− τRt) = 0 (4.2.5)
The Appendix 4.A shows that the particular solution to this non-homogeneous diﬀeren-
tial equation is given by:
Vt(pt, Rt) = B1(Rt)p
β1
t +B2(Rt)p
β2
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
option to expand R: G(pt, Rt)
+ sRt
(
(1− ψ)pt
ρ− α −
c+ τRt
ρ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamental
(4.2.6)
where B1(Rt) and B2(Rt) are to be determined, β1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2ρ
σ2
and
β2 =
1
2
− α
σ2
−
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2ρ
σ2
.
G(pt, Rt) is the value of the ﬁrm's growth options, i.e. given the current size Rt and
the current value of pt, G(pt, Rt) is the present value of any additional proﬁts that might
result of future size expansion (Pindyck, 1988: 971).2 This value is given by G(pt, Rt) =
B1(Rt)p
β1
t +B2(Rt)p
β2
t . However, the likelihood of expanding the size becomes very small
when the market price becomes small, so the value of the options to expand should be
zero as p goes to zero. Therefore, the coeﬃcient B2, corresponding to the negative root
β2, should be equal to zero, such that (4.2.6) becomes:
Vt(pt, Rt) = B1(Rt)p
β1
t + sRt
(
(1− ψ)pt
ρ− α −
c+ τRt
ρ
)
(4.2.7)
The interpretation of (4.2.7) is the following. The last terms represent the expected
present value of the proﬁt the intermediary would obtain if he kept the size of the col-
lection area constant at the level Rt forever. B1(Rt)p
β1
t is the value of the intermediary's
options to expand this area in the future. It may be socially diﬃcult to reduce the size
of the collection area (i.e. excluding farmers). This is why we take the investment in
the collection area as being irreversible. Once the area has been extended, it cannot be
reduced. Thus the value of the installed project (4.2.7) does not take into account any
option of decreasing the size.
4.2.2 Value of the option to invest F
Knowing the value Vt(pt, Rt) of the installed project as a function of the current price
pt, we could use the diﬀusion process of pt and Ito's Lemma to obtain the diﬀusion
2Assume for a moment that the units of size are discrete, in this case, G(pt, Rt) = ∆G(pt, Rt) +
∆G(pt, Rt + 1) + ∆G(pt, Rt + 2) + ... where, given the current size of Rt, ∆G(pt, Rt) is the value of the
option of expanding the size by one unit, that is reaching the size Rt+1. ∆G(pt, Rt+1) is the value of the
option of expanding the size from Rt+1 to Rt+2 and so on. These options must be exercised sequentially,
so the total value of the ﬁrm's options to expand is G(pt, Rt) =
∑∞
j=Rt
∆G(pt, j) (Pindyck, 1988: 971).
With these incremental units becoming inﬁnitesimally small, we have: G(pt, Rt) =
∫∞
Rt
∆G(pt, z)dz.
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process of Vt(pt, Rt). From that, we could ﬁnd the value F of the option to invest in
the project as a function of V . However, it would be diﬃcult to solve the diﬀerential
equation linking F and V , as the drift and diﬀusion parameters of V are complicated
expressions. Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 182), we use an alternative approach.
We determine the value of the option to invest as the function of the price, Ft(pt). Then
we use the solution for Vt(pt, Rt) given by (4.2.7) as the boundary condition that holds
at the optimal price threshold.
The option to invest, which can be seen as the value of the inactive ﬁrm, takes into
account the possibility to postpone the investment. While the value of the installed
project depends on the size Rt, the value of the option to invest does not depend on this
size, because, by deﬁnition, the option to invest only has a value when the project is
not installed, i.e. it has no size. As long as the investment is not undertaken, holding
the option to invest yields no cash ﬂow, thus the only return it yields is its capital
appreciation. The value is thus given by:
Ft(pt) = e
−ρdtE[Ft(pt+dt)] (4.2.8)
Using Ito's lemma, Ft(pt) satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation
1
2
σ2p2t
∂2Ft(pt)
∂p2
+ αpt
∂Ft(pt)
∂p
− ρFt(pt) = 0 (4.2.9)
The particular solution is Ft(pt) = A1p
β1
t +A2p
β2
t . This solution is valid over the range
of prices for which it is optimal to hold the option. This range is deﬁned by boundary
conditions. One natural boundary condition is 0. Since p = 0 is an absorbing barrier,
the option to invest has no value for very small values of pt. This indicates that the
constant A2, corresponding to the negative root β2, must be equal to zero:
Ft(pt) = A1p
β1
t (4.2.10)
where A1 is a constant to be determined.
The other boundary of that region is p∗(R), the price at which it is optimal to exercise
the option (i.e. to invest). This boundary can be described as a free boundary (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994: 109 and 141). Indeed, p∗(R) is endogenous and must be determined
simultaneously with F (p). It means that A1 will be determined as a part of the solution,
simultaneously with threshold p∗(R) above which it is optimal to invest. This is the
object of the next section.
4.2.3 Threshold for the initial investment p∗(R)
We look for the threshold price p∗(R) above which (pt > p∗(R)) it is optimal to invest
in the project. The investment strategy is determined by the following trade-oﬀ. On
one hand, investing later saves the interest on the investment cost I + κR. On the other
hand, investing now yields an immediate cash ﬂow plus the opportunity to expand the
size (so to increase the cash ﬂow) but eliminates the opportunity to avoid losses if the
market price decreases. This investment strategy satisﬁes a value matching condition
and a smooth pasting condition.
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The value matching condition indicates that at the threshold price p∗(R) the ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent between investing in a project of size R, and not investing, that is: F (p∗(R)) =
V (p∗(R), R)− κR− I. The smooth pasting condition is given by ∂F (p∗(R))
∂p
= ∂V (p
∗(R),R)
∂p
.
From (4.2.10) and (4.2.7), we have3:
A1p
∗(R)β1 = B1(R)p∗(R)β1 + sR
(
(1− ψ)p∗(R)
ρ− α −
c+ τR
ρ
)
− κR− I (4.2.11)
β1A1p
∗(R)β1−1 = β1B1(R)p∗(R)β1−1 + sR
(1− ψ)
ρ− α (4.2.12)
From (4.2.11) and (4.2.12), we have:
p∗(R) =
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)
(
κ
s
+
c+ τR
ρ
+
I
sR
)
(4.2.13)
The interpretation of p∗(R) is the following: the intermediary is willing to spend the
initial investment cost I + κR in order to invest in a project of size R when the market
price reaches the threshold p∗(R).
4.2.4 Threshold curve p#(R) and optimal size R∗(p)
We look for the price threshold p#(R) that must be reached in order to extend the size
up to R.4 The threshold satisﬁes two boundary conditions: a value matching condition
and a smooth pasting condition (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 364).
The value matching condition is given by ∂Vt(pt, Rt)/∂R = κ. From (4.2.7), this is
equivalent to
∂B1(Rt)
∂R
pβ1t + s
(
(1− ψ)pt
ρ− α −
c+ 2τRt
ρ
)
= κ (4.2.14)
When the ﬁrm decides to expand the size up to Rt+1, it gives up the option ∆G(pt, Rt),
because once exercised, the option is dead (Pindyck, 1988: 971) and so on for the
following units. Equation (4.2.14) says that the ﬁrm should expand the size until the
value of marginal unit of size is equal to the cost of this marginal unit: the purchase cost
κ and the opportunity cost ∆G(pt, Rt) = −(∂B1(Rt)/∂R)pβ1t (Pindyck, 1988: 972).
The smooth pasting condition is given by ∂2Vt(pt, Rt)/∂R∂p = 0. From (4.2.7), this
is equivalent to:
β1
∂B1(Rt)
∂R
pβ1−1t +
s(1− ψ)
ρ− α = 0 (4.2.15)
3Note that the value of A1 is found by substituting (4.2.13) in (4.2.12) and that B1(R) will be
determined in the following section.
4The fact that ∂2Π/∂R2 < 0 ensures that the marginal unit of size R can be treated independently
independently of any other unit (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 366).
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These boundary conditions give us the curve of thresholds p#(R) that must be reached
to expand the size up to R:
p#(R) =
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)
(
κ
s
+
c+ 2τR
ρ
)
(4.2.16)
This threshold curve for the incremental investments p#(R) has to be distinguished
from the threshold for the initial investment p∗(R) given by (4.2.13) . When the price
reaches p#(R), the intermediary (who is already installed) is willing to spend the invest-
ment cost κ in order to increase the size until R.
This threshold curve allow us to determine the optimal size R∗(pt) such that, at the
market price pt, the ﬁrm is just indiﬀerent between extending the capacity by one unit or
not. This optimal size is given by the inverse of the thresholds curve (4.2.16). Precisely,
R∗(pt) =
1
2τ
(
β1 − 1
β1
ρ
ρ− α(1− ψ)pt −
κρ
s
− c
)
(4.2.17)
Equations (4.2.14) and (4.2.15) also give b1(Rt) = ∂B1(Rt)/∂R. Value matching
says that, at the optimal size level, the marginal discounted proﬁt has to be equal to
the marginal cost of increasing the size. This cost includes monetary cost κ as well as
opportunity cost −b1(Rt)pβ1t . When the ﬁrm exercises its option to install the Rth unit
of size, it gives up the marginal option value −b1(Rt)pβ1t . With this deﬁnition, b1(Rt) is
negative. Replacing p by (4.2.16) in the smooth pasting condition (4.2.15) we obtain:
b1(Rt) = −s(β1 − 1)
β1−1(1− ψ)β1
ββ11 (ρ− α)β1
(
κ
s
+
c+ 2τRt
ρ
)1−β1
(4.2.18)
This allows us to determine B1(Rt). Indeed, as B1(Rt)p
β
1 represents the value of the
ﬁrm's growth options, it is given by the integration of the marginal value −b1(R)pβ1t
(Pindyck, 1988: 972, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 365): B1(Rt) =
∫∞
Rt
−∂B1(z)
∂z
dz.
Under the assumption5 that ρ > 2α + σ2, we have:
B1(Rt) =
1
2(β1 − 2)
s
τ
(β1 − 1)β1−1ρ(1− ψ)β1
ββ11 (ρ− α)β1
(
κ
s
+
c+ 2τRt
ρ
)2−β1
(4.2.19)
5 B1(Rt) =
∫∞
Rt
s(β1−1)β1−1(1−ψ)β1
β
β1
1 (ρ−α)β1
(
κ
s +
c+2τz
ρ
)1−β1
dz. This integral converges if the power of the
integrand is lower than -1. Indeed, limz→∞ b1(z) = 0 only if the the power of z is lower than -1 (in order
to get something divided by ∞). This is the case when β1 > 2. Assuming that α and σ are given, this
condition may be rewritten has ρ > 2α + σ2. In other words, the ﬁrm has to be impatient enough for
the option of expanding the size to be ﬁnite. Otherwise, the value of the option to expand the size is
inﬁnite and the ﬁrm never exercises it.
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4.2.5 Investment strategy
The threshold for investment, for any given size, is given by p∗(R) deﬁned by (4.2.13),
while the optimal size, for any given market price is given by R∗(p) deﬁned by (4.2.17).
The solution to this system of two equations in the two unknowns p and R gives us p∗
and R∗, that are the threshold price for the initial investment and the initial optimal
size. Above which this threshold (pt > p
∗) it is optimal to invest in a project of size R∗.
Substituting (4.2.17) in (4.2.13), we have:
p∗ =
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)
(
κ
s
+
c
ρ
+ 2
√
τI
sρ
)
(4.2.20)
At that level, the ﬁrm establishes the plant (which costs I) with a capacity R∗(p∗) (that
costs κR∗(p∗)). Substituting (4.2.20) in (4.2.17), this initial size is given by:
R∗ =
√
ρI
τs
(4.2.21)
At the following periods, the intermediary expands R when p increases, following the
curve R∗(p) given by (4.2.17).
4.3 Discussion
Consider p∗ and R∗ deﬁned by (4.2.20) and (4.2.21). One may note that these results
are the solution to the system of two equations (4.2.13) and (4.2.16) whose curves always
intersect at the minimum of p∗(R). It means that R∗ is the size that minimizes the
threshold for investment.
This size R∗ is nothing else that the size which minimizes the average initial cost per
unit produced. Consider the total discounted cost sR c+τR
ρ
+ κR + I. Intuitively, the
threshold for the initial investment p∗(R) depends directly on the average cost per unit
produced c+τR
ρ
+ κ
s
+ I
sR
. In the same way, the threshold for the incremental investment
p#(R) depends directly on the marginal cost per unit produced c+2τR
ρ
+ κ
s
. Before R∗, the
marginal cost being lower than the average one, increasing the size allows to decrease the
average cost. After R∗, the opposite is true and any increase in the size of the collection
area also increases the average cost. Hence, the intermediary chooses the initial size of
the collection area as if he was simply cost-minimizer. Doing so, he chooses the initial
size such as he is able to make the initial investment as soon as possible.
This result is due to the presence of the option to increase the size. The intermediary's
choice for the initial investment is only driven by timing considerations: he may choose
a small size in order to invest sooner, knowing that he can expand the size in the future.
In the absence of such a possibility, the intermediary would have chosen a larger size as
well as a longer delay for the initial investment.
Indeed, assume that the option to increase the size does not exist.6 Then the optimal
6This corresponds to setting B1(R) equal to zero in the previous sections.
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size is ﬁxed: once it has been chosen, it cannot be changed. It is the case for instance when
considering building a hotel. The number of rooms is chosen at the time of investment
and additional rooms cannot be easily added after the hotel is build. Dangl (1999)
and Bøckman et al. (2008) consider such models. In this case, the optimal size, for
any observed price, is such that the intertemporal proﬁt net from investment cost is
maximized, that is:
max
R
sR
(
(1− ψ)p
ρ− α −
c+ τR
ρ
)
− (I + κR) (4.3.1)
The ﬁrst-order condition is given by:
s
(
(1− ψ)p
ρ− α −
c+ 2τR
ρ
)
= κ (4.3.2)
The optimal size, for any given price, is thus:
R˜∗(p) =
1
2τ
(
ρ
ρ− α(1− ψ)p−
κρ
s
− c
)
(4.3.3)
Comparing (4.2.17) and (4.3.3) we have R˜∗(p) > R∗(p) as (β1 − 1)/β1 (the inverse of
the option value multiple) is lower than 1. The absence of the option to expand the
size however does not aﬀect p∗(R), the threshold for initial investment for any given size.
The solution to the system of equations (4.2.13) and (4.3.3) is:
R˜∗ =
ρ
2(β1 − 2)τs
(κ
s
+
c
ρ
)
s+
√(
κ
s
+
c
ρ
)2
s2 +
4β1(β1 − 2)τsI
ρ
 (4.3.4)
Comparing (4.2.21) and (4.3.4) we have that R˜∗ > R∗.7
When the intermediary has no option to expand the size in the future, he faces a
trade-oﬀ between investing rapidly in a smaller collection area and waiting in order to
invest in a larger project. When he has the option to increase the size, this trade-oﬀ
disappears, as he can invest rapidly in a small collection area and expand it in the future.
In that case, minimizing the threshold for the initial investment is the optimal strategy.
In the absence of the option to expand the size, each change in the external envi-
ronment of the intermediary may aﬀect the result in two ways. On the one hand, there
is an entry threshold eﬀect: the change induces the ﬁrm to advance or postpone the
initial investment, for any given initial size. The entry threshold eﬀect of a change of
the parameter x is given by the ﬁrst (partial) derivative of (4.2.13) with respect to x:
∂p∗(R)/∂x. It is the eﬀect of x on the threshold for the initial investment in a project of
7A suﬃcient condition for R˜∗ > R∗ is
(
κ
s +
c
ρ
)
s +
√(
κ
s +
c
ρ
)2
s2 + 4β1(β1−2)τsIρ >
√
4(β1−2)2τsI
ρ
which is always satisﬁed as
(
κ
s +
c
ρ
)
s > 0 and β1 > β1 − 2.
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size R. On the other hand, we have an eﬀect on the optimal size: given the current price,
the optimal size of the collection area is aﬀected by the external change. This eﬀect is
given by the ﬁrst (partial) derivative of (4.3.3) with respect to x: ∂R˜∗(p)/∂x that is the
eﬀect of x on the optimal size, for any given p. As both eﬀects go in opposite directions,
the total eﬀect is a priori ambiguous. For instance, a higher uncertainty tends to delay
the investment for any initial size, but also tends to reduce the optimal size, for any
given price. As the threshold for investment is lower when the initial size is smaller, one
cannot a priori determine whether the threshold for investment will be higher or lower,
and whether the initial size will by larger or smaller.
However, in the presence of the option to expand the size, only the entry threshold
eﬀect matters when determining p∗ as this price is always the minimum of p∗(R). The
eﬀect on R∗ depends on the way the parameter aﬀects the curve p∗(R). If the eﬀect
is the same for any size, then R∗ is not aﬀected. However if the parameter aﬀects the
threshold for investment p∗(R) diﬀerently depending whether the size is small or large,
then the initial size is aﬀected by a change of the parameter. Therefore, there are two
questions of interest in terms of economic policy. First, how does the entry threshold
react to an external change? Second, is the initial size of the collection area aﬀected? If
this is the case, are the eﬀects on p∗ and R∗ going in the same or opposite directions?
Table 4.1 reports these eﬀects for various parameters of interest.
Table 4.1: Eﬀects on the entry threshold and on the optimal size
Entry threshold Eﬀect on the
eﬀect optimal size Eﬀect on p∗ Eﬀect on R∗
∂p∗(R)
∂x
∂R∗(p)
∂x
dp∗
dx
dR∗
dx
Uncertainty σ + − + 0
Transport cost τ + − + −
Supply s − + − −
Invest. cost I + 0 + +
Extension cost κ + − + 0
Derivatives for the total eﬀects are given in Appendix 4.B.
Interestingly, the price volatility has no eﬀect on the initial size of the collection area
R∗. In an uncertain context, the intermediary tends to invest later but in the same
collection area as in a certain environment. When the uncertainty is high (i.e. σ is
large), the expected cash ﬂow from investing is large, as the expected proﬁt is unlimited
for p large and limited for p small. However, the value of the option to invest, that is the
value of waiting before investing, is also large, thus the opportunity cost of investing is
large. The latter eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst, such that when uncertainty is high the ﬁrm
postpones investments and waits for p to be higher before investing. For any given size
of the collection area, p∗(R) is larger, thus p∗ is larger: when the uncertainty increases,
the intermediary chooses to postpone the initial investment (dp∗/dσ > 0). Uncertainty
aﬀects the investment threshold p∗(R) independently of the size of the project, hence,
whatever is σ, the initial size is always the same (dR∗/dσ = 0). Note that, while the
uncertainty has no eﬀect on the initial size of the project, the optimal size for any given
117
market price is smaller when the uncertainty is higher. Thus, under high uncertainty,
the intermediary waits until the market price reaches a threshold such that the initial
size is the same as under low uncertainty.
As explained before, milk production in Senegal (as lots of agricultural productions in
developing countries) takes place in system that involves low quantity supplied by each
farmer and high transport costs. These elements depress farmers' incomes in the absence
of intermediaries, but also tend to delay the emergence of such intermediaries. Indeed,
both low s and high τ increase p∗. This would not be such a worry if the initial size of
the collection area was larger. In this case, the intermediary would simply wait longer
in order to make an investment that beneﬁts to more farmers. The results above show
it is not the case for transport cost: with large τ , the intermediary tends to have smaller
collection area (∂R∗(p)/∂τ < 0) as collecting the product on this area is costly. He also
waits longer (∂p∗(R)/∂τ > 0) as a higher output price is necessary to compensate the
higher cost. This eﬀect is even larger for large sizes, such that the initial size is reduced
(dR∗/dτ < 0). Hence, the transport costs reduce farmers' access on both sides as the
intermediary invests later (p∗ increases) and in a smaller collection area (R∗ decreases).
The low supply, however, increases the initial size of the collection area R∗. Facing
farmers with low individual supply (low s), the intermediary has to wait for a higher
market price before that contracting with an additional farmer becomes proﬁtable (p#(R)
is larger). Hence, the optimal size of the collection area for any given market price R∗(p)
is lower. In the same way, the intermediary has to wait longer before making the initial
investment, for any given initial size p∗(R) is higher. This eﬀect is even more important
when considering a small initial collection area. Indeed, it is more diﬃcult to cover the
investment cost incurred when the total level of production (sR) is low. Hence, facing
low supply, the intermediary invests later (p∗ is higher) but in a larger initial size R∗
in order to compensate for the low level of production coming from the low individual
supply.
An external donor can intervene in favor of the intermediaries with various instru-
ments. We analyze two of them here. First, he can provide aid in the form of a support
to the intermediary for the investment. This consists in ﬁnancing part of the invest-
ment cost I. Decreasing I has no eﬀect on the optimal size of the collection area for a
given market price (R∗(p)). However, it decreases the threshold for initial investment p∗.
When the initial investment takes places, the size of the collection area R∗(p∗) is smaller.
Nevertheless, when the output market price increases, this size also increases. When
the market price eventually crosses the threshold that was relevant before the donor's
intervention, the size also reaches a level equivalent to the initial size before intervention.
From the farmers' point of view, a donor ﬁnancing a part of the investment cost helps
the intermediary to propose a contract to some of them sooner. For the most distant
farmers, however, this intervention has no eﬀect, as the price has to cross the without
intervention threshold for them to be included.
Second, the aid for the investment may be allocated to increase the number of farmers
included rather than to the initial investment. In this case, the external donor ﬁnances
a part of κ. This increases the optimal size R∗(p) for any given market price. Moreover,
decreasing κ also decreases the threshold for initial investment p∗, while keeping the
initial size R∗ unchanged. This means that the initial investment takes place sooner, but
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that no less farmers are included, contrarily to what happens when the donor ﬁnances
directly the initial investment.
Depending on the donor's objective, one or the other instrument may be more eﬃ-
cient. For instance, when the donor wants to improve remote farmers' participation to
the market, helping the intermediary to reduce κ deserves the donor's aim. If he wants
to improve market participation for only few farmers, but more rapidly, then the aid for
investment is relevant. It can be shown that a benevolent planner who want to maxi-
mize the social welfare (deﬁned by the sum of the intermediary's proﬁt and the farmers'
income) is willing to advance the initial investment compared to what is chosen by the
for-proﬁt intermediary (pSO∗ < p∗).8 However, the initial size chosen by the for-proﬁt
intermediary is socially optimal (RSO∗ = R∗). Financing the initial investment I, an
external donor permits to decrease the threshold for the initial investment p∗ but the
initial size R∗ is also reduced. When ﬁnancing the incremental investments cost κ, R∗
is not aﬀected, but the decrease in p∗ is expected to be less important. In the following
section, we simulate the impacts of the donor's aid, and compare the eﬀects of the two
instruments in a cost-beneﬁt analysis perspective.
4.4 Case studies: Senegalese milk sector
Although milk consumption in Africa is still low compared to the rest of the world,
dairy products make now part of the consumption habits of most of the African house-
holds. In Senegal, the two most consumed dairy products are sour milk (that can be
made either with fresh local milk or with imported powder) and milk powder (up to
now, only imported). Currently, the Senegalese demand for dairy products is mainly
satisﬁed by imports, mostly from Europe. Indeed, local production only covers 32% of
the demand (MINEFI, 2006). This may be explained by three factors. First, most of
the Senegalese milk sector is characterized by a pastoral or agro-pastoral system of pro-
duction. Farmers are distributed in large rural areas, while consumers are concentrated
in the main urban centers. The high transport costs prevent the farmers to access the
market by themselves. Second, it is often claimed that the cheap imports, sometimes
subsidized by the exporter countries, hamper the development of the local sector. Third,
as any agricultural product, milk faces high price volatility. The uncertainty it creates
tends to reduce the investments in the sector.
Since the nineties, we have seen the emergence of small-scale processing units that
play an intermediary role between the farmers and the market. These intermediaries also
faces high transport costs, low market price and uncertainty, but are able to support some
ﬁxed investment costs that cannot be borne by each farmer alone. Moreover, external
donors who want to improve farmers' access to the market provide aid to set-up such
ﬁrms.
8Precisely, pSO∗ = β1(ρ−α)(β1−1)
(
κ
s +
c
ρ + 2
√
τI
sρ
)
< p∗.
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We apply our theoretical model to two of these processing ﬁrms, as well as to the
case of a new project that is still under consideration for investment. For the existing
processing units, we want ﬁrst to assess if the investment already made was appropriate
in the sense of our model and second to determine the future growth of the collection
area, that is the improvement of remote farmers' access to the market. Regarding the
new project, we would like to assess whether it is proﬁtable or not and what would be the
collection area if it is appropriate to build such a business. For all the cases considered,
we also look at the eﬀects of the potential intervention of external donors interested in
improving farmers' market access.
4.4.1 Le Fermier
The small-scale milk processing unit Le Fermier is located at Kolda in Southern
Senegal, since 1997. This unit produces sour milk and pasteurized milk, using fresh milk
from the farmers located in the countryside around Kolda. The products are mainly
sold to the consumers in Kolda. Le Fermier is the most important processing unit in the
region of Kolda. It treats more than 40% of milk collected in this region (Dieye, 2006:
97). Since 2001, Le Fermier is involved in a loyalty system with the farmers that supply
fresh milk. It progressively increases the number of regular suppliers (from 9 villages in
2001 to 12 in 2002 and 15 in 2003).
In what follows we determine the price p∗ at which the project should have been
established and check that the current market price is actually above this threshold, i.e.
that the investment was indeed an appropriate strategy. We also look at the optimal
size of the collection area, depending on the market price, and verify that the observed
size corresponds to what is predicted by our model.
Bakhoum (2006: 29) estimated that the total investment has cost between 8 and 10
millions F CFA. From that, we assume 8.2 millions were devoted to the creation of the
unit (I = 8200000) and 1.8 millions to the capacity expansion until 15 villages, that is
an investment of 120000 F CFA per village (κ = 120000).
Dieye (2003: 39) reports that the input transport cost ranges from 10.8 to 29 F
CFA per liter. We know that the villages where milk is collected are from 7.39 to 18 km
from Kolda (Dieye, 2006: 101 and Dia, 2002: 90-91). We can reasonably assume that
the highest transport cost (29 CFA) corresponds to the largest distance (18 km) and the
smallest cost (10.8 CFA) to the smallest distance (7.39 km). From that, we assume that
input transport cost is approximately 1.5 F CFA per liter per km (we can, with more
certainty assert that the average input transport cost lies between 0.6 and 3.9 F CFA
per liter per km). The average distance between the villages currently involved in Le
Fermier's collection area is 1.5 km. For that reason, we use 1.5 km as unit of distance.
Hence the input transport costs is τ = 2.25 F CFA per liter per unit of distance.
In 2001, the price paid to the farmers was 200 F CFA per liter during the wet season
and 245 F CFA during the dry season (Dieye, 2003: 40) while the market price ranged
between 350 and 450 CFA (Dieye, 2003: 44 and Diao et al., 2002: 226). From that we
estimates that the price paid to the farmer is around 55% of the market price, such that
we use ψ = 0.55.
From the income statement of Le Fermier (Dieye, 2003: 44), we calculate that the
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operating cost (including the costs of sugar, sachets, gas, electricity as well as the output
transport cost) is 119 F CFA per liter. Input transport from the ﬁrst village (located
at 7.39 km) to the plant is independent of the size of the collection area, such that we
include this cost (1.5∗7.39 = 11) in the operating cost. Thus, we use c = 130.
Dia (2002: 34) observed that the individual supply is around 10 liters per day, that
we multiply by the average number of producers per village (3.7 from Dia, 2002: 34) to
get the village supply. Hence s = 37.
We estimate the drift of the milk price distribution process as the mean of the monthly
milk price index (IHPC lait) real growth rate9 in Senegal (from November 2005 to May
2010) divided by 30: α = 0.0000773 which correspond to an annual real growth of around
2.8%. As an estimation of σ, we use the square root of the variance of this index, that
we divide by 30: σ = 0.001016 (this corresponds to 0.389 annualy). Finally, we choose
ρ = 0.00018. This daily interest rate corresponds to a 6.6% annual interest rate.
Table 4.2: Le Fermier
β1 = 2.30644
p#(R) = 292.299 + 10.0728R
R∗(p) = −29.0186 + 0.0992772p
p∗ = 334.712
R∗ = 4.21067
R∗(400) = 10.6923
R∗(450) = 15.6561
I = 8200000, κ = 120000, ψ = 0.55, c = 130, s = 37,
τ = 2.25, α = 0.0000773, σ = 0.001016 and ρ = 0.00018.
Main results are given in table 4.2. The option to invest should be exercised when
the output market price is above p∗ = 334.712. At this price, the ﬁrm must built an
initial collection area of 4 villages (R∗(p∗) = 4.21067).
We have noted that the actual market price in 2001 ranges between 350 and 450
CFA. Our calibration shows that, if the price is 400 F CFA, the ﬁrm should include 11
villages (R∗(400) = 10.6923). This ﬁts with the number of villages actually included by
Le Fermier in 2001 (9 villages).
Our results are robust to changes in most of the parameters values. For the param-
eters α, σ, ρ, τ , κ, I and s, a 10% increase in the value of the parameter aﬀects p∗ by
less than 0.7%. The eﬀects of c and ψ, however, are more important, a 10% increase in
c (resp. ψ) leading p∗ to increase by 8.7% (resp. 13.9%).
When choosing to enter at the price p∗ = 334.712 with an initial size R∗ = 4.21067,
the ﬁrm takes into account the possibility of further expand the size, what it actually
did in reality. While models with ﬁxed capacity are relevant in some contexts, they
9To obtain real growth rate, we deduct the nominal growth rate of the general IHPC index from the
nominal growth rate of the speciﬁc IHPC lait index. As rates are lower than 5%, this represents a good
approximation.
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are certainly not in the agricultural production context. Accounting for the possibility
to increase the size thus gives us a more accurate view of the ﬁrm's optimal strategy.
But, more importantly, not taking this possibility into account would lead to unrealistic
predictions. Indeed, in a ﬁxed capacity model, we calculate that the intermediary has
interest to enter when the market price reaches the threshold p˜∗ = 1250.15. In that case
the size of the collection area would be R˜∗ = 190.093. This is due to the fact that this
model consider the trade-oﬀ between size and threshold, which does not exist in reality.
Table 4.3: Le Fermier: impact of aid
I κ p∗ R∗ R∗(450)
Financing initial investment 6304000 120000 329.487 3.69192 15.6561
(-1.59%) (-14.05%) ( 0%)
Financing incremental invest. 8200000 0 333.405 4.2167 15.7859
(-0.39%) (0%) ( +0.82%)
Cost for the donor in the two cases: 1896000 FCFA (assuming market price is 450 F CFA).
Other parameters: ψ = 0.55, c = 130, s = 37, τ = 2.25, α = 0.0000773, σ = 0.001066 and ρ = 0.00018.
Variation with respect to the results without intervention (table 4.2) are reported in parentheses.
An example of the impact of an external donor's intervention is given in table 4.3.
Two polices that have the same cost are compared: ﬁnancing the initial investment
(i.e. decreasing I by 1896000 FCFA) and ﬁnancing the incremental investments (i.e.
decreasing κ by 120000 FCFA). The choice of the instrument depends on the donors'
objective. If he wants to increase the actual number of villages involved, he has to ﬁnance
the incremental investment and help the ﬁrm to decrease κ. For instance he may set-up
an artiﬁcial insemination program, exclusively devoted to Le Fermier's suppliers. Or he
may ﬁnance medical assistance given by the ﬁrm to the farmers. If however he wants
the ﬁrm to invest sooner, it is better for him to ﬁnance the initial investment.
4.4.2 La Laiterie du Berger
La Laiterie du Berger (LdB) produces dairy products in Richard-Toll (Northern
Senegal) since 2006. It buys fresh milk to farmers dispersed on an area of 50 km around
the plant. We want to calculate the threshold price p∗ at which the project should have
been installed, as well as the optimal size of the collection area that should have been
established. As the processing unit has been constructed with the aid of external donors,
we analyze the impact of this intervention on the investment strategy.
According to the managers of LdB (personal interview, 2009), the costs of transport-
ing, cleaning and testing the raw material are 100 F CFA per liter. From that, we assume
that half of the costs comes from transport such that input transport cost is estimated
at 50 F CFA per liter. As milk is transported on average on 25 km, we use τ = 2.
The transformation at the plant (pasteurization, packaging, etc.) costs 150 F CFA per
liter. The output transport cost is estimated from the data of the ﬁrm Nestlé that was
previously operating in Senegal, as LdB uses the same kind of transport devices, that is
a refrigerated truck. Dieye (2006: 36) estimated that Nestlé's transport costs were 135
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F CFA per liter from the collection area of Dahra to the consumption center of Dakar
at 265 km, that is 0.5 F CFA per liter and per kilometer. As the LdB mainly sells
its products at Dakar at 365 km from Richard-Toll, we estimate output transport costs
182.5 F CFA per liter. The operating cost is calculated as the sum of transformation
cost, cleaning and testing cost and output transport cost, such that c = 382, 5.
The French Agency for Development10 reports that the initial investment for the LdB
was 1100000 euros, that is 7216000000 F CFA. From that, we assume that 1000000 euros
are devoted to build the plant (I = 656000000) and 100000 to the initial capacity. We
estimate the initial size of the collection segment was 25 km11 such that κ = 2624000.
Individual supply is assumed to be higher than for Le Fermier, as LdB's farmers
are assumed to have more productive cows (due to better feed, inseminations, medical
care, etc.). We use s = 15 which corresponds to what is observed in reality (personal
interview, 2009).
The market price for the products of the LdB is between 750 and 1200 CFA, depending
on the volume of the package (personal observations, 2009), while each farmer received
200 F CFA per liter for the milk he provides to the LdB, that is between 17% and 27%
of the market price. From that, we use ψ = 0.2. This is lower than for the farmers
contracting with Le fermier because LdB's providers are more isolated than Le Fermiers'
one. Indeed, Kolda is an urban center where fresh milk can be sold directly to the
consumers, while Richard-Toll is much more smaller. The closest urban center from
Richard-Toll is Saint-Louis located at 120 km from the LdB.
Parameters of the milk price distribution process are calculated similarly to what has
been done in the case of Le Fermier: α = 0.0000773 and σ = 0.001066. Also, ρ = 0.00018.
Table 4.4: La Laiterie du Berger
β1 = 2.30644
p#(R) = 521.252 + 5.0364R
R∗(p) = −103.497 + 0.198554p
p∗ = 837.224
R∗ = 62.7375
R∗(975) = 90.0936
I = 656000000, κ = 2624000, ψ = 0.2, c = 382.5, τ = 2,
s = 15, α = 0.0000773, σ = 0.001066 and ρ = 0.00018.
Table 4.4 summarizes the main results. The ﬁrm should invest when the output
market price crosses the threshold p∗ = 837.224. At this price, the ﬁrm must build an
initial collection area of 60 kilometers (R∗ = 62.7375). The current market price for
the products of the LdB is between 750 and 1200 CFA, depending on the volume of the
10http://www.afd.fr/home/presse-afd/projets_emblematiques/pid/1138
11Indeed, the number of farmers involved has doubled between 2006 and 2009: from 200 (http:
//www.rsesenegal.com/portail/main.php?page=projet&id=6) to 400 (personal interview, 2009). So
we assume the size of the collection area has also doubled.
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package (personal observations, 2009) which we cannot assert is above the investment
threshold12.
Table 4.5: La Laiterie du Berger: impact of actual aid
I κ p∗ R∗ R∗(975)
Financing initial 300000000 2624000 734.929 42.4264 90.0936
investment (-13.91%) (-47.87%) (0%)
(cost=356000000)
ψ = 0.2, c = 382.5, τ = 2, s = 15, α = 0.0000773, σ = 0.001066 and ρ = 0.00018.
Variation with respect to the results without intervention (table 4.4) are reported in parentheses.
Nevertheless, the investment took place, mainly thanks to the aid of the French
Agency for Development (AFD). We assume external donors provided ﬁnancial aid for
356000000 F CFA.13 Table 4.5 shows the impact of this intervention.
Note again that not accounting for the option to increase the size would lead to
unrealistic predictions. Indeed, in that case the threshold for the initial investment (with
the full cost I = 656000000) would have been p˜∗ = 2277.85 and the size R˜∗ = 694.97.
4.4.3 Powder project at La Laiterie du Berger
Senegalese farmers' organizations and external donors have recently considered the
possibility of producing milk powder in Senegal. Indeed, this product is less perishable
than fresh milk, and is largely consumed in Dakar. As farmers complain that the local
fresh milk suﬀers from the unfair competition from imported milk powder, this has
been considered as a way to increase farmers' access to the market. In what follows, we
analyze the opportunity of investing in such a project for a ﬁrm such as La Laiterie du
Berger.
The cost of the spray drying equipment is estimated to 385000 euros, that is I =
250250000 F CFA. Transporting powder is less costly than transporting fresh milk, as
it does not need refrigerated devices, and needs less space. However, transforming fresh
milk into powder is more costly than transforming it in pasteurized or sour milk, what
the LdB currently does. This is due to the important electricity consumption of the
equipment as well as to the need for a sterile environment. To take this into account, we
assume c = 300.
Contrarily to sour milk, powder market price is driven by the international price, as
the powder currently consumed in Senegal is imported. We estimate the parameters of
12Indeed, as we do not know the distribution of market prices between the minimum 750 and the
maximum 1200, it is diﬃcult to say if the average price is above 837.224. Nevertheless, we can have
some doubts about this.
13Indeed, the director of the LdB reports he has to borrow 300000000 F CFA to build the plant
(http://www.rsesenegal.com/portail/main.php?page=projet&id=6). The remaining amount has
been provided by external donors such as the AFD.
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the distribution process from the FAO dairy price index14 (from November 2005 to May
2010): α = 0.00001186 and σ = 0.002292. This correspond to 0.043 and 0.836 annually.
For the other parameters, we use similar assumptions as in the previous section.
Table 4.6: Powder project
β1 = 1.50105
p#(R) = 423.438 + 5.10954R
R∗(p) = −82.872 + 0.195712p
p∗ = 1055.48
R∗ = 123.699
R∗(375) = 0
I = 250250000, κ = 2624000, ψ = 0.2, c = 300, s = 15,
τ = 2, α = 0.00001186, σ = 0.002292 and ρ = 0.00018.
Main results are given in table 4.6. The option to invest should be exercised when
the output market price is above p∗ = 1055.48. At this price, the ﬁrm should invest
in the powder technology and devote a collection area of 124 km to the production
of powder. This threshold price is a bit higher than the one obtained in the previous
section. However, the market price of powder, driven down by imports, is much lower
than the one of liquid milk. In 2009 (personal observations), the price for 1kg of powder
lied between 2500 and 3500 F CFA. As 8 liters of fresh milk are necessary to make one
kilogram of powder, this means that the powder price for the equivalent of 1 liter of
milk was between 312.5 and 437.5 F CFA, which is largely under the threshold for initial
investment. Even the intervention of an external donor ﬁnancing all the investment cost
is not able to drive p∗ under the market price (with I = 0, p∗ = 423.438). From that, it
is clear that investing in the powder technology is not an interesting strategy to expand
the milk sector in Senegal, given the low market prices.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we study the investment decisions of an intermediary who buys
an input from geographically dispersed farmers and who sells this transformed input
on a market characterized by price volatility. Due to the irreversible nature of the
investment and to the uncertainty linked to price volatility, we use the real options
theory to determine at what price it is optimal for the intermediary to invest as well
as the number of farmers who are included in the collection area, both initially and in
future periods.
If the possibility to increase the size of the collection area in future periods was not
taken into account, the ﬁrm would face a trade-oﬀ between investing rapidly in a project
14To obtain real growth rate, we deduct the nominal growth rate of the general (Senegalese) IHPC
index from the nominal growth rate of the FAO dairy price index. As rates are lower than 5%, this
represents a good approximation.
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that includes a small number of farmers or waiting in order to invest in a larger project.
However, when the option to expand the area is taken into account, our results show that
this trade-oﬀ disappears. Indeed, it is possible to invest rapidly in a small collection area
and expand it in the future. In that case, minimizing the delay for the initial investment
is the optimal strategy for the investor and the initial size is determined by this strategy.
Higher volatility is shown to postpone the initial investment, while the initial size
is not aﬀected by this factor. Hence, under higher uncertainty, the ﬁrm postpones the
investment until the market price reaches a threshold suﬃcient for the ﬁrm to invest
in the same collection area. From the farmers' point of view, higher uncertainty thus
means that while the same number of them can initially beneﬁt from the intermediary's
entry, this entry takes place later. Note that, for any given market price, higher is the
uncertainty, lower is the number of farmers included.
Furthermore, our model shows that the intermediary's entry is delayed by high trans-
port costs. In the context of developing countries, large transport costs crucially explain
farmers' low participation to the market, but also tend to decrease intermediaries' entry.
While external donors may be unable to reduce transport costs either for the farmer or
the intermediary, they may provide some aid for the investment. Our analysis shows that
an intervention that reduces the initial investment cost helps the intermediary to enter
more rapidly (that is, when the market price is lower) with a smaller collection area.
However, at any given market price, the number of farmers included is not aﬀected. An
intervention that reduces the expansion costs is less eﬃcient in reducing the delay for
investment: it helps the intermediary to invest sooner but the initial collection area is not
aﬀected, such that the threshold for initial investment is higher than if the intervention
focuses on the initial investment cost. Nevertheless, the reduction of the expansion costs
allow to include more farmers at any given market price.
We apply our theoretical model to three case studies in the milk sector in Senegal. The
results show that the milk processing unit Le Fermier implanted in Kolda (Southern
Senegal) since 1997 results indeed from a proﬁtable investment decision. The actual
evolution of the number of suppliers involved corresponds to the predictions of our model.
Regarding La Laiterie du Berger established in Richard-Toll (Northern Senegal) since
2006, the proﬁtability is less obvious. It is likely that the initial investment would
not have been proﬁtable without the aid of external donors. Finally, the project of
producing milk powder has been recently considered by Senegalese farmers' organizations
and external donors. Our analysis shows that such a project is not proﬁtable due to the
low price of milk powder, more than to the large investment cost incurred for such a
project.
The inclusion of the option to expand the size of the collection area dramatically
changes the results, compared to a situation where the intermediary is assumed to choose
the optimal size at the moment of the initial investment. None of the considered projects
in the Senegalese milk sector would turn to be proﬁtable if the option to expand the
size was not considered. A model of ﬁxed size can be relevant for some industries, for
instance when considering building an hotel, the number of rooms is chosen at the time
of investment and additional rooms cannot be easily add after the hotel is build. In the
agricultural sector however, the option to increase the size has to be considered.
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The model developed here gives potential avenues for future research.15 First, in the
previous analysis, we consider that the intermediary is unable to decrease the number
of farmers included. It means that he takes his investment decisions knowing that his
operating proﬁt can become negative if the output price becomes too small. A possible
extension of our model consists in the inclusion of an option to decrease the size, or at
least to suspend the operation at the remote locations should the output price fall. An
alternative is to consider the option to suspend the whole operation, if the operating
proﬁt becomes negative. Including such options should decrease the threshold for initial
investment by oﬀering a (not costless) protection against negative proﬁt. Second, for
simplicity, we only have considered linear transport costs, while it is likely that actual
transport costs are convex. More general proﬁt function should be considered in future
work. Third, the accuracy of the model could be improved by considering other diﬀusion
processes for the market price than the simple geometric Brownian motion. In particular
it does not account for the surges of food imports16 that many developing countries have
recently experienced. Examples17 are numerous and these episodes seem to be more
frequent since 1994 with the implementation of trade liberalization measures under the
Uruguay Round Agreements (FAO, 2006). Combining a jump (Poisson) process with
the Brownian motion would more closely represent these import surges that decreases
dramatically the price with a non zero probability.
15In appendices 4.C, 4.D and 4.E, we draw some outlines for possible extensions.
16While there is no unique deﬁnition of import surge we retain the one given by the WTO Agreement
on Safeguards (Article 2): When a product is imported into a country in such increased quantities,
absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause
serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.
17For instance, the rise of chicken legs imports in Senegal between 1997 and 2003 have depressed retail
prices by 15% (Duteurtre et al., 2005). In 2004 in Philippines, domestically produced onions prices
were about one-third of the 1999 level, after sharp increases of imports in 1999, 2001 and 2003 (FAO,
2007a). In Honduras, farm gate prices for rice collapsed by 30 % in 1992, following the 1991 import
surge (FAO, 2007b).
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Appendices
4.A Appendix A
The diﬀerential equation (4.2.5) can be written as:
1
2
σ2p2Vpp + αpVp − ρV + γp+ ω = 0
where Vpp = ∂
2Vt(pt, Rt)/∂p
2, Vp = ∂Vt(pt, Rt)/∂p, γ = sR(1−ψ) and ω = sR(−c−τR).
We guess that the particular solution has the following form:
Vpart(p) = Cγp+Dω
Plugging into the diﬀerential equation:
1
2
σ2p20 + αpCγ − ρ(Cγp+Dω) = −γp− ω
⇔ (α− ρ)pCγ + γp = ρDω − ω
A possible solution (such as both sides equal zero) is:
C =
1
ρ− α , D =
1
ρ
Thus,
Vpart(p) =
pγ
ρ− α +
ω
ρ
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 180), the solution of the homogeneous part of
the equation can be expressed as a linear combination of any two independent solutions:
Vhomo(p) = B1p
β1 +B2p
β2
where β1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2ρ
σ2
and β2 =
1
2
− α
σ2
−
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2ρ
σ2
are respectively
the positive and the negative root of the quadratic equation: 1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ.
The solution to the equation (4.2.5) is given by the solution to the homogeneous part
of the equation to which we add the the particular solution of the full equation:
V (p) = B1p
β1 +B2p
β2 +
pγ
ρ− α +
ω
ρ
Replacing γ and ω, we get:
V (p) = B1p
β1 +B2p
β2 +
psR(1− ψ)
ρ− α +
sR(−c− τR)
ρ
V (p) = B1p
β1 +B2p
β2 + sR
(
p(1− ψ)
ρ− α −
(c+ τR)
ρ
)
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4.B Appendix B
dp∗
dσ
=
(
κ
s
+
c
ρ
+ 2
√
τI
sρ
)
ρ− α
1− ψ
−1
(β1 − 1)2
∂β1
∂σ
> 0
dp∗
dI
=
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)
√
τ
sρI
> 0
dp∗
dκ
=
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)
1
s
> 0
dp∗
dτ
=
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)
√
I
τsρ
> 0
dp∗
ds
=
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)2
(
−κ
s2
+
−1
s2
√
τIs
ρ
)
< 0
dR∗
dσ
= 0
dR∗
dI
=
1
2I
√
ρI
τs
> 0
dR∗
dκ
= 0
dR∗
dτ
=
−1
2τ
√
ρI
τs
< 0
dR∗
ds
=
−1
2s
√
ρI
τs
< 0
4.C Appendix C: Inclusion of a suspension option
We have noted that, because the price is variable over time, we can have periods
during which the operating proﬁt is negative. In the framework of the previous analy-
sis, once he has invested, the intermediary has no possibility to avoid these periods of
operating losses. Nevertheless, it would be optimal for him to suspend the operation
during these periods. In particular, it would be optimal to suspend the collection of
the agricultural product from the most distant farmers. Hence, decreasing the collection
cost, he could increase his proﬁt until it becomes positive.
One may assume that the intermediary is able to temporarily suspend the collection
at some locations, when they lead to a negative proﬁt. In what follow, we assume the
intermediary has the option to suspend, without any cost, the collection from some
farmers in case of negative proﬁt. Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 186), we
consider that the intermediary has to re-activate these farmers (still without any cost)
as soon as the market price is such that he can make positive proﬁt by collecting their
product.
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We ﬁrst determine the optimal strategy regarding the inclusion of an additional
farmer, depending on the market price. That is, we determine p#(R), the threshold
price at which it is optimal to incur the investment cost κ in order to include an addi-
tional farmer. Then, we determine the optimal strategy regarding the initial investment.
That is, we look at p∗(R), the threshold at which it is optimal to spend the cost I + κR
in order to launch a project of size R. As in the previous analysis, the initial size R∗
and the threshold for the initial investment p∗ are determined by the equality between
p#(R) and p∗(R).
Threshold curve p#(R)
Assume the intermediary has the possibility to suspend a farmer would the proﬁt
become negative. This will aﬀect the intermediary's decision regarding the inclusion of an
additional farmer.18 This additional farmer does not need to be utilized (Pindyck, 1988:
974), in the sense that the intermediary can make the investment necessary to expand the
collection area, but is not obliged to collect the agricultural product from all the farmers
in that area. The proﬁt generated by the marginal farmer is given by ∂Πt(pt, Rt)/∂Rt
where Πt(pt, Rt) is given by (4.2.2). If this is positive, then the intermediary buys the
agricultural product from the incremental farmer, however, if it is negative, the farmer
is just kept idle for some time. Thus the proﬁt ﬂow yield by the considered farmer is
given by:
pit(pt, Rt) =
{
s ((1− ψ)pt − c− 2τRt) if pt ≥ (c+ 2τRt)/(1− ψ)
0 if pt < (c+ 2τRt)/(1− ψ)
(4.5.1)
The value of this installed incremental farmer is given by:
vt(pt, Rt) = pit(pt, Rt)dt+ Et[vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt)e
−ρdt]
From that, we have the following Bellman equation:
vt(pt, Rt) = pit(pt, Rt)dt+ e
−ρdtEt[vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt)] (4.5.2)
Approximating e−ρdt by 1 − ρdt, adding and substracting vt between the square
brackets, applying Ito's Lemma to Et[dv] deﬁned as Et[vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt) − vt(pt, Rt)],
ignoring terms which are small relative to dt, reorganizing the terms, and ﬁnally dividing
by dt yields the following non-homogeneous diﬀerential equation:
1
2
σ2p2t
∂2vt(pt, Rt)
∂p2
+ αpt
∂vt(pt, Rt)
∂p
− ρvt(pt, Rt) + pit(pt, Rt) = 0 (4.5.3)
18Hereafter, to keep some consistency with real option theory of incremental investment, we use the
terms to install the farmer and the farmer installed to say that the intermediary spend an investment
cost (κ) to include the farmer in the collection area.
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In the region where pt < (c + 2τRt)/(1 − ψ), from (4.5.1), we have pit(pt, Rt) = 0
and only the homogeneous part of the diﬀerential equation remains. Thus the general
solution is given by
vt(pt, Rt) = d1(Rt)p
β1 + d2(Rt)p
β2 (4.5.4)
where d1(Rt) and d2(Rt) have to be determined using appropriate boundary conditions,
β1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2ρ
σ2
and β2 =
1
2
− α
σ2
−
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2ρ
σ2
. (4.5.4) represents
the value of the option to activate the farmer located in Rt. However, the likelihood of
activating this farmer becomes very small when the market price becomes small, so the
value of the option to activate should be zero as p goes to zero. Therefore, the coeﬃcient
d2(Rt), corresponding to the negative root β2, should be equal to zero.
In the region where pt ≥ (c+ 2τRt)/(1− ψ), from (4.5.1), we have that pit(pt, Rt) =
s ((1− ψ)pt − c− 2τRt) and the particular solution to the non-homogeneous diﬀerential
equation (4.5.3) is given by:
vt(pt, Rt) = c1(Rt)p
β1
t + c2(Rt)p
β2
t + s
(
(1− ψ)pt
ρ− α −
c+ 2τRt
ρ
)
(4.5.5)
where c1(Rt) and c2(Rt) have to be determined using appropriate boundary conditions.
In (4.5.5), c1(Rt)p
β1
t +c2(Rt)p
β2
t represents the value of the option to suspend the farmer
located in Rt. However, the likelihood of suspending this farmer becomes very small when
the market price becomes large, so the value of the option to suspend should be zero as
p goes to inﬁnity. Therefore, the coeﬃcient c1(Rt), corresponding to the positive root
β1, should be equal to zero.
From (4.5.4) and (4.5.5), the value of the installed marginal farmer is given by:
v(pt, Rt) =
{
d1(Rt)p
β1
t if pt < (c+ 2τRt)/(1− ψ)
c2(Rt)p
β2
t + s
(
(1−ψ)pt
ρ−α − c+2τRtρ
)
if pt > (c+ 2τRt)/(1− ψ)
(4.5.6)
where d1(Rt) and c2(Rt) are unknown constants to be determined.
Since the Brownian motion of pt can diﬀuse freely across the boundary (c+2τRt)/(1−
ψ), the value function cannot change abruptly across it (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994:
188). Equating the values and derivatives of the two component solutions at pt = (c +
2τRt)/(1 − ψ), we have a system of two linear equations in the two unknowns d1(Rt)
and c2(Rt):
d1(Rt)
(
c+ 2τRt
1− ψ
)β1
= c2(Rt)
(
c+ 2τRt
1− ψ
)β2
+ s
(
c+ 2τRt
ρ− α −
c+ 2τRt
ρ
)
(4.5.7)
β1d1(Rt)
(
c+ 2τRt
1− ψ
)β1−1
= β2c2(Rt)
(
c+ 2τRt
1− ψ
)β2−1
+ s
1− ψ
ρ− α (4.5.8)
Solving this system gives us the value of d1(Rt) and c2(Rt). As we will need this
result later on also, the result for c2(Rt) is:
c2(Rt) =
β1
β1 − β2
(
1− ψ
c+ 2τRt
)β2
s(c+ 2τRt)
(
1
ρ
− β1 − 1
β1(ρ− α)
)
(4.5.9)
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Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 189), one may check that the last term in (4.5.9)
is positive, hence c2(R) is positive and decreasing in R, for any given value of R.
Knowing c2(Rt) and d1(Rt), we know the value v of the marginal installed farmer as
a function of the current price pt (given by (4.5.6)). In order to ﬁnd the price threshold
at which it is optimal to invest in the additional farmer, we deﬁne the value of the option
to invest as the function of the price, ft(pt, Rt) and use the solution for vt(pt, Rt) as the
boundary condition that holds at the optimal price threshold.
The option to invest, by deﬁnition, has a value when the investment has not yet been
undertaken. As long as the investment is not undertaken, holding the option to invest
yields no cash ﬂow, thus the only return it yields is its capital appreciation. The value
is thus given by:
ft(pt, Rt) = e
−ρdtEt[ft+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt)] (4.5.10)
Using Ito's lemma, ft(pt, Rt) satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation
1
2
σ2p2t
∂2ft(pt, Rt)
∂p2
+ αpt
∂ft(pt, Rt)
∂p
− ρft(pt, Rt) = 0 (4.5.11)
The particular solution is ft(pt, Rt) = b1(Rt)p
β1
t + b2(Rt)p
β2
t . This solution is valid
over the range of prices for which it is optimal to hold the option. This range is deﬁned
by some boundary conditions. One natural boundary condition is 0. Since p = 0 is an
absorbing barrier, the option to invest has no value for very small values of pt. This
indicates that the constant b2(Rt), corresponding to the negative root β2, must be equal
to zero:
ft(pt, Rt) = b1(Rt)p
β1
t (4.5.12)
The other boundary of that region is p#(R), the price at which it is optimal to exercise
the option (i.e. to invest in the incremental farmer located in R). This boundary can
be described as a free boundary (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 109 and 141). Indeed,
p#(R) is endogenous and must be determined simultaneously with f . It means that
b1(Rt) will be determined as a part of the solution, simultaneously with threshold p
#(R)
above which it is optimal to invest to install the marginal farmer.
At this threshold, two boundary conditions, a value matching condition and a smooth
pasting condition (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 364), have to be satisﬁed. The value
matching condition indicates that at the threshold price p#(R) the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between investing to install the farmer located in R, and not investing for that, that
is: f(pt, Rt) = v(pt, Rt)− κ. The smooth pasting condition is given by ∂f(pt, Rt)/∂p =
∂v(pt, Rt)/∂p. From (4.5.6) and (4.5.12), this is equivalent to
b1(R)p
β1 = c2(R)p
β2 + s
(
(1− ψ)p
ρ− α −
c+ 2τR
ρ
)
− κ (4.5.13)
β1b1(R)p
β1−1 = β2c2(R)pβ2−1 +
s(1− ψ)
ρ− α = 0 (4.5.14)
where c2(R) is given by (4.5.9). There is no reason to incur the investment cost only to
keep the farmer idle for some time. This is why, in equation (4.5.6) we use the solution
for v in the region where the marginal farmer is active.
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Together, (4.5.13) and (4.5.14) deﬁne the price threshold curve p#(R) which gives us
for each R the critical price that has to be reached in order for the collection area to be
optimally expanded till R. It is implicitly deﬁned by:
Q(p(R)) ≡ β1 − β2
β1
c2(R)p
β2 +
β1 − 1
β1
s
1− ψ
ρ− αp− s
c+ 2τR
ρ
− κ = 0 (4.5.15)
where c2(R) is given by (4.5.9).
As β1 − β2 > 0, β1 > 0 and c2(R) > 0, comparing (4.5.15) with (4.2.16), it can be
seen that this threshold p#(R) is lower than the one previously obtained, for any given
R, as (4.2.16) is obtained by setting c2(R) = 0 in (4.5.15). The intermediary is willing
to invest sooner in the establishment of any farmer, knowing that he has the possibility
to suspend this farmer in case of negative proﬁt.
Threshold for initial investment p∗(R)
The value of the installed project is given by:
Vt(pt, Rt) = Πt(pt, Rt)dt+ Et[Vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt)e
−ρdt]
From that, we have the following Bellman equation:
Vt(pt, Rt) = Πt(pt, Rt)dt+ e
−ρdtEt[Vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt)] (4.5.16)
Approximating e−ρdt by 1−ρdt, adding and substracting Vt between the square brackets,
applying Ito's Lemma to Et[dV ] deﬁned as Et[Vt+dt(pt+dt, Rt+dt) − Vt(pt, Rt)], ignoring
terms which are small relative to dt, reorganizing the terms, and ﬁnally dividing by dt
yields the following non-homogeneous diﬀerential equation:
1
2
σ2p2t
∂2Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p2
+ αpt
∂Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p
− ρVt(pt, Rt) + Πt(pt, Rt) = 0 (4.5.17)
The particular solution to this non-homogeneous diﬀerential equation is:
Vt(pt, Rt) = B1(Rt)p
β1
t + C2(Rt)p
β2
t + sRt
(
(1− ψ)pt
ρ− α −
c+ τRt
ρ
)
(4.5.18)
At the time of the initial investment, the interpretation of (4.5.18) is the following.
The last term is the expected present value of the proﬁt the intermediary would get if
he kept the number of farmers constant at the level Rt forever. C2(Rt)p
β2
t is the value
of his options to suspend some farmers in the future. Finally, B1(Rt)p
β1
t is the value of
the intermediary's options to install more farmers in the future, that is to expand the
collection area further than Rt. There is no reason to incur an investment cost only to
keep some farmers idle for some time. Thus, we can assume that the farmers initially
included are also active. This is why the option to activate some farmers is not taken
into account in (4.5.18).
We look for the threshold price p∗(R) above which (pt > p∗(R)) it is optimal to
invest in the project. The value matching condition indicates that at the threshold
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price p∗(R) the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between investing in a project of size R, and not
investing, that is keeping the option to invest, deﬁned, as before, by (4.2.10): F (p∗(R)) =
V (p∗(R), R)− κR− I. The smooth pasting condition is given by ∂F (p∗(R))
∂p
= ∂V (p
∗(R),R)
∂p
.
From (4.2.10) and (4.5.18), we have:
A1p
β1 = B1(R)p
β1 + C2(R)p
β2 + sR
(
(1− ψ)p
ρ− α −
c+ τR
ρ
)
− κR− I (4.5.19)
β1A1p
β1−1 = β1B1(R)pβ1−1 + β2C2(R)pβ2−1 + sR
(1− ψ)
ρ− α (4.5.20)
Using (4.5.19) and (4.5.20), p∗(R) is implicitly deﬁned by:
Z(p(R)) ≡ β1 − β2
β1
C2(R)p
β2 + sR
(
β1 − 1
β1
(1− ψ)
ρ− α p−
c+ τR
ρ
)
− κR− I = 0 (4.5.21)
where C2(R) =
∫ R
0
c2(z)dz where c2(.) is deﬁned by (4.5.9).
As β1 − β2 > 0, β1 > 0 and C2(R) > 0, comparing (4.5.21) with (4.2.13), it can be
seen that this threshold p∗(R) is lower than the one previously obtained, for any given
R, as (4.2.13) is obtained by setting C2(R) = 0 in (4.5.21). The intermediary is willing
to invest sooner, knowing that he has the possibility to suspend the furthest farmers if
they become unproﬁtable.
Investment strategy
The threshold for investment, for any given size, is given by Z(p(R)) = 0 deﬁned
by (4.5.21), while the optimal size, for any given market price is given by Q(p(R)) = 0
deﬁned by (4.5.15). The solution to this system of two equations in the two unknowns p
and R gives us p∗ and R∗, that are the threshold price for the initial investment and the
initial optimal size. The ﬁrst time the price p reaches this threshold p∗, it is optimal to
invest in a collection area of size R∗.
Using the implicit function theorem on (4.5.21), we have: dp
∗(R)
dR
= −∂Z(p(R))/∂R
∂Z(p(R))/∂p
.
Using (4.5.15), we have that ∂Z(p(R))
∂R
= Q(p(R)). As, at the optimum R∗, Q(p(R∗)) has
to be equal to zero, we have that the numerator of the above derivative is zero. From
this result, one may expect that the result obtained before still holds, that is: R∗ is such
that p∗(R) is minimized. If this is true, then p∗ is lower when the option to suspend the
size is taken into account (compared to (4.2.20)). Indeed, as p∗(R) is lower for any given
R (as shown in (4.5.21)), and R∗ is at the minimum of p∗(R) then p∗ = p∗(R∗) is also
lower.
4.D Appendix D: Elastic supply function
Assume that the farmer's supply function is increasing in the price received. For
simplicity, we assume it follows the linear function s(wt) = −a + bwt where wt is the
price paid by the intermediary at period t while a ≥ 0 and b > 0 are given.
134
The intermediary's operating proﬁt is given by:
Π(pt, Rt) = (−a+ bwt)Rt (pt − c− wt − τRt)) (4.5.22)
The price wt is endogenously determined at each period by the intermediary as a
function of the current output market price, in order to maximize proﬁt:
∂Π(pt, Rt)
∂wt
= 0⇔ wt = 1
2
(
pt − c− τRt + a
b
)
(4.5.23)
Substituting (4.5.23) in (4.5.22), the intermediary's operating proﬁt is given by:
Π(pt, Rt) =
bRt
4
(
pt − c− τRt − a
b
)2
(4.5.24)
Threshold for initial investment p∗(R)
From (4.5.24), the diﬀerential equation (4.2.4) can be written as:
1
2
σ2p2t
∂2Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p2
+αpt
∂Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p
−ρVt(pt, Rt)+ bRt
4
(
pt − c− τRt − a
b
)2
= 0 (4.5.25)
The particular solution to this is given by:
Vt(pt, Rt) = B1(Rt)p
β1
t +
bRt
4(ρ− 2α− σ2)p
2
t−
bRt(c+ τRt + (a/b))
2(ρ− α) pt+
bRt(c+ τRt + (a/b))
2
4ρ
(4.5.26)
Note that the coeﬃcient corresponding to the negative root is zero as the likelihood to
increase the size becomes very small when p goes to zero.
We look for the threshold price p∗(R) above which it is optimal to invest in the project.
The value matching condition indicates that at the threshold price p∗(R) the ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent between investing in a project of size R, and not investing, that is keeping the
option to invest, deﬁned, as before, by (4.2.10): F (p∗(R)) = V (p∗(R), R)− κR− I. The
smooth pasting condition is given by ∂F (p
∗(R))
∂p
= ∂V (p
∗(R),R)
∂p
. From (4.2.10) and (4.5.26),
we have:
A1p
β1 = B1(R)p
β1+
bR
4(ρ− 2α− σ2)p
2−bR(c+ τR + (a/b))
2(ρ− α) p+
bR(c+ τR + (a/b))2
4ρ
−κR−I
(4.5.27)
β1A1p
β1−1 = β1B1(R)pβ1−1 +
bR
2(ρ− 2α− σ2)p−
bR(c+ τR + (a/b))
2(ρ− α) (4.5.28)
From (4.5.27) and (4.5.28), we have that p∗(R) is implicitly deﬁned by:
Z(p(R)) ≡
β1 − 2
β1
bR
4(ρ− 2α− σ2)p
2−β1 − 1
β1
bR(c+ τR + (a/b))
2(ρ− α) p+
bR(c+ τR + (a/b))2
4ρ
−κR−I = 0
(4.5.29)
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Threshold curve p#(R)
We look for the successive thresholds p#(R) that must be reached to extend the
size until the successive R. These thresholds satisfy two boundary conditions, a value
matching condition given by ∂Vt(pt, Rt)/∂R = κ and a smooth pasting condition is given
by ∂2Vt(pt, Rt)/∂R∂p = 0. From (4.5.26), this is equivalent to
∂B1(R)
∂R
pβ1 +
b
4(ρ− 2α− σ2)p
2 − b(c+ 2τR + (a/b))
2(ρ− α) p
+
b(c+ τR + (a/b))2
4ρ
+
bτR(c+ τR + (a/b))
2ρ
= κ (4.5.30)
β1
∂B1(R)
∂R
pβ1−1 +
b
2(ρ− 2α− σ2)p−
b(c+ 2τRt + (a/b))
2(ρ− α) = 0 (4.5.31)
From (4.5.30) and (4.5.31), we have that p#(R) is implicitly deﬁned by:
Q(p(R)) ≡ β1 − 2
β1
b
4(ρ− 2α− σ2)p
2 − β1 − 1
β1
b(c+ 2τR + (a/b))
2(ρ− α) p
+
b(c+ τR + (a/b))2
4ρ
+
bτR(c+ τR + (a/b))
2ρ
− κ = 0 (4.5.32)
Investment strategy
The threshold for investment, for any given size, is given by p∗(R) deﬁned by (4.5.29),
while the optimal size, for any given market price is given by p#(R) deﬁned by (4.5.32).
The solution to this system of two equations in the two unknowns p and R gives us p∗
and R∗, that are the threshold price for the initial investment and the initial optimal
size. Above which this threshold it is optimal to invest in a project of size R∗.
Using the implicit function theorem on (4.5.29), we have: dp
∗(R)
dR
= −∂Z(p(R))/∂R
∂Z(p(R))/∂p
.
Using (4.5.32), we have that ∂Z(p(R))
∂R
= Q(p(R)). As, at the optimum R∗, Q(p(R∗)) has
to be equal to zero, we have that the numerator of the above derivative is zero. Numerical
simulations show that, as before, R∗ is such that p∗(R) is minimized.
4.E Appendix E: Alternative collection cost function
Hereafter we assume a more general function for the collection cost, precisely T (Rt) =
τRγt with γ > 0. This function covers the cases of convex (γ > 1) and concave (γ < 1)
transport costs. When γ = 1, the transport cost is linear, such that the previous analysis
is a speciﬁc case of the following analysis.
Threshold for initial investment p∗(R)
With T (Rt) = τR
γ
t , the diﬀerential equation (4.2.4) can be written as:
1
2
σ2p2t
∂2Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p2
+ αpt
∂Vt(pt, Rt)
∂p
− ρVt(pt, Rt) + sRt ((1− ψ)pt − c− τRγt ) = 0 = 0
(4.5.33)
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The particular solution to this is given by:
Vt(pt, Rt) = B1(Rt)p
β1
t + sRt
(
(1− ψ)pt
ρ− α −
c+ τRγt
ρ
)
(4.5.34)
Note that the coeﬃcient corresponding to the negative root is zero as the likelihood to
increase the size becomes very small when p goes to zero.
We look for the threshold price p∗(R) above which it is optimal to invest in the project.
The value matching condition indicates that at the threshold price p∗(R) the ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent between investing in a project of size R, and not investing, that is keeping the
option to invest, deﬁned, as before, by (4.2.10): F (p∗(R)) = V (p∗(R), R)− κR− I. The
smooth pasting condition is given by ∂F (p
∗(R))
∂p
= ∂V (p
∗(R),R)
∂p
. From (4.2.10) and (4.5.34),
we have:
A1p
β1 = B1(R)p
β1 + sR
(
(1− ψ)p
ρ− α −
c+ τRγ
ρ
)
− κR− I (4.5.35)
β1A1p
β1−1 = β1B1(R)pβ1−1 + sR
1− ψ
ρ− α (4.5.36)
From (4.5.35) and (4.5.36), we have that p∗(R) is deﬁned by:
p∗(R) =
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)
(
κ
s
+
c
ρ
+
τRγ
ρ
+
I
sR
)
(4.5.37)
One may note that p∗(R) is increasing in γ. When the collection costs are convex,
the intermediary waits longer before investing in the project for any given size, compared
to the linear case. Indeed, he incurs an additional cost compared to the case of linear
collection costs. When collection costs are concave, the intermediary is able to invest
sooner.
Threshold curve p#(R)
We look for the successive thresholds p#(R) that must be reached to extend the
size until the successive R. These thresholds satisfy two boundary conditions, a value
matching condition given by ∂Vt(pt, Rt)/∂R = κ and a smooth pasting condition is given
by ∂2Vt(pt, Rt)/∂R∂p = 0. From (4.5.34), this is equivalent to
∂B1(R)
∂R
pβ1 + s
(
(1− ψ)p
ρ− α −
c
ρ
− (1 + γ)τR
γ
ρ
)
= κ (4.5.38)
β1
∂B1(R)
∂R
pβ1−1 +
s(1− ψ)
ρ− α = 0 (4.5.39)
From (4.5.38) and (4.5.39), we have that p#(R) is deﬁned by:
p#(R) =
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)
(
κ
s
+
c
ρ
+
(1 + γ)τRγ
ρ
)
(4.5.40)
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One may note that p#(R) is increasing in γ. When the collection costs are convex, the
intermediary waits longer before including an additional farmer, compared to the linear
case, as the cost incurred for collecting the product at this location is larger. When
collection costs are concave, the intermediary is able to include this additional farmer
sooner.
Investment strategy
The threshold for investment, for any given size, is given by p∗(R) deﬁned by (4.5.37),
while the optimal size, for any given market price is given by p#(R) deﬁned by (4.5.40).
The solution to this system of two equations in the two unknowns p and R gives us p∗
and R∗, that are the threshold price for the initial investment and the initial optimal
size. Above this threshold it is optimal to invest in a project of size R∗. Precisely,
R∗ =
(
ρI
γτs
) 1
γ+1
(4.5.41)
p∗ =
β1(ρ− α)
(β1 − 1)(1− ψ)
(
κ
s
+
c
ρ
+
(1 + γ)τ
ρ
(
ρI
γτs
) γ
γ+1
)
(4.5.42)
As expected, R∗ is smaller and p∗ is higher when γ is larger. When the collection
costs are convex (resp. concave), the intermediary invests later (resp. sooner), in a
smaller (resp. larger) collection area, compared to the linear case. One may check that,
for any value of γ > 0, R∗ is such that p∗(R) (deﬁned by (4.5.37)) is minimized.
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